Brahma Sutras

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

athāto brahmajijñāsā || 1 ||

Now, therefore, [one should undertake] the inquiry into Brahman (the ultimate, non-dual reality that is the source of the universe). 'Now' signals that this inquiry follows upon prior Vedic study and the fourfold qualification (discernment of the eternal from the transient, dispassion, the sixfold discipline of self-control, and longing for liberation, mokṣa — final release from bondage); 'therefore' gives the reason — ritual action (karma) yields only impermanent results, while knowledge (jñāna) of Brahman yields the supreme good.

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥

janmādyasya yataḥ || 2 ||

[Brahman is] that from which the origination, subsistence, and dissolution of this [universe] proceed. This defines Brahman by its being the omniscient, omnipotent cause from which the whole world arises, in which it rests, and into which it finally dissolves.

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

śāstrayonitvāt || 3 ||

[Brahman is known] because scripture (śāstra, i.e. the Veda) is its wellspring — the Vedas themselves are said to issue forth from Brahman, evidencing its omniscience, and correspondingly scripture, not ordinary perception or inference, is the sole valid means of knowing such a transcendent cause.

तत् तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

tat tu samanvayāt || 4 ||

That [Brahman defined above] is indeed what Vedānta (the Upanishadic portions of the Veda) teaches throughout, because [its] many passages, though found in different contexts, converge (samanvaya) in harmonious agreement upon this one Brahman as their common purport. This coherence gives the present book its name, Samanvaya.

ईक्षतेर् नाशब्दम् ॥ ५ ॥

īkṣater nāśabdam || 5 ||

Because of the [scriptural] word 'seeing' or 'thinking' (īkṣaṇa) — applied to Being (sat) in the Chandogya Upanishad's account of creation — [the cause of the world is] not the unconscious [pradhāna, Sāṅkhya's insentient primal matter], since thinking cannot be the act of anything but a conscious being.

गौणश् चेन् नात्मशब्दात् ॥ ६ ॥

gauṇaś cen nātmaśabdāt || 6 ||

If it be objected that this 'seeing' is used only in a figurative (secondary) sense — that objection fails, because the same Being is elsewhere in the passage called 'ātman' (self, glossed here as the innermost conscious essence); and the word ātman is never used of anything insentient.

तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥

tanniṣṭhasya mokṣopadeśāt || 7 ||

And [the cause is Brahman, not the unconscious pradhāna], because liberation (mokṣa) is taught for one who abides steadfast in it — teaching mokṣa in connection with an insentient principle would be pointless.

हेयत्वावचनाच् च ॥ ८ ॥

heyatvāvacanāc ca || 8 ||

And because [the text] nowhere states that Sat is to be abandoned — whereas in the Sāṅkhya system pradhāna is precisely what must be discriminated away from and renounced for liberation; here Sat is presented as the goal to be attained, not relinquished.

प्रतिज्ञाविरोधात् ॥ ९ ॥

pratijñāvirodhāt || 9 ||

And because otherwise the opening promise [of Chandogya 6.1.3, 'by knowing which everything becomes known'] would be contradicted — an insentient pradhāna could not account for conscious effects like intellect, so only a conscious, all-encompassing cause fulfills that promise.

स्वाप्ययात् ॥ १० ॥

svāpyayāt || 10 ||

And because [scripture states that in deep sleep] one merges into one's own [Sat] — showing that Sat is the individual's own innermost self, not some external unconscious principle.

गतिसामान्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

gatisāmānyāt || 11 ||

And because of the uniformity of [scripture's] teaching regarding the [soul's ultimate] destiny — various Upanishadic passages consistently describe the departed or liberated self as going to one and the same all-pervading Being, confirming that a single conscious Brahman, not many discrete pradhānas, is meant.

श्रुतत्वाच् च ॥ १२ ॥

śrutatvāc ca || 12 ||

And because this [the sentient cause's status as Brahman] is also directly declared elsewhere in śruti (revealed scripture, the Veda) — so the conclusion rests on direct textual statement, not on inference alone. This closes the section (adhikaraṇa) establishing, against the Sāṅkhya pradhāna theory, that the world's cause is the conscious Brahman.

आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ॥ १३ ॥

ānandamayo'bhyāsāt || 13 ||

[Topic: whether the 'one made of bliss' (ānandamaya) of the Taittiriya Upanishad is Brahman] Ānandamaya is the Supreme Self, because of the repeated occurrence (abhyāsa) of the word 'bliss' [in that passage] — such repetition shows the term denotes Brahman's own essentially blissful nature, not merely a passing sheath (kośa) of bliss.

विकारशब्दान् नेति चेन् न प्राचुर्यात् ॥ १४ ॥

vikāraśabdān neti cen na prācuryāt || 14 ||

If it be objected that the suffix '-maya' denotes a modification/product [as in 'annamaya', made of food] — hence Ānandamaya would be a mere effect (kośa), not the unchanging Brahman — that objection fails, because '-maya' can also denote abundance; 'ānandamaya' thus means 'abounding in bliss', i.e. Brahman itself, full of bliss.

तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच् च ॥ १५ ॥

taddhetuvyapadeśāc ca || 15 ||

And because [scripture] speaks of [Brahman] as the source of that [Ānandamaya's] bliss — showing the bliss of Ānandamaya derives from Brahman's own nature, confirming continuity of reference to the one Brahman throughout the passage.

मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते ॥ १६ ॥

māntravarṇikameva ca gīyate || 16 ||

And that which is celebrated in the [earlier] Mantra portion [the Taittiriya hymn 'satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma' — Brahman as truth, knowledge, infinitude] is indeed the very same [Brahman] being sung of here [in the Anandamaya passage, 'the self further within is made of bliss'] — both portions of the text point to one and the same Brahman.

नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ १७ ॥

netaro'nupapatteḥ || 17 ||

[Ānandamaya] is not the other [i.e. the individual soul, jīva, glossed as the transmigrating self], because that reading would be untenable — the qualities described (being the source and support of all beings' bliss) cannot fit the limited jīva.

भेदव्यपदेशाच् च ॥ १८ ॥

bhedavyapadeśāc ca || 18 ||

And because of [the text's] statement of difference — the terms 'dear', 'joy', 'great joy' etc. are described as Ānandamaya's own limbs (head, right and left sides), distinguishing it from the ordinary jīva who seeks it out — confirming Ānandamaya is the Supreme Self, other than the seeking jīva.

कामाच् च नानुमानापेक्षा ॥ १९ ॥

kāmāc ca nānumānāpekṣā || 19 ||

And because of [the text's mention of] desire — 'he desired, may I become many, may I be born forth' — an act identical to the desire attributed to Sat/Brahman in the creation accounts elsewhere; hence there is no need to fall back on inference [to construe this as insentient pradhāna, which cannot desire]; the direct wording itself settles it.

अस्मिन्न् अस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति ॥ २० ॥

asminn asya ca tadyogaṁ śāsti || 20 ||

And [scripture] teaches, within this very [Ānandamaya passage], the union (yoga, i.e. realized oneness) of this [individual self] with THAT [Brahman] — confirming Ānandamaya as Brahman, since the text's culmination teaches the seeker's attainment of oneness with it here. This closes the Ānandamaya section.

अन्तस् तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ॥ २१ ॥

antas taddharmopadeśāt || 21 ||

[Topic: the 'one within' (antar) the sun and the eye] The golden Person seen within the sun and within the eye [is Brahman], because attributes proper to Brahman (such as freedom from sin) are taught of it.

भेदव्यपदेशाच् चान्यः ॥ २२ ॥

bhedavyapadeśāc cānyaḥ || 22 ||

And it is other [than the ordinary jīva or any lesser deity], because of [scripture's] explicit statement of difference — it is described as distinct from embodied beings, all-pervading and untouched by evil. This closes the first Antar section.

आकाशस् तल्लिङ्गात् ॥ २३ ॥

ākāśas talliṅgāt || 23 ||

[Topic: 'ākāśa' (ether/space) as Brahman] Ākāśa — of which Chandogya says 'from this indeed all beings arise' — is Brahman, because it bears the marks (liṅga) of Brahman, namely being the origin and support of all beings, as defined in sūtra 1.1.2.

अत एव प्राणः ॥ २४ ॥

ata eva prāṇaḥ || 24 ||

For the very same reason, Prāṇa (the vital principle, spoken of elsewhere as 'prāṇo brahma') too [is Brahman] — the same marks of being the source and support of all are found in its case.

ज्योतिश् चरणाभिधानात् ॥ २५ ॥

jyotiś caraṇābhidhānāt || 25 ||

[Topic: 'jyotis' (light) as Brahman] The light spoken of [in Chandogya 3.13.7] as shining higher than heaven is Brahman, because of the mention of 'feet' (caraṇa) — linking this passage to the preceding Gāyatrī section, where Gāyatrī's cosmic 'feet' are ultimately identified with Brahman.

छन्दोऽभिधानान् नेति चेन् न तथा चेतोऽर्पणनिगदात् तथा हि दर्शनम् ॥ २६ ॥

chando'bhidhānān neti cen na tathā ceto'rpaṇanigadāt tathā hi darśanam || 26 ||

If it be objected that this refers merely to the Vedic meter (chandas, i.e. Gāyatrī itself) rather than Brahman — that fails, because the meter is invoked as a support for fixing the mind (a device of meditative worship, upāsanā) upon Brahman; such usage is seen elsewhere in scripture too.

भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश् चैवम् ॥ २७ ॥

bhūtādipādavyapadeśopapatteś caivam || 27 ||

And this is confirmed since the description of Gāyatrī's 'feet' as [cosmic] beings (earth, atmosphere, heaven, and a fourth, transcendent foot) is fitting only if the ultimate referent is Brahman — an ordinary meter has no such cosmic dimensions.

उपदेशभेदान् नेति चेन् नोभयस्मिन्न् अप्य् अविरोधात् ॥ २८ ॥

upadeśabhedān neti cen nobhayasminn apy avirodhāt || 28 ||

If it be objected that a difference in the teaching [across recensions] rules out Brahman — that fails, because there is no real contradiction in either version; both point to the same Brahman. This closes the Jyotiścaraṇa section.

प्राणस् तथानुगमात् ॥ २९ ॥

prāṇas tathānugamāt || 29 ||

[Topic: Prāṇa in Indra's teaching to Pratardana, Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad] Prāṇa here too is Brahman, in the same way [as established in 1.1.24] — because attributes fitting Brahman run consistently through the whole passage.

न वक्तुर् आत्मोपदेशाद् इति चेद् अध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा ह्य् अस्मिन् ॥ ३० ॥

na vaktur ātmopadeśād iti ced adhyātmasaṁbandhabhūmā hy asmin || 30 ||

If it be objected that this teaching concerns only the speaker (Indra) himself [self-glorification by a deity, not a teaching of Brahman] — that fails, because there is abundant connection with matters of the inner Self (adhyātma) in this passage, showing its subject is the inner Self, not some external deity.

शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ॥ ३१ ॥

śāstradṛṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmadevavat || 31 ||

But the teaching, though phrased in the first person ('know me'), is from the standpoint of scriptural insight [i.e. realized wisdom, not egotism] — like the sage Vāmadeva, who upon self-realization declared 'I was Manu, I was the sun.'

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान् नेति चेन् नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वाद् इह तद्योगात् ॥ ३२ ॥

jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṅgān neti cen nopāsātraividhyādāśritatvād iha tadyogāt || 32 ||

If it be objected that marks of the individual soul (jīva) and the chief vital breath (mukhya prāṇa) appear in this passage, so it cannot be Brahman — that fails, because positing a threefold meditative worship (upāsanā — jīva, prāṇa, and Brahman all at once) within one continuous passage would be incoherent; rather, since both the opening and closing of the passage point to union with THAT [Brahman], it is Brahman that is to be relied upon (āśrita) here. This closes Pāda 1.

सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

sarvatra prasiddhopadeśāt || 1 ||

[Topic: the being dwelling within the heart, 'to be sought and inquired into' (Chandogya 8.1)] That being is Brahman, because it is taught with attributes that are famously ascribed to Brahman everywhere in the Upanishads.

विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश् च ॥ २ ॥

vivakṣitaguṇopapatteś ca || 2 ||

And because the qualities intended here — true desire, freedom from evil, and the like — are fitting only for Brahman, not for any lesser being.

अनुपपत्तेस् तु न शारीरः ॥ ३ ॥

anupapattes tu na śārīraḥ || 3 ||

But, because such qualities would be untenable [in a limited being], [the being spoken of] is not the embodied soul (jīva).

कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच् च ॥ ४ ॥

karmakartṛvyapadeśāc ca || 4 ||

And because [the text] speaks of it in terms both of the object [sought] and the agent [seeking/directing] — such a dual role befits only Brahman, the innermost Self of the seeker, not a separate embodied jīva.

शब्दविशेषात् ॥ ५ ॥

śabdaviśeṣāt || 5 ||

And because of a peculiarity of the [scriptural] wording used, which specifically marks the referent as Brahman.

स्मृतेश् च ॥ ६ ॥

smṛteś ca || 6 ||

And because smṛti (secondary tradition-texts, such as the Bhagavad Gītā) likewise corroborates that the innermost dweller of the heart is the Supreme Lord.

अर्भकौस्त्वात् तद्व्यपदेशाच् च नेति चेन् न निचाय्यत्वाद् एवं व्योमवच् च ॥ ७ ॥

arbhakaustvāt tadvyapadeśāc ca neti cen na nicāyyatvād evaṁ vyomavac ca || 7 ||

If it be objected that describing it as 'smaller than a grain of rice or barley' rules out Brahman — that fails, because this smallness points to its subtlety (something to be discerned through refined insight), and the same passage also describes it, like space (vyoma), as greater than all the worlds — both descriptions befitting Brahman, subtle yet all-pervading.

संभोगप्राप्तिर् इति चेन् न वैशेष्यात् ॥ ८ ॥

saṁbhogaprāptir iti cen na vaiśeṣyāt || 8 ||

If it be objected that [describing dream-experiences etc.] means it is merely the enjoying jīva — that fails, because of a distinguishing feature: it is also ascribed attributes such as freedom from evil, not found in the ordinary experiencer. This closes the Sarvatra-Prasiddhi section.

अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् ॥ ९ ॥

attā carācaragrahaṇāt || 9 ||

[Topic: the 'eater' (attā) of Kaṭha Upaniṣad, who consumes all creatures with death as a condiment] The Eater is Brahman, because it encompasses moving and unmoving creatures alike — a universal scope befitting only Brahman, not any lesser deity.

प्रकरणाच् च ॥ १० ॥

prakaraṇāc ca || 10 ||

And because of the context (prakaraṇa) of the passage, which throughout concerns Brahman as its topic. This closes the Attā section.

गुहां प्रविष्टाव् आत्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ११ ॥

guhāṁ praviṣṭāv ātmānau hi taddarśanāt || 11 ||

[Topic: the 'two who have entered the cave' of the heart, Kaṭha 1.3.1] The two entered into the cave [likened to shadow and light] are indeed the individual soul (jīva) and the Supreme Self (Brahman, here as Īśvara — the Lord), because this same distinction is seen elsewhere, as in the 'two birds on one tree' passage.

विशेषणाच् च ॥ १२ ॥

viśeṣaṇāc ca || 12 ||

And because of the [distinct] qualifying epithets given to each — one enjoying the fruits of past deeds (the jīva), the other a mere unaffected witness (Īśvara) — confirming two distinct referents are meant. This closes the Guhāpraviṣṭa section.

अन्तर उपपत्तेः ॥ १३ ॥

antara upapatteḥ || 13 ||

[Topic: a second 'one within' — the person seen in the eye, Chandogya 4.15.1] The person seen within the eye is Brahman, because attributing Brahman's qualities to it is logically fitting.

स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच् च ॥ १४ ॥

sthānādivyapadeśāc ca || 14 ||

And because of the description of its abode etc. — its reach extending 'up to the world of Brahman' and free movement through all worlds — fitting only the Supreme Self.

सुखविशिष्टाभिधानाद् एव च ॥ १५ ॥

sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānād eva ca || 15 ||

And precisely because it is described as characterized by supreme, unsurpassed happiness — such unqualified bliss befits Brahman alone.

अत एव च स ब्रह्म ॥ १६ ॥

ata eva ca sa brahma || 16 ||

And for this very reason, that [person within the eye] is Brahman.

श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधानाच् च ॥ १७ ॥

śrutopaniṣatkagatyabhidhānāc ca || 17 ||

And because of the mention of the [boundless] destiny of one who has learned this esoteric teaching (upaniṣad) — such a result befits only knowledge of Brahman.

अनवस्थितेर् असंभवाच् च नेतरः ॥ १८ ॥

anavasthiter asaṁbhavāc ca netaraḥ || 18 ||

And it is not the other [i.e. a mere optical reflection], because a reflection is inconstant, and it would be impossible for it to possess the described attributes. This closes the second Antara section.

अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् ॥ १९ ॥

antaryāmyadhidaivādhilokādiṣu taddharmavyapadeśāt || 19 ||

[Topic: the Inner Ruler (Antaryāmin), Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.7] The Antaryāmin, present within the deities, the worlds, and all else, is Brahman, because Brahman's own attributes are declared of it.

न च स्मार्तम् अतद्धर्माभिलापाच् छारीरश् च ॥ २० ॥

na ca smārtam ataddharmābhilāpāc chārīraś ca || 20 ||

And it is neither the pradhāna [the primal matter] known from the Sāṅkhya smṛti, since that system's attributes are not stated of it, nor is it the embodied soul.

शारीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते ॥ २१ ॥

śārīraścobhaye'pi hi bhedenainamadhīyate || 21 ||

And the embodied soul is, in both recensions [of this Upanishad], explicitly read as distinct from the Antaryāmin — confirming that the Antaryāmin is the Supreme Self, not the jīva. This closes the Antaryāmin section.

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः ॥ २२ ॥

adṛśyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ || 22 ||

[Topic: the imperceptible (adṛśya) Imperishable (akṣara), Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.8] The Imperishable, described with qualities of invisibility and the like, is Brahman, because [further] attributes proper to Brahman — such as ruling sun and moon — are also declared of it.

विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ ॥ २३ ॥

viśeṣaṇabhedavyapadeśābhyāṁ ca netarau || 23 ||

And it is not either of the other two [pradhāna or jīva], because both its distinguishing qualifications and scripture's explicit statement of difference exclude those readings.

रूपोपन्यासाच् च ॥ २४ ॥

rūpopanyāsāc ca || 24 ||

And because the presentation of its nature accords with this conclusion. This closes the Adṛśyatva section.

वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ॥ २५ ॥

vaiśvānaraḥ sādhāraṇaśabdaviśeṣāt || 25 ||

[Topic: Vaiśvānara, Chandogya 5.11-18] Vaiśvānara — though the term ordinarily denotes common or digestive fire — is Brahman here, because of the specific, distinguishing use of this otherwise general term in this passage.

स्मर्यमाणम् अनुमानं स्याद् इति ॥ २६ ॥

smaryamāṇam anumānaṁ syād iti || 26 ||

(Objection stated) It might be argued that Vaiśvānara here is simply the ordinary fire known from smṛti (tradition), so identifying it with Brahman would be a mere inference, not a direct scriptural teaching.

शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच् च नेति चेन् न तथा दृष्ट्युपदेशाद् असम्भवात् पुरुषमपि चैनम् अधीयते ॥ २७ ॥

śabdādibhyo'ntaḥpratiṣṭhānāc ca neti cen na tathā dṛṣṭyupadeśād asambhavāt puruṣamapi cainam adhīyate || 27 ||

If it be objected that the term and its abode within the body rule out Brahman — that fails, because scripture teaches it to be perceived in a cosmic manner [head as heaven, eye as sun, etc.], which would be impossible for ordinary fire; moreover it is also spoken of there as a Person (puruṣa).

अत एव न देवता भूतं च ॥ २८ ॥

ata eva na devatā bhūtaṁ ca || 28 ||

For this very reason, Vaiśvānara is neither [merely] a deity nor [merely] a physical element — its described attributes exceed what either could account for.

साक्षाद् अप्य् अविरोधं जैमिनिः ॥ २९ ॥

sākṣād apy avirodhaṁ jaiminiḥ || 29 ||

Ācārya Jaimini holds that there is no contradiction even in understanding this [identification of Vaiśvānara's limbs with cosmic entities] directly/literally, without figurative qualification.

अभिव्यक्तेर् इत्य् आश्मरथ्यः ॥ ३० ॥

abhivyakter ity āśmarathyaḥ || 30 ||

Ācārya Āśmarathya holds this is because of manifestation — Brahman becomes especially manifest through these cosmic forms.

अनुस्मृतेर् बादरिः ॥ ३१ ॥

anusmṛter bādariḥ || 31 ||

Ācārya Bādari holds it is for repeated recollection (anusmṛti) — the identification of limbs with cosmic entities serves as an aid to sustained meditation on Brahman.

संपत्तेर् इति जैमिनिस् तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ३२ ॥

saṁpatter iti jaiminis tathā hi darśayati || 32 ||

Jaimini [again] holds it is because of 'attainment' (sampatti — the cosmic entities being drawn into or realized as Vaiśvānara in meditation); scripture itself shows it in this way.

आमनन्ति चैनम् अस्मिन् ॥ ३३ ॥

āmananti cainam asmin || 33 ||

And [scriptural] texts also teach this Vaiśvānara/Brahman as present, to be worshipped, within this very [individual body] — 'this fire Vaiśvānara that is here, within a person.' This closes the Vaiśvānara section and Pāda 2.

द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ॥ १ ॥

dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ svaśabdāt || 1 ||

[Topic: the support (āyatana) of heaven, earth, etc.] The support in which heaven, earth, and the intermediate space are 'woven' [Muṇḍaka 2.2.5] is Brahman, because scripture itself explicitly names it 'Brahman' — no inference is needed.

मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशाच् च ॥ २ ॥

muktopasṛpyavyapadeśāc ca || 2 ||

And because it is described as that which is approached by the liberated — an attribute fitting only Brahman as the final resort of liberated souls.

नानुमानम् अतच्छब्दात् प्राणभृच् च ॥ ३ ॥

nānumānam atacchabdāt prāṇabhṛc ca || 3 ||

This is not [merely] established by inference [as Sāṅkhya's insentient pradhāna], because the text uses no word suggesting pradhāna; and [this support] is also 'possessed of life' (prāṇabhṛt) — impossible for the unconscious pradhāna, but fitting for Brahman, the living source of all.

Note: Wikisource labels an additional short variant sutra here as ‘ब्रसू-१,३.३(१)’, text ‘प्राणभृच्च।’ (= the final two words of this sutra repeated as a separate sub-numbered entry). Treated as an alternate/variant sub-reading noted by the source rather than an independent sutra in this project's sequential numbering (per the ±1 numbering-variance policy), so it is not assigned its own verse; recorded here for transparency.

भेदव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४ ॥

bhedavyapadeśāt || 4 ||

And because of [scripture's] statement of difference — this support is described as distinct from, and superior to, heaven and earth themselves.

प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

prakaraṇāt || 5 ||

And because of the context (prakaraṇa) — the surrounding passage is throughout concerned with Brahman.

स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च ॥ ६ ॥

sthityadanābhyāṁ ca || 6 ||

And because [the immediately following verse, the famous 'two birds on one tree' image] distinguishes it by abiding (sthiti, merely witnessing) as against eating (adana, experiencing) — the bird that merely abides, without eating the fruit, is Brahman, confirming the support's identity as Brahman. This closes the Dyubhvādi section.

भूमा संप्रसादाद् अध्युपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥

bhūmā saṁprasādād adhyupadeśāt || 7 ||

[Topic: the Bhūman/Infinite, Chandogya 7.23-24, Sanatkumāra's teaching to Nārada] The Bhūman is taught as beyond the tranquil self of deep sleep (saṃprasāda) discussed just before it, because the text expressly teaches its superiority over that.

धर्मोपपत्तेश् च ॥ ८ ॥

dharmopapatteś ca || 8 ||

And because the attributes described there — infinite bliss, all-pervasiveness — fit only Brahman. This closes the Bhūman section.

अक्षरम् अम्बरान्तधृतेः ॥ ९ ॥

akṣaram ambarāntadhṛteḥ || 9 ||

[Topic: the Imperishable (akṣara), Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.8.8] The Imperishable is Brahman, because it holds [heaven, earth, and] everything up to the ether together — an all-supporting power fitting only Brahman.

सा च प्रशासनात् ॥ १० ॥

sā ca praśāsanāt || 10 ||

And that [Akṣara is Brahman is confirmed] because it is spoken of in terms of ruling/commanding all — sun and moon stand apart under its rule alone.

अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ॥ ११ ॥

anyabhāvavyāvṛtteśca || 11 ||

And because [its description] excludes every other possible nature (not gross, not subtle, and so on) — such apophatic ('not this, not that') description is reserved for Brahman's transcendent nature. This closes the Akṣara section.

ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् सः ॥ १२ ॥

īkṣatikarmavyapadeśāt saḥ || 12 ||

[Topic: continuity of reference] That same [Akṣara/Brahman, just discussed] is also [what is meant in the immediately following passage, the dialogue with Gārgī], because it is referred to there in connection with 'seeing'/being the ultimate seer — showing the subject continues unbroken as Brahman across both passages.

दहर उत्तरेभ्यः ॥ १३ ॥

dahara uttarebhyaḥ || 13 ||

[Topic: the famous Dahara-vidyā, the tiny (dahara) space within the heart's lotus, Chandogya 8.1.1] This small space is Brahman, because the subsequent passages describe it with attributes proper to Brahman — encompassing heaven and earth, being the abode of all desires.

गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथा हि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च ॥ १४ ॥

gatiśabdābhyāṁ tathā hi dṛṣṭaṁ liṅgaṁ ca || 14 ||

And because of both the mention of [the self's] departure [at death] and the [explicit] name 'Brahman' — such an identification is seen similarly elsewhere — along with other supporting marks.

धृतेश् च महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्न् उपलब्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

dhṛteś ca mahimno'syāsminn upalabdheḥ || 15 ||

And because the sustaining of [the entire universe's] greatness is found in it — heaven, earth, fire, air, sun, and moon are all said to be held together within this small space, a capacity fitting only Brahman.

प्रसिद्धेश् च ॥ १६ ॥

prasiddheś ca || 16 ||

And because this [identification of the heart-space with Brahman] is well established/celebrated elsewhere in scripture too.

इतरपरामर्शात् स इति चेन् नासंभवात् ॥ १७ ॥

itaraparāmarśāt sa iti cen nāsaṁbhavāt || 17 ||

If it be objected that a subsequent verse's word 'that' refers back to the jīva discussed just before, so the small space must be jīva — that fails, because it would be impossible for the bound, limited jīva to possess the vast, all-sustaining qualities described.

उत्तराच् चेद् आविर्भूतस्वरूपस् तु ॥ १८ ॥

uttarāc ced āvirbhūtasvarūpas tu || 18 ||

If [it is argued this refers to jīva] because of yet another subsequent passage — [the reply is that this refers to] the jīva whose own true [Brahman-]nature has become manifest [upon liberation], so this too, properly understood, points to Brahman.

अन्यार्थश् च परामर्शः ॥ १९ ॥

anyārthaś ca parāmarśaḥ || 19 ||

And that [earlier] reference [to 'that'] serves quite another purpose [not the identification with the bound jīva].

अल्पश्रुतेर् इति चेत् तद् उक्तम् ॥ २० ॥

alpaśruter iti cet tad uktam || 20 ||

If it be objected that being called 'small' means jīva — that has already been answered [under sūtra 1.2.7, where smallness was shown to denote subtlety, not literal size].

अनुकृतेस् तस्य च ॥ २१ ॥

anukṛtes tasya ca || 21 ||

[Topic: continuation of the Dahara section] And the imitation/reflection of that [Brahman — e.g. a subsequent image of a bridge/dam holding the worlds apart] is also described in the same context, confirming continuity of reference to Brahman.

अपि च स्मर्यते ॥ २२ ॥

api ca smaryate || 22 ||

Moreover, this is also stated in smṛti — Brahman being described there too as a bridge/bank keeping the worlds apart. This closes the Anukṛti section.

शब्दाद् एव प्रमितः ॥ २३ ॥

śabdād eva pramitaḥ || 23 ||

[Topic: the 'thumb-sized' Person of Kaṭha Upaniṣad] From the [scriptural] word alone, [this Self] is rightly known [as Brahman] — no further inference is needed.

हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

hṛdyapekṣayā tu manuṣyādhikāratvāt || 24 ||

But its being called 'thumb-sized' is with reference to the heart [the meditative seat, roughly that size in a human], because this teaching pertains specifically to human beings — it is not a statement of Brahman's actual measure. This closes the Pramita section.

तदुपर्य् अपि बादरायणः संभवात् ॥ २५ ॥

tadupary api bādarāyaṇaḥ saṁbhavāt || 25 ||

[Topic: are gods too qualified for this knowledge?] Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa holds that beyond [the human sphere] too [i.e. gods and other beings are qualified for this knowledge/meditation], because it is possible for them as well.

विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन् नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर् दर्शनात् ॥ २६ ॥

virodhaḥ karmaṇīti cen nānekapratipatter darśanāt || 26 ||

If it be objected that this would conflict with [a deity's cosmic] ritual duty — that fails, because scripture shows that one and the same office can be simultaneously occupied by many [or a single deity can pervade multiple forms at once].

शब्द इति चेन् नातः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ॥ २७ ॥

śabda iti cen nātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣānumānābhyām || 27 ||

If it be objected that this is established merely from [scriptural] words [without adequate corroboration] — that fails, because it arises from that very scripture, confirmed both by direct statement and by inference.

अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ॥ २८ ॥

ata eva ca nityatvam || 28 ||

And for this very reason, the eternality [of the deities, as offices/types rather than specific individuals] is also established.

समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश् च ॥ २९ ॥

samānanāmarūpatvāccāvṛttāvapyavirodho darśanāt smṛteś ca || 29 ||

And because of the sameness of name and form [across cosmic cycles], there is no contradiction even in repeated creation — this is seen directly in both śruti and smṛti.

मध्वादिष्व् असंभवाद् अनधिकारं जैमिनिः ॥ ३० ॥

madhvādiṣv asaṁbhavād anadhikāraṁ jaiminiḥ || 30 ||

[A narrower, technical qualification] Jaimini holds that, in the specific case of the 'madhu' (honey) teaching and similar passages, there is disqualification [of certain classes], because certain features described would be impossible for them.

ज्योतिषि भावाच् च ॥ ३१ ॥

jyotiṣi bhāvāc ca || 31 ||

And because their status is specifically bound up with [the sacrificial] fire (jyotis) in that context.

भावं तु बादरायणोऽस्ति हि ॥ ३२ ॥

bhāvaṁ tu bādarāyaṇo'sti hi || 32 ||

But Ācārya Bādarāyaṇa holds that such eligibility does indeed exist [even in this madhu-vidyā case] — gods are not excluded even here; this settled view (siddhānta) closes the Devatā section.

शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात् तदाद्रवणात् सूच्यते हि ॥ ३३ ॥

śugasya tadanādaraśravaṇāt tadādravaṇāt sūcyate hi || 33 ||

[Topic: eligibility for Vedāntic knowledge — the Raikva story, Chandogya 4] It is indicated by [Janaśruti's] grief on hearing himself called 'śūdra' [by the geese] and by his rushing eagerly toward [the sage Raikva] — neither reaction befits an actual śūdra, who is held ineligible for this knowledge.

क्षत्रियत्वगतेश् च ॥ ३४ ॥

kṣatriyatvagateś ca || 34 ||

And because his status as a kṣatriya (king) is established elsewhere in the narrative.

उत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् ॥ ३५ ॥

uttaratra caitrarathena liṅgāt || 35 ||

And because of the further mark, later in the passage, provided by the mention of [a nobleman associated with] Caitraratha.

संस्कारपरामर्शात् तदभावाभिलापाच् च ॥ ३६ ॥

saṁskāraparāmarśāt tadabhāvābhilāpāc ca || 36 ||

And because of [scripture's] mention of the [Vedic] sacraments [proper to the twice-born] and its explicit statement of their absence in the case of śūdras — confirming that śūdras generally lack eligibility for such knowledge.

तद्भावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

tadbhāvanirdhāraṇe ca pravṛtteḥ || 37 ||

And because scripture is seen elsewhere actively concerned with ascertaining a person's precise caste-status — showing this distinction genuinely matters for eligibility.

श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात् ॥ ३८ ॥

śravaṇādhyayanārthapratiṣedhāt || 38 ||

Because [smṛti] explicitly prohibits śūdras from the purpose of hearing and studying the Veda.

स्मृतेश् च ॥ ३९ ॥

smṛteś ca || 39 ||

And this is also corroborated by smṛti. This closes the Apaśūdra section on eligibility.

कम्पनात् ॥ ४० ॥

kampanāt || 40 ||

[Topic: 'this whole world trembles, having gone forth from Prāṇa... a great fear, an uplifted thunderbolt'] The cause of this cosmic trembling (kampana) is Brahman, not mere wind (as first supposed) — because both the preceding and following context clearly indicate Brahman, and a parallel passage elsewhere states that fire burns, sun shines, and all things function only from fear of Brahman, not from fear of wind alone. This closes the Kampana section.

ज्योतिर् दर्शनात् ॥ ४१ ॥

jyotir darśanāt || 41 ||

[Topic: another 'light' passage] This light too is Brahman, because it is directly perceived/described [with Brahman's characteristic attributes].

आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४२ ॥

ākāśo'rthāntaratvādivyapadeśāt || 42 ||

[Topic: another 'ākāśa' passage] Ākāśa here too is Brahman, because of the statement declaring it to be something distinct from ordinary elemental space, along with other confirming marks.

सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर् भेदेन ॥ ४३ ॥

suṣuptyutkrāntyor bhedena || 43 ||

[Topic: the controller within, in the Ajātaśatru-Bālāki dialogue] This is Brahman, because it is distinguished from the jīva precisely in respect of deep sleep (suṣupti) and departure at death (utkrānti) — the controller remains unaffected through both changing states of the jīva.

पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ॥ ४४ ॥

patyādiśabdebhyaḥ || 44 ||

And because of words such as 'lord' (pati) — the indwelling controller, even in deep sleep, is described as the jīva's ruler, an attribute fitting only Brahman. This closes Pāda 3.

आनुमानिकम् अप्य् एकेषाम् इति चेन् न शरीर-रूपक-विन्यस्त-गृहीतेर् दर्शयति च ॥ १ ॥

ānumānikam apy ekeṣām iti cen na śarīra-rūpaka-vinyasta-gṛhīter darśayati ca || 1 ||

[Topic: does the Kaṭha Upaniṣad's chariot-simile passage teach Sāṅkhya's Pradhāna?] If it be said that 'the Unmanifest' (avyakta) here, according to some, is the inferentially-established Pradhāna of Sāṅkhya (the primal unconscious matter of that school) — that fails, because it is understood as occupying its place within the body-simile (the chariot image structuring the whole passage), and [scripture] elsewhere shows it in the same light — not as Sāṅkhya's independent, insentient principle.

सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

sūkṣmaṁ tu tadarhatvāt || 2 ||

But 'subtle' [here, describing avyakta] refers to the subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra — the fine causal frame underlying the gross body, sthūla śarīra), because that reading fits appropriately within the graded structure of the chariot simile.

तदधीनत्वाद् अर्थवत् ॥ ३ ॥

tadadhīnatvād arthavat || 3 ||

Because that [Avyakta, even as subtle body,] is entirely dependent on THAT [Brahman] — unlike Sāṅkhya's independent Pradhāna — this reading is meaningful within the passage.

ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच् च ॥ ४ ॥

jñeyatvāvacanāc ca || 4 ||

And because Avyakta is not spoken of there as an object of [discriminative] knowledge in the way Sāṅkhya's Pradhāna must be known and distinguished from puruṣa for liberation.

वदतीति चेन् न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

vadatīti cen na prājño hi prakaraṇāt || 5 ||

If it be objected that the word 'wise' (prājña) is used there [seemingly implying a conscious principle] — that fails, because 'the wise one' refers, given the context, to the discriminating seeker/aspirant, not to Avyakta itself.

त्रयाणाम् एव चैवम् उपन्यासः प्रश्नश् च ॥ ६ ॥

trayāṇām eva caivam upanyāsaḥ praśnaś ca || 6 ||

And thus, the presentation and the questions [posed by Naciketas earlier in the dialogue] concern only the same three [original topics] — there is no independent, separate discussion of Sāṅkhya's Pradhāna here.

महद्वच् च ॥ ७ ॥

mahadvac ca || 7 ||

And just as the word 'Mahat' [in the same passage] denotes simply the intellect (buddhi) in an ordinary sense, not Sāṅkhya's technical category, so too 'Avyakta' does not denote Sāṅkhya's independent Pradhāna. This closes the Ānumānika section.

चमसवदविशेषात् ॥ ८ ॥

camasavadaviśeṣāt || 8 ||

[Topic: technical terms shifting meaning by context] Just as the word 'chamasa' (cup) can take on a different sense depending on context without any special difficulty, likewise here [Sāṅkhya-derived terms used within a Vedāntic passage pose] no obstacle to a Vedāntic reading.

ज्योतिरुपक्रमा तु तथा ह्य् अधीयत एके ॥ ९ ॥

jyotirupakramā tu tathā hy adhīyata eke || 9 ||

But some [Vedic branches] recite this passage as beginning with a reference to light (jyotis) — some [schools] indeed study it that way — tying the whole discussion, from its very opening, to Brahman.

कल्पनोपदेशाच् च मध्वादिवदविरोधः ॥ १० ॥

kalpanopadeśāc ca madhvādivadavirodhaḥ || 10 ||

And because [this passage] teaches a particular constructed scheme, as in the case of the 'madhu' teaching etc. — just as that scheme poses no contradiction, neither does this one. This closes the Chamasa section.

न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि ज्ञानाभावाद् अतिरेकाच् च ॥ ११ ॥

na saṁkhyopasaṁgrahādapi jñānābhāvād atirekāc ca || 11 ||

[Topic: does an Upanishadic enumeration resembling Sāṅkhya's list of 25 principles establish Sāṅkhya's Pradhāna?] Not so — even the inclusion of a matching number does not establish Sāṅkhya's scheme, because there is no accompanying mention of Sāṅkhya's discriminative liberating knowledge, and moreover the list includes an excess [an additional entity, beyond Sāṅkhya's fixed count of 25].

प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १२ ॥

prāṇādayo vākyaśeṣāt || 12 ||

And the vital breaths (prāṇa) and other items are further enumerated in the concluding portion of the same passage — items that do not fit within Sāṅkhya's fixed count of 25 at all.

ज्योतिषैकेषाम् असत्यन्ने ॥ १३ ॥

jyotiṣaikeṣām asatyanne || 13 ||

And for some [Vedic branches], this reckoning [proceeds] in connection with light (jyotis), without mention of food — such recensional variation confirms this is not Sāṅkhya's fixed technical enumeration. This closes the Saṅkhyopasaṅgraha section.

कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ॥ १४ ॥

kāraṇatvena cākāśādiṣu yathāvyapadiṣṭokteḥ || 14 ||

[Topic: Brahman as sole cause of the elements] And because Brahman's causality with respect to ākāśa and the other elements is described just as expressly declared elsewhere [Taittiriya's sequential creation account] — Brahman alone, not any separate Pradhāna, is the single cause.

समाकर्षात् ॥ १५ ॥

samākarṣāt || 15 ||

And because of the drawing-together (samākarṣa) of this topic with the preceding context, tying the discussion consistently back to Brahman as sole cause throughout. This closes the Kāraṇatva section.

जगद्वाचित्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

jagadvācitvāt || 16 ||

[Topic: the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru dialogue] 'He who is the maker of these persons, whose work this is — he indeed is to be known.' [The word] 'this [work]' denotes the [entire, undifferentiated] world, by elimination [with no specific antecedent otherwise available] — hence its maker must be the Supreme Lord (Īśvara), not the individual soul (jīva) or the chief vital breath, since only Brahman is spoken of as maker of the whole universe.

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान् नेति चेत् तद्व्याख्यातम् ॥ १७ ॥

jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṅgān neti cet tadvyākhyātam || 17 ||

If it be objected that marks of the jīva and the chief vital breath appear in this passage, so it cannot be Brahman — this has already been answered [under sūtra 1.1.32].

अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्याम् अपि चैवम् एके ॥ १८ ॥

anyārthaṁ tu jaiminiḥ praśnavyākhyānābhyām api caivam eke || 18 ||

But Jaimini holds that [this passage] has another purpose altogether, based on both the question and its explanation in the dialogue — and some other [teachers] hold likewise. This closes the Bālāki section.

वाक्यान्वयात् ॥ १९ ॥

vākyānvayāt || 19 ||

[Topic: the Self discussed throughout the Bṛhadāraṇyaka's Maitreyī dialogue] Because of the coherence of the sentence [as a whole] (vākyānvaya), [that Self] is ultimately Brahman — only reading Brahman as the unifying referent makes the whole passage's connected structure make sense.

प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर् लिङ्गम् आश्मरथ्यः ॥ २० ॥

pratijñāsiddher liṅgam āśmarathyaḥ || 20 ||

Ācārya Āśmarathya holds this [coherence] serves as the mark confirming the fulfillment of the opening promise, 'by knowing which everything becomes known.'

उत्क्रमिष्यत एवं भावाद् इत्य् औडुलोमिः ॥ २१ ॥

utkramiṣyata evaṁ bhāvād ity auḍulomiḥ || 21 ||

Ācārya Auḍulomi holds it is because the departing [jīva], at the point of leaving the body, is described as existing in that very [Brahman-]nature.

अवस्थितेर् इति काशकृत्स्नः ॥ २२ ॥

avasthiter iti kāśakṛtsnaḥ || 22 ||

Ācārya Kāśakṛtsna holds it is because of [Brahman's] ever-present abiding [within the jīva] — the jīva is, even now, always already Brahman itself, not merely attaining it. This closes the Vākyānvaya section — three teachers offering complementary rationales for the same conclusion.

प्रकृतिश् च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥ २३ ॥

prakṛtiś ca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt || 23 ||

[Topic: Brahman as material cause] And Brahman is also the material cause (prakṛti, i.e. the very substance out of which the universe is made) — not merely its efficient/operative cause — because this alone accords with, and does not conflict with, the opening promise and the illustrative example [the clay-and-pot analogies in Chandogya 6.1]; Brahman is thus both agent and material of creation at once.

अभिध्योपदेशाच् च ॥ २४ ॥

abhidhyopadeśāc ca || 24 ||

And because of the teaching of [Brahman's own] desire ('It desired, may I become many') — a conscious being's own act of desiring and thereby transforming itself needs no separate external material, unlike Sāṅkhya's independent Pradhāna.

साक्षाच् चोभयाम्नानात् ॥ २५ ॥

sākṣāc cobhayāmnānāt || 25 ||

And because of the direct, joint mention of both [Brahman's roles as efficient and material cause] — leaving no room for positing any separate, additional material substratum.

आत्मकृतेः ॥ २६ ॥

ātmakṛteḥ || 26 ||

Because [scripture describes the universe] as made from [Brahman's] own self — Brahman alone, without any other material, transforms into the universe.

परिणामात् ॥ २७ ॥

pariṇāmāt || 27 ||

Because [scripture] describes [the creative process] in terms of actual transformation (pariṇāma) — Brahman really becomes the universe as its material cause (though, in Śaṅkara's fuller reading, this transformation properly belongs to Brahman's power of māyā — its capacity to appear as manifold — rather than touching Brahman's own changeless nature).

योनिश् च हि गीयते ॥ २८ ॥

yoniś ca hi gīyate || 28 ||

And Brahman is indeed celebrated in scripture as the source (yoni) of the universe. This closes the Prakṛti section, which establishes Brahman as both the efficient and material cause of the world.

एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याताः ॥ २९ ॥

etena sarve vyākhyātāḥ || 29 ||

By this [foregoing reasoning], all [other similar Upanishadic passages regarding the nature of the world's cause] are likewise explained — the same principles extend to resolve every analogous passage not individually treated. This closes the first adhyāya, Samanvaya (Harmonization).

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन् नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १ ॥

smṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅga iti cen nānyasmṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅgāt || 1 ||

Objection: If Brahman alone (without an independent pradhāna, the Sāṅkhya's unmanifest primal matter) is held to be the world's cause, the Sāṅkhya smṛti (secondary scripture) would be left with no valid scope, which is a flaw. Reply: No — the same flaw of 'no scope' would fall on other smṛtis (e.g. those teaching a conscious Lord as cause) if pradhāna were accepted as cause instead. The objection therefore proves nothing.

इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ॥ २ ॥

itareṣāṁ cānupalabdheḥ || 2 ||

Moreover, the other doctrines peculiar to the Sāṅkhya (such as the evolution of mahat and the rest from pradhāna) are nowhere verified — neither in the Veda nor by ordinary perception — so the Sāṅkhya smṛti's authority is independently weak.

एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ३ ॥

etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ || 3 ||

By this same refutation, the Yoga system too stands refuted, since it likewise posits an independent, insentient pradhāna as material cause alongside a nominally accepted Īśvara (Lord).

न विलक्षणत्वाद् अस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ॥ ४ ॥

na vilakṣaṇatvād asya tathātvaṁ ca śabdāt || 4 ||

Objection: The world (effect) is utterly unlike Brahman — insentient and impure, whereas Brahman is sentient (chetana) and pure — and dissimilarity between cause and effect is never seen elsewhere (clay-effects remain clay). But this very dissimilarity is also affirmed by the Word (śabda) of scripture, which itself distinguishes the sentient cause from the insentient effect it produces; the matter is therefore to be settled by scriptural authority in what follows, not by unaided reasoning (tarka) about resemblance.

अभिमानिव्यपदेशस् तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ॥ ५ ॥

abhimānivyapadeśas tu viśeṣānugatibhyām || 5 ||

Passages where scripture ascribes speech or perception to insentient elements or organs (e.g. 'the clay said,' 'the waters said') refer, on account of specific textual details and the consistent presence of this idea throughout such passages, to the conscious presiding deities (abhimānin) of those elements and organs — not to the insentient elements or organs themselves.

दृश्यते तु ॥ ६ ॥

dṛśyate tu || 6 ||

And indeed it is observed elsewhere that dissimilar effects do arise from dissimilar causes — insentient hair and nails grow from sentient bodies, and sentient scorpions arise from insentient cow-dung. So dissimilarity between cause and effect is not, after all, an invariable rule, and it poses no real obstacle to accepting the sentient Brahman as cause of the insentient world.

असद् इति चेन् न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

asad iti cen na pratiṣedhamātratvāt || 7 ||

Objection: Scripture says 'in the beginning this was non-existent (asat)' — implying the effect did not exist before its production. Reply: No, because this is a mere negation (of the manifest, differentiated form), not a denial of real existence — the effect exists even before its manifestation, as identical with its cause.

अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गाद् असमञ्जसम् ॥ ८ ॥

apītau tadvatprasaṅgād asamañjasam || 8 ||

Objection: If the effect is non-different from Brahman, then at dissolution (pralaya), when the effect merges back into the cause, its qualities of grossness and impurity would taint the cause too; and since all distinctions collapse into an undivided state at dissolution, there would be no basis left for the fixed division of enjoyer and enjoyed at the next creation — even liberated souls could be dragged back into bondage. Hence this doctrine is inconsistent (asamañjasa).

न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॥ ९ ॥

na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt || 9 ||

Reply: No, because there are parallels — pot-shards and the like, though ultimately merging back into clay, never taint the clay with their own qualities; similarly the world, non-different from Brahman only because its distinctions are superimposed by ignorance (avidyā), does not taint Brahman at dissolution — just as a magician is never touched by the illusion (māyā) he himself projects.

स्वपक्षदोषाच् च ॥ १० ॥

svapakṣadoṣāc ca || 10 ||

And this same objection applies equally to the opponent's own position (the Sāṅkhya): since they too hold the effect to be non-different from pradhāna at dissolution, the identical problem recurs for them. It is therefore not a special defect of the Vedāntin's view alone, but a difficulty both sides must equally face.

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानाद् अपि ॥ ११ ॥

tarkāpratiṣṭhānād api || 11 ||

And also because mere unaided human reasoning (tarka), without the support of scripture, has no fixed ground — one thinker's logic is always overturned by a sharper thinker's counter-logic. So in a matter beyond the senses like the world's ultimate cause, scripture alone, not bare tarka, can be the final authority. (The famous 'tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt' sūtra.)

अन्यथानुमेयम् इति चेद् एवम् अप्य् अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ॥ १२ ॥

anyathānumeyam iti ced evam apy anirmokṣaprasaṅgaḥ || 12 ||

Objection: Then we shall reason differently, so as to avoid the fault of unfixed conclusions. Reply: Even so, some tarka-based conclusion will always remain open to being overturned by sharper counter-argument, so the problem of never reaching final certainty — and hence the impossibility of liberating knowledge (anirmokṣa) — remains inescapable for reasoning alone; bare logic can never by itself yield the certainty needed for mokṣa (liberation).

एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ॥ १३ ॥

etena śiṣṭāparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ || 13 ||

By this same reasoning, other cause-theories not accepted even in part by learned tradition-bearers (Manu, Vyāsa and the like) who follow the Veda — such as atomism (aṇu-vāda) — are likewise to be understood as refuted, since the same grounds for rejection (the inconclusiveness of unaided reasoning on so profound a matter, and conflict with scripture) apply equally to them.

भोक्त्रापत्तेर् अविभागश् चेत् स्याल् लोकवत् ॥ १४ ॥

bhoktrāpatter avibhāgaś cet syāl lokavat || 14 ||

Objection: If Brahman, without real distinction, is the material cause of everything, the well-known distinction between the enjoyer (bhoktṛ, the individual soul) and the enjoyed (bhogya, sense-objects) would collapse — enjoyer would become enjoyed or vice versa, since both are equally non-different from the one Brahman. Reply: It can be explained as in ordinary experience (lokavat) — just as sea-foam and waves remain mutually distinct in worldly usage even though all are non-different from water, the enjoyer-enjoyed distinction can likewise hold within a non-dual Brahman.

तदनन्यत्वम् आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ॥ १५ ॥

tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ || 15 ||

This entire world of enjoyer, enjoyed and so on is in ultimate reality wholly non-different (ananya) from its cause, Brahman — the everyday distinctions being merely practical — because the Chāndogya's 'ārambhaṇa' passage ('a modification is a name begun by speech alone; the clay alone is real') and similar texts teach that the effect is only a name superimposed by speech, while the cause alone is truly real (satya).

भावे चोपलब्धेः ॥ १६ ॥

bhāve copalabdheḥ || 16 ||

And also because the effect is perceived only when the cause is present, never in its absence — a pot is perceived only when clay exists — this invariable co-presence itself proves that the effect is not different from its cause.

सत्वाच् चापरस्य ॥ १७ ॥

satvāc cāparasya || 17 ||

And also because scripture affirms the later effect's existence ('sat') even prior to its manifestation, as identical with the cause ('this was sat, being alone, in the beginning') — whatever is nowhere present in any form cannot arise from that. Since the effect is thus non-different from the cause even before its production, it remains non-different from the cause after production too.

असद्व्यपदेशान् नेति चेन् न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषाद्युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच् च ॥ १८ ॥

asadvyapadeśān neti cen na dharmāntareṇa vākyaśeṣādyukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca || 18 ||

Objection: Elsewhere scripture calls the pre-existent effect 'non-existent' (asat) too ('this was asat in the beginning'), so the effect's pre-existence as identical with the cause is not established. Reply: No — this 'asat' refers to a different attribute (absence of manifest, differentiated name-and-form), as the continuation of that very passage clarifies ('that became sat'); and this is also established by reasoning (a specific effect like curd arises only from its specific cause, milk, and not from just any substance — inexplicable if the effect is utterly non-existent beforehand) and by other scriptural passages.

पटवच् च ॥ १९ ॥

paṭavac ca || 19 ||

And as a folded cloth, though indistinct, is the very same cloth made distinct when unfolded — it does not become a different thing — so too the effect, present but unmanifest in the state of its cause (e.g. thread), is merely made manifest by the weaver's action, not newly created. This too proves the effect's non-difference from its cause.

यथा च प्राणादिः ॥ २० ॥

yathā ca prāṇādiḥ || 20 ||

And as the various vital breaths (prāṇa, apāna etc.), when restrained in breath-control, merely sustain life (their causal-state function) but, on being active again, produce further effects like contraction and expansion — yet never become a substance other than breath itself — so too the effect remains non-different from its cause across its varying states. Thus the scriptural promise 'by which the unheard becomes heard' is vindicated: since the whole world is Brahman's effect, it is non-different from Brahman.

इतरव्यपदेशाद् धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

itaravyapadeśād dhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ || 21 ||

Objection: If the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman were simply identical (as texts like 'that art thou' seem to say), then the jīva, being an independent creator, ought to fashion for itself only what is beneficial — not the painful world of birth, death, old age and disease. No independent agent builds his own prison. Hence a conscious cause is open to the charge of failing to do what is beneficial for itself.

अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २२ ॥

adhikaṁ tu bhedanirdeśāt || 22 ||

Reply: This fault does not touch our view, because the one we call the world's creator is Brahman — eternally pure, awake, and free, omniscient and omnipotent — who is distinct from (greater than, adhika) the individual soul, as scripture's very distinguishing of agent and object of knowledge ('the Self, verily, is to be seen, heard...') shows. Being eternally free, Brahman has nothing to do for its own benefit and nothing harmful to avoid, so the fault of failing to secure what is beneficial does not arise for it.

अश्मादिवच् च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

aśmādivac ca tadanupapattiḥ || 23 ||

And just as stones of the same earthly substance yield both precious gems like diamond and ordinary pebbles, as the same soil produces sandal and poison-fruit trees of wildly different character, and as the same food-essence yields diverse products like blood and hair — so too the diversity of jīva and Īśvara (Lord), and the variety of their effects, can well arise from the one Brahman. The fault alleged by the opponent thus does not hold.

उपसंहारदर्शनान् नेति चेन् न क्षीरवद् धि ॥ २४ ॥

upasaṁhāradarśanān neti cen na kṣīravad dhi || 24 ||

Objection: We see in the world that agents like the potter bring together various external instruments — clay, wheel, stick, water — to produce their effects; but Brahman is said to be without any aids (asahāya). How then could it, unaided, fashion the world? Reply: No — because just as milk or water, unaided by anything external, transforms by its own nature into curd or ice, so too the all-powerful Brahman, through its own extraordinary innate power, can create the world without depending on any external instrument.

देवादिवद् अपि लोके ॥ २५ ॥

devādivad api loke || 25 ||

And it is also seen in the world that beings of great power though themselves conscious — gods, ancestral spirits, sages — create manifold palaces, chariots and the like by mere will, without external means; a spider spins its thread out of its own body. So too the conscious Brahman can produce the world purely out of itself, without needing external aids.

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर् निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॥ २६ ॥

kṛtsnaprasaktir niravayavatvaśabdakopo vā || 26 ||

Objection: If the partless (niravayava) Brahman itself transforms into the world, since it has no part that could remain untransformed, the whole of Brahman would have to turn into the effect — destroying the root-cause itself, and rendering pointless the injunction to meditate on Brahman (as something still to be known). Or, if to avoid this fault Brahman is held to have parts, then scriptural statements declaring it partless, actionless, and the like would be contradicted. Either way this position is untenable.

श्रुतेस् तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

śrutes tu śabdamūlatvāt || 27 ||

Reply: No such fault, for scripture itself also declares that Brahman remains in its unmodified form even after producing the world — both the causal and the transformed aspects are separately taught. Since knowledge of the transcendent Brahman rests solely on the Word (scripture), it must be accepted exactly as the Word states: scripture affirms both that Brahman transforms only in a qualified sense and that it is partless — a paradox resolved by Brahman's inconceivable power acting through the ignorance-constructed distinctions of name and form, without real division.

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश् च हि ॥ २८ ॥

ātmani caivaṁ vicitrāś ca hi || 28 ||

And there is nothing strange in one Brahman giving rise to a manifold creation without any loss of its own integral nature — for even in a single dreaming self, a whole manifold world of chariots, roads and so on appears without disruption of the self's nature ('there are no chariots there... yet it creates chariots'); and gods and magicians are seen conjuring up elephants, horses and the like without any impairment of their own real form. In just the same way, a manifold creation can arise from the one Brahman without disruption of its nature.

स्वपक्षदोषाच् च ॥ २९ ॥

svapakṣadoṣāc ca || 29 ||

And this same 'wholesale transformation' difficulty applies equally to the opponent's own position — the Sāṅkhya's three guṇas (sattva, rajas, tamas), each held to be partless in their state of equilibrium, face the identical problem; and the atomist's atoms, whether taken as partless or, to avoid the fault, as having parts, meet a corresponding difficulty of impermanence. So this is not a special defect of the Vedāntin's position but one both rival theories must equally face — and, as shown, the Vedāntin has already resolved it.

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt || 30 ||

And the supreme Deity (Brahman) must be held to be endowed with every power, because scripture presents it that way — texts such as 'doer of all deeds, desirer of all desires, of all savours... all-embracing' and 'the omniscient, the all-knowing' establish Brahman's possession of every power, which alone enables it, through this manifold power, to produce a manifold creation.

विकरणत्वान् नेति चेत् तद् उक्तम् ॥ ३१ ॥

vikaraṇatvān neti cet tad uktam || 31 ||

Objection: But scripture also describes Brahman as devoid of all senses ('without eyes, without ears...') — how then, lacking organs, can it be all-powerful and act? Reply: This has already been answered — Brahman is utterly profound, accessible only through scripture, not through logic; and it has been shown how apparent distinctions are merely constructions of ignorance. Scripture itself states: 'without hands or feet, yet swift and a grasper; without eyes, yet seeing; without ears, yet hearing' — thus even without organs, Brahman's possession of every power is established.

न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

na prayojanavattvāt || 32 ||

Objection: A conscious supreme Self would not undertake so vast an enterprise as creating the world without some purpose, since intelligent agents are never seen to engage in great undertakings without self-interest; if the Lord too acts for some purpose of his own, scripture's declaration that he is ever fulfilled (āptakāma) would be contradicted, and if there is no purpose at all, there could be no activity either. Hence a conscious cause seems untenable.

लोकवत् तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

lokavat tu līlākaivalyam || 33 ||

Reply: As in the world the sportive activities of a fully satisfied king, undertaken purely for amusement, need no other purpose, or as breathing occurs quite naturally without any conscious aim, so too the Lord's activity of creation is mere sport (līlā) — it requires no further purpose. Being of unlimited power, it is no burden to him at all.

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ३४ ॥

vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darśayati || 34 ||

Objection: If Īśvara (the Lord) alone is the world's cause, he creates an unequal world — some beings blissful like gods, some wretched like animals, some middling like humans — and this makes him guilty of partiality (rāga-dveṣa) like an ordinary person, and of sheer cruelty (nairghṛṇya). Reply: No such fault arises, because the Lord's creative act is conditioned (sāpekṣa) — it depends on the prior merit and demerit (karma) of the beings themselves. He is only the common instrumental cause, like rain, while the beings' own past deeds cause the inequality; scripture confirms this too ('he indeed makes him whom he wishes to lead upward do good deeds...').

न कर्माविभागाद् इति चेन् नानादित्वाद् उपपद्यते चाप्य् उपलभ्यते च ॥ ३५ ॥

na karmāvibhāgād iti cen nānāditvād upapadyate cāpy upalabhyate ca || 35 ||

Objection: Before creation, scripture says 'sat alone existed' — i.e. there was no distinction at all — so no karma could then have existed on which an unequal creation could depend; the first creation ought therefore to have been uniform (karma's dependence on bodies and bodies' dependence on karma being otherwise a case of mutual reliance, itaretarāśraya). Reply: No such fault, because saṃsāra (the cycle of birth and death) is beginningless — like the beginningless succession of seed and sprout, there is no contradiction in karma and unequal creation depending on each other without a first term. This is both logically sound (otherwise inequality would be causeless, and even liberated souls could be dragged back into bondage) and confirmed by both scripture and smṛti.

सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश् च ॥ ३६ ॥

sarvadharmopapatteś ca || 36 ||

And also because, once Brahman is accepted as cause in the manner shown, all the attributes required of a world-cause (omniscience, omnipotence, and the power of great māyā) are found to be consistent. Hence this Upaniṣadic doctrine (Vedānta) is beyond doubt. With this the teacher (Śaṅkara), having established his own position, closes Pāda 1 and turns next to refuting rival schools.

रचनानुपपत्तेश् च नानुमानं प्रवृत्तेश् च ॥ १ ॥

racanānupapatteś ca nānumānaṁ pravṛtteś ca || 1 ||

The Sāṅkhya doctrine of an unconscious pradhāna (primordial matter, prakṛti) as world-cause is unreasonable: the world's elaborate, purposeful design (comparable to a house, which only an intelligent craftsman can build) could not arise from an unconscious, unsupervised, independent pradhāna (rachanānupapatti, 'inexplicability of the design'); nor could an insentient pradhāna even begin to act without a conscious overseer, since insentient things like a chariot never move by themselves without a conscious driver (pravṛttyanupapatti). Hence neither by inference nor by observing how things actually act can an unconscious pradhāna be established as the world's cause.

पयोऽम्बुवच् चेत् तत्रापि ॥ २ ॥

payo'mbuvac cet tatrāpi || 2 ||

Objection: Just as milk flows spontaneously to nourish the calf and water flows for the world's benefit without any conscious overseer, so too the unconscious pradhāna could spontaneously act for the soul's benefit. Reply: But even there the activity is really governed by consciousness (the cow's affection and the calf's suckling are involved; water's flow depends on the lay of the land; and scripture describes the Lord as presiding over the waters too) — so this analogy merely assumes the very point still in dispute, and does not establish the pradhāna's case.

व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश् चानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

vyatirekānavasthiteś cānapekṣatvāt || 3 ||

And since the Sāṅkhya's three guṇas (sattva, rajas, tamas — the constituent qualities of prakṛti), while in equilibrium, depend on nothing external to set them in motion or restrain them (puruṣa being merely indifferent), there is no way to fix why pradhāna should transform at one time and not another — being independent of anything else, no stable rule governs its activity or inactivity. Whereas for an omniscient, omnipotent Lord possessed of great māyā, both activity and inactivity are perfectly consistent.

अन्यत्राभावाच् च न तृणादिवत् ॥ ४ ॥

anyatrābhāvāc ca na tṛṇādivat || 4 ||

Objection: Just as grass and fodder, without depending on any other cause, spontaneously transform into milk (once eaten by the cow), so too pradhāna might spontaneously transform into mahat and the rest. Reply: No, because grass too transforms only dependent on another cause — this is shown by the fact that grass never becomes milk anywhere else (without a cow's body). So the analogy of grass does not establish an unconditioned, causeless transformation for pradhāna either.

पुरुषाश्मवद् इति चेत् तथापि ॥ ५ ॥

puruṣāśmavad iti cet tathāpi || 5 ||

Objection: Just as a lame man (who can see but not walk) directs a blind man (who can walk but not see) by riding him, or as a magnet, itself motionless, sets iron in motion, so an indifferent puruṣa might set pradhāna in motion. Reply: Even so the fault remains — the Sāṅkhya itself holds pradhāna to act independently (not that puruṣa impels it); an indifferent puruṣa, unlike the lame man, cannot direct by speech or gesture, having no activity of any kind; and if mere proximity (like the magnet) were the cause, since that proximity is eternal, activity would have to be eternal too (making dissolution impossible).

अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश् च ॥ ६ ॥

aṅgitvānupapatteś ca || 6 ||

And also because, in the state of equilibrium, the three guṇas exist merely each in its own nature, without the relation of principal and subordinate to each other; each, fearing loss of its own nature, cannot on its own enter into that mutual relation, and no external disturber is present to produce the imbalance among the guṇas that alone could give rise to mahat and the rest.

अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् ॥ ७ ॥

anyathānumitau ca jñaśaktiviyogāt || 7 ||

Objection: We do not hold the guṇas to be immutable but ever-changing, inferring their character solely from their effects — so even in equilibrium they remain capable of producing inequality; this is no fault. Reply: Even so, being devoid of any power of knowledge (jña-śakti), pradhāna is still open to the earlier faults of 'inexplicable design' and the rest; and if the guṇas were granted a power of knowledge, they would simply become the conscious Brahman (contradicting the Sāṅkhya's own position). Moreover it remains unexplained why, absent any cause, they should not either remain uniformly in equilibrium forever, or remain permanently unequal.

अभ्युपगमेऽप्य् अर्थाभावात् ॥ ८ ॥

abhyupagame'py arthābhāvāt || 8 ||

Objection: Granted that pradhāna's activity is spontaneous (uncaused). Reply: Even then the fault persists, because no genuine purpose for pradhāna's activity can be shown: not enjoyment (bhoga), since a flawless puruṣa's enjoyment would be pointless and liberation would never occur; nor liberation (apavarga) itself, since if puruṣa is already free by nature the activity serves no purpose, while if liberation could occur without any prior activity, even the perception of sound and other objects would become inexplicable. Thus the claim that 'pradhāna acts for the soul's sake' collapses.

विप्रतिषेधाच् चासमञ्जसम् ॥ ९ ॥

vipratiṣedhāc cāsamañjasam || 9 ||

And the Sāṅkhya system is also internally contradictory — in some places seven senses are counted, elsewhere eleven; in some places the subtle elements (tanmātras) are said to arise from mahat, elsewhere from ahaṃkāra (ego); in some places three internal organs are described, elsewhere one. Hence the Sāṅkhya doctrine is inconsistent (asamañjasa) — quite apart from its already-noted conflict with the scripture teaching a conscious Lord as cause, and with the smṛti that follows it.

महद्दीर्घवद् वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॥ १० ॥

mahaddīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām || 10 ||

Now begins the critique of atomism (the Vaiśeṣika school, which posits paramāṇu / minute atoms combining into dvyaṇuka dyads). The Vaiśeṣikas hold that a quality inherent in the cause-substance produces a similar quality in the effect-substance (e.g. white threads produce a white cloth), and on this rule they object that if the conscious Brahman is the world's cause, consciousness ought to inhere in the world too — which it plainly does not. But this very rule breaks down within the Vaiśeṣikas' own system: from the round (parimaṇḍala) shape and minute (aṇu) size of a single atom arises, in a dyad, not a similarly round and minute magnitude but the opposite — a large, elongated (mahat-dīrgha) one. So if 'like produces like' fails even in the Vaiśeṣikas' own scheme, there is no obstacle to the conscious Brahman producing an unconscious world.

उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥

ubhayathāpi na karmātastadabhāvaḥ || 11 ||

The atomic theory of causation is itself untenable: at the very start of creation, the initial motion (karma) that would bring atoms into conjunction cannot arise without some cause — neither conscious effort (impossible, since there is as yet no body) nor unseen merit/demerit, adṛṣṭa (which, being itself insentient, cannot produce motion in atoms without a conscious overseer to direct it), can serve as that cause. Without this initial motion there is no conjunction of atoms, and without conjunction no dyads or further compound substances can form. Thus, motion being impossible at both the start of creation and the onset of dissolution, atomism fails to explain the world.

समवायाभ्युपगमाच् च साम्याद् अनवस्थितेः ॥ १२ ॥

samavāyābhyupagamāc ca sāmyād anavasthiteḥ || 12 ||

And since the Vaiśeṣikas hold the dyad, produced from two atoms, to be an entity utterly distinct from the atoms, joined to them by a special relation called 'inherence' (samavāya), that inherence — being itself distinct from what it relates — would in turn need some further relation to connect it to its relata (there being no relevant difference between inherence and mere conjunction, saṃyoga, in this regard). This leads to an infinite regress (anavasthā) of relations; and since not even the first relation can thus be established, the very production of the dyad becomes impossible.

नित्यम् एव च भावात् ॥ १३ ॥

nityam eva ca bhāvāt || 13 ||

And whether atoms are held to be inherently active, inherently inactive, both, or neither, a fault is unavoidable in every case: if inherently active, there would be perpetual motion and dissolution would never occur; if inherently inactive, creation would never occur; 'both' is self-contradictory; and if 'neither', with motion and rest dependent on an external cause like adṛṣṭa (unseen merit/demerit), since that cause would be either eternally present (giving perpetual motion) or never operative (giving perpetual rest), no satisfactory account of periodic creation and dissolution remains.

रूपादिमत्त्वाच् च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ॥ १४ ॥

rūpādimattvāc ca viparyayo darśanāt || 14 ||

And since atoms are held to possess qualities like colour, taste, smell, and touch, then by the observed rule that whatever possesses such qualities is invariably gross and impermanent relative to its own cause (a cloth is gross and impermanent relative to its thread), atoms too must be gross and impermanent relative to their ultimate cause (Brahman). Thus the Vaiśeṣikas' desired conclusion — that atoms are minute and eternal — gets reversed (viparyaya) by their own reasoning.

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ १५ ॥

ubhayathā ca doṣāt || 15 ||

And in the four elements (earth, water, fire, air) a graded scale of qualities (smell-taste-form-touch) is observed in the world — earth has all four, water three, fire two, air one. If atoms too are held to have such graded qualities, an increase in bulk (contradicting their minuteness) would follow for atoms with fewer qualities as they build up compound elements; but if all atoms are held to have all four qualities equally, then smell should be perceptible in water, smell and taste in fire, and smell-form-taste in air too — which is not observed. A fault arises either way.

अपरिग्रहाच् चात्यन्तम् अनपेक्षा ॥ १६ ॥

aparigrahāc cātyantam anapekṣā || 16 ||

Moreover this atomic doctrine is not accepted in even the smallest part by any learned tradition-bearer following the Veda (Manu and the like) — unlike the pradhāna-theory, part of which does appear in some such smṛtis — so it deserves utter neglect. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣikas' claim that quality and the rest, though utterly distinct categories from substance (among their six categories — substance, quality, action, universal, particular, inherence), are nonetheless wholly dependent on substance, is self-contradictory, since utterly distinct things cannot stand in mutual dependence; nor is any coherent account available of what distinguishes conjunction (saṃyoga) from inherence (samavāya). Hence the Vaiśeṣika doctrine deserves no regard whatsoever.

समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ॥ १७ ॥

samudāya ubhayahetuke'pi tadaprāptiḥ || 17 ||

Now the critique of the Buddhist Sarvāstivādins (the Realists), who accept both external and internal entities — the elements and their derivatives, and the mind and mental factors comprising the five aggregates (skandhas). Even granting both kinds of aggregation (atoms forming gross elements, and the five skandhas), the very notion of an 'aggregate' (samudāya) cannot be established, because the constituents are themselves insentient, and no stable conscious enjoyer or controller who could organize them into a unity is admitted. Hence no such thing as an organized 'aggregate' is established — and without it, the entire practical order of the world would collapse.

इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वाद् उपपन्नम् इति चेन् न सङ्घातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

itaretarapratyayatvād upapannam iti cen na saṅghātabhāvānimittatvāt || 18 ||

Objection: True, no stable conscious enjoyer exists, yet the mundane order still functions, revolving like a water-wheel through the mutual causation of the twelve links (avidyā and the rest of the dependent-origination chain) — nothing further is needed. Reply: No — because avidyā and the other links are causes only of each other's successive arising, not of their forming into an organized aggregate. The chain of mutual production among them does nothing to explain why they should combine into one unified thing; so 'aggregation' remains unaccounted for.

उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ॥ १९ ॥

uttarotpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt || 19 ||

And on the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda), since the previous moment is held to cease the very instant the next moment arises, the relation of cause and effect between successive moments cannot be established at all — for a moment that is ceasing or has already ceased, being caught up in non-existence, cannot serve as the cause of the next moment. Even granting the prior moment full existence before it ceases, causal efficacy still cannot be shown (positing a further 'activity' for it would require its persisting into a second moment, contradicting momentariness itself). Hence the Buddhist doctrine proves incoherent.

असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ॥ २० ॥

asati pratijñoparodho yaugapadyamanyathā || 20 ||

If the effect (the next moment) is said to arise even in the absence of the cause (the prior, ceased moment), then the Buddhist's own thesis that 'mind and mental factors arise from four causes' is contradicted (and, causation being unnecessary, anything could arise anywhere from anything). And if instead the prior moment is held to persist until the next moment arises, cause and effect would then coexist simultaneously (yaugapadya) — contradicting the other Buddhist thesis that 'all conditioned things are momentary.' Either way, the Buddhist's own theses are undermined.

प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिर् अविच्छेदात् ॥ २१ ॥

pratisaṁkhyāpratisaṁkhyānirodhāprāptir avicchedāt || 21 ||

And of the three uncompounded, unreal entities the Buddhists posit — reasoned cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), unreasoned cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, mere absence of obstruction) and space — even the two kinds of cessation cannot be established, since they must apply either to a continuum (impossible, because in every continuum the uninterrupted relation of cause and effect persists, and the continuum is never actually broken) or to a particular entity (equally impossible, since no entity's utter, traceless annihilation is ever confirmed — recognition, pratyabhijñā, always shows continuity across states). Neither kind of cessation can therefore be established.

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ २२ ॥

ubhayathā ca doṣāt || 22 ||

And this cessation of avidyā and the rest, classified under 'reasoned cessation,' must occur either through right knowledge with supporting conditions, or spontaneously on its own — in the first case, the Buddhist's own principle that nothing ceases without a cause would have to be abandoned; in the second, teaching the path to liberation would become pointless. A fault arises either way, so this doctrine is untenable.

आकाशे चाविशेषात् ॥ २३ ॥

ākāśe cāviśeṣāt || 23 ||

Nor is it correct to hold, as with the two cessations, that space too is a mere non-entity (nirupākhya). Both scriptural authority ('from this Self, space arose') and the inference from space being the substrate of sound and other qualities establish space as a real entity, no less than other things. Moreover, holding space to be 'mere absence of obstruction' leads to absurdities (e.g., a bird already occupying a space should not obstruct another bird's flight there, if space is nothing but absence of obstruction; and the Buddhists' own texts say air rests upon space, which presupposes space as something real). So space must be accepted as real — and calling all three (the two cessations and space) simultaneously 'eternal' and yet 'unreal, non-entities' is self-contradictory, since only real things can properly bear such attributes.

अनुस्मृतेश् च ॥ २४ ॥

anusmṛteś ca || 24 ||

And a thoroughgoing momentarist would have to accept that the perceiving subject too is momentary — which is contradicted by the fact of recollection (anusmṛti). Recognition-cognition of the form 'I saw that before, I see this now' is possible only if the perceiver and the rememberer are one continuous subject; otherwise how could one being remember another's experience? This recognition is a fact of common experience for everyone, so the doctrine of momentariness is refuted by it too.

नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

nāsato'dṛṣṭatvāt || 25 ||

And also because 'existence arising from non-existence' — which the Buddhists imply by phrases like 'nothing arises without prior destruction' (e.g. a seed must perish for a sprout to arise) — cannot be established, since mere non-existence is never actually observed anywhere functioning as the cause of anything's arising; if it were, things ought to arise even from utter non-entities like a hare's horn, which they do not. It is proper instead to hold, as with the persisting substance of gold through its transformations, that the sprout arises from a persisting underlying substrate (part of the seed), not from bare non-existence.

उदासीनानाम् अपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॥ २६ ॥

udāsīnānām api caivaṁ siddhiḥ || 26 ||

And if existence really arose from mere non-existence, then even idle people, making no effort at all, should attain whatever they wish (since non-existence, unlike specific causes, is universally and equally 'available' everywhere) — a farmer would reap a harvest without tilling, a potter would get pots without shaping clay, a weaver cloth without weaving, and no one would need to strive for heaven or liberation. This is neither reasonable nor accepted by anyone. Hence the doctrine of 'existence from non-existence' is untenable.

नाभाव उपलब्धेः ॥ २७ ॥

nābhāva upalabdheḥ || 27 ||

Now the critique of the Idealist Buddhists (Vijñānavāda / Yogācāra), who deny external objects altogether and hold consciousness (vijñāna) alone to be real — arguing from the rule that object and cognition are always perceived together (sahopalambha), and that waking cognitions, like dream and illusion (māyā), could occur without any external object. Against this: the non-existence of the external object cannot be maintained, because it is itself directly perceived (upalabdhi) — a pillar, a wall, a pot, a cloth are each directly apprehended, in every single act of cognition, as something external. To deny the existence of what is itself being directly perceived is self-contradictory.

वैधर्म्याच् च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २८ ॥

vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat || 28 ||

And waking experience is not comparable to dream experience, because there is a clear difference (vaidharmya) between the two — what is seen in a dream is contradicted (sublated) on waking ('the crowd I saw' proves false), whereas the pillar and the like seen while waking are never sublated in any state; moreover dream-perception is of the nature of memory, while waking-perception is of the nature of direct apprehension — the difference between the two is itself directly experienced. Hence the analogy with dreams cannot be used to claim that waking cognitions lack any real external support.

न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ २९ ॥

na bhāvo'nupalabdheḥ || 29 ||

Objection: Even without any external object, the diversity of cognitions could be explained purely by the diversity of latent impressions (vāsanā). Reply: This too fails, because the impressions themselves cannot arise without prior direct perception (upalabdhi) of objects — how could a specific impression form on account of something that was never actually experienced? Hence, unless external objects are accepted, the very existence of these impressions cannot be established.

Note: Wikisource labels an additional short variant sutra here as ब्रसू-२,२.29(१), text 'क्षणिकत्वाच्च।'. Treated as an alternate/variant sub-reading noted by the source rather than an independent sutra in this project's sequential numbering, so it is not assigned its own verse; recorded here for transparency. The variant's own point (per the Bhāṣya) is that even the store-consciousness (ālayavijñāna) posited by the Idealists as the seat of these impressions cannot serve that role, since it too is held to be momentary and hence has no stable, continuous nature to sustain memory and recognition across time.

सर्वथानुपपत्तेश् च ॥ ३० ॥

sarvathānupapatteś ca || 30 ||

In short, however thoroughly the doctrine of the momentarists is examined, from every angle it collapses like a well dug in loose sand — no consistency is to be found in it anywhere. Moreover, since one and the same teacher (the Buddha) taught three mutually contradictory doctrines — realism, idealism, and voidism (śūnyavāda) — this itself betrays either incoherent rambling or a deliberate wish to confuse people. Hence the Buddhist system deserves no regard whatsoever from those who seek the good.

नैकस्मिन्न् असम्भवात् ॥ ३१ ॥

naikasminn asambhavāt || 31 ||

Now the critique of the Jain (Ārhata) doctrine, which through its seven-fold predication (saptabhaṅgī nyāya — 'in some sense it is, in some sense it is not...', the syādvāda) attributes mutually contradictory properties like existence and non-existence simultaneously to every entity. This is untenable, because a single substrate cannot at one and the same time contain two mutually opposed properties (like cold and hot); if the nature of a thing could never be definitely fixed, such cognition would be as invalid as a state of doubt — and a teacher (tīrthaṅkara) who instructs on such indeterminate matters would himself be no more credible than a madman.

एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम् ॥ ३२ ॥

evaṁ cātmākārtsnyam || 32 ||

And this same flaw of the Jain doctrine leads to a further defect: the incompleteness (akārtsnya) of the soul. The Jains hold the soul to be exactly the size of its body; since bodies vary in size (a human soul becoming, say, an elephant's through rebirth), the soul would then fail to pervade its entire new body fully, or else — like a pot — it would have to be impermanent, changing size with each rebirth. Neither conclusion is acceptable even to the Jains themselves.

न च पर्यायाद् अप्य् अविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥ ३३ ॥

na ca paryāyād apy avirodho vikārādibhyaḥ || 33 ||

Objection: The soul has infinite parts, which contract in a small body and expand in a large one — the parts entering and leaving in succession. Reply: Even this successive process does not resolve the contradiction — the constant coming and going of parts inevitably makes the soul subject to change, leading (like skin) to impermanence; moreover, where these incoming and outgoing parts come from and go to cannot be shown, and the soul's very nature would remain indeterminate. Hence this alternative too is untenable.

अन्त्यावस्थितेश् चोभयनित्यत्वाद् अविशेषः ॥ ३४ ॥

antyāvasthiteś cobhayanityatvād aviśeṣaḥ || 34 ||

And the Jains themselves hold that the soul's final size, at liberation, remains fixed forever — but by the same reasoning its size in the earlier stages too should be equally fixed (otherwise there is no principled reason why size should change at some stages and not others), collapsing the very thesis that the soul's size equals its current body's size. Hence, just like the Buddhist doctrine, the Jain (Ārhata) doctrine too proves incoherent and deserves to be set aside.

पत्युर् असामञ्जस्यात् ॥ ३५ ॥

patyur asāmañjasyāt || 35 ||

Now the refutation of the view that Īśvara (the Lord) is merely the instrumental cause (adhiṣṭhātṛ, a mere overseer, not the material cause) — held by some Vaiśeṣikas, and by the Pāśupata / Māheśvara school, according to which Paśupati, the Lord, teaches the five categories (cause, effect, union, ritual, and the end of suffering) for releasing bound souls (paśu) from their fetters (pāśa). The 'Lord' (pati) cannot be established as such a merely instrumental overseeing-cause of pradhāna and puruṣa, because of the resulting incongruity (asāmañjasya): a Lord who fashions an unequal creation — making some beings low, some middling, some excellent — would be guilty of the same partiality (rāga-dveṣa) as an ordinary person; moreover, no agent is ever seen to act without some motive of self-interest — a Lord who acts entirely for others' sake without any interest of his own would thereby cease to be a genuine 'Lord' at all, becoming no different from an ordinary self.

सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३६ ॥

sambandhānupapatteśca || 36 ||

And there is a further incongruity: such a Lord, distinct from pradhāna and puruṣa, could stand in no coherent relation to them at all — not conjunction (saṃyoga), since all three are held to be all-pervading and partless; not inherence (samavāya), since no relation of substrate and thing-inhering can be shown between them; nor any other relation inferable from their supposed effect, since the very causal relation is still unestablished. Hence the Sāṅkhya-Yoga conception of an overseeing Lord proves incoherent. (For the Vedāntin, by contrast, cause and effect stand in a relation of identity, tādātmya, so this fault does not touch his own position.)

Note: Wikisource labels an additional short variant sutra here as ब्रसू-२,२.36(१), text 'अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश् च ।'. Treated as an alternate/variant sub-reading noted by the source rather than an independent sutra in this project's sequential numbering, so it is not assigned its own verse; recorded here for transparency. The variant's own point (per the Bhāṣya) is that the very idea of an overseer 'presiding over' pradhāna, the way a potter presides over clay, is inexplicable, since pradhāna, being imperceptible and formless, is utterly unlike any substance a craftsman is ever seen to work upon.

करणवच् चेन् न भोगादिभ्यः ॥ ३७ ॥

karaṇavac cen na bhogādibhyaḥ || 37 ||

Objection: Just as puruṣa presides over the imperceptible, formless sense-organs, so too the Lord could preside over pradhāna. Reply: Even so this does not work, because the sense-organs' being 'presided over' is known through the fact of enjoyment (bhoga) accompanying their use, but no such enjoyment of the Lord through pradhāna is observed. And if, on the analogy of sense-organs, pradhāna is taken as the Lord's 'body,' then, like an ordinary transmigrating soul, the Lord too would be subject to experience and its attendant limitations — destroying his very status as Lord.

अन्तवत्त्वम् असर्वज्ञता वा ॥ ३८ ॥

antavattvam asarvajñatā vā || 38 ||

And there is a further flaw in this logically constructed Lord: does the omniscient Lord know the exact number and extent of pradhāna, of the many puruṣas, and of himself, or not? If he does, then — since by common observation whatever is limited by a definite quantity proves to be finite (antavat, perishable) — pradhāna, puruṣa and Īśvara would all three prove finite; and if he does not know their extent, his omniscience itself collapses. Either finitude or loss of omniscience is thus unavoidable.

उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ॥ ३९ ॥

utpattyasaṁbhavāt || 39 ||

Now the critique of the doctrine holding the Lord to be both material and overseeing cause together (the Bhāgavata / Pāñcarātra school: the one Bhagavān Vāsudeva is distributed into four emanations, vyūhas — Vāsudeva (the supreme Self), Saṅkarṣaṇa (the individual soul), Pradyumna (mind), and Aniruddha (ego), each held to arise successively from the one before). This doctrine is untenable, because if Saṅkarṣaṇa (the soul) is said to arise from Vāsudeva (the supreme Self), the soul would then be subject to the faults of impermanence (which the teacher explicitly rules out later: 'the Self does not arise, because of scripture and its eternality'), and since an effect eventually dissolves back into its cause, liberation (union with Bhagavān) would mean the soul's own annihilation, not release. Hence the soul's production from the Lord is impossible.

न च कर्तुः करणम् ॥ ४० ॥

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam || 40 ||

And it is likewise untenable that a mental faculty (Pradyumna, mind) should be produced from an agent (Saṅkarṣaṇa, the soul), and that another agent (Aniruddha, the ego) should in turn be produced from that faculty — for nowhere in ordinary experience is an instrument like an axe seen to be produced from an agent like Devadatta. Without any such precedent, this sequence cannot reasonably be accepted, nor is any scriptural text found teaching it.

विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४१ ॥

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ || 41 ||

Objection: Saṅkarṣaṇa and the rest are not to be understood as soul, mind and ego at all, but are themselves fully divine — each endowed with knowledge, lordship, power, strength, vigour and splendour, all equally Vāsudeva, flawless, without any substrate — so the fault of 'impossibility of production' does not apply here. Reply: Even so, this same fault persists in another form: either the four emanations are mutually distinct lords (in which case positing many lords is pointless, and it also contradicts the school's own tenet that 'the one Bhagavān Vāsudeva alone is the ultimate reality'), or they are emanations of one and the same Bhagavān (in which case the production of Saṅkarṣaṇa from Vāsudeva, and so on, remains just as impossible, since cause and effect show no distinguishing superiority of one over the other, as clay does over a pot).

विप्रतिषेधाच् च ॥ ४२ ॥

vipratiṣedhāc ca || 42 ||

And this scripture (the Pāñcarātra) shows further self-contradiction — in some places knowledge, lordship and the rest are called mere attributes (guṇa), elsewhere Vāsudeva and the other emanations are themselves called the possessor of those attributes; and it conflicts with the Veda too, even disparaging it, as when it claims 'not finding the highest good in the four Vedas, Śāṇḍilya obtained this teaching instead.' Hence this Bhāgavata conception is also shown to be untenable. (Here Pāda 2 of Adhyāya 2 concludes.)

न वियदश्रुतेः ॥ १ ॥

na viyadaśruteḥ || 1 ||

On the origin of space (ākāśa, one of the five great elements): initial view — space does not originate, because in the Chāndogya's account of creation only the origination of fire, water and food (three elements) from 'sat' (Brahman) is heard; nowhere is the origination of space itself mentioned, and in a matter beyond the senses, scripture (śruti) alone is our authority.

अस्ति तु ॥ २ ॥

asti tu || 2 ||

But the origination of space is indeed heard elsewhere (in the Taittirīya): 'from this very Self, space arose.' Yet the Chāndogya names fire as first-born, while the Taittirīya names space — and since a single act of speaking cannot connect the same subject to two different first-created things at once, an apparent conflict (vipratiṣedha) arises between the two scriptural passages.

गौण्यसंभवाच् छब्दाच् च ॥ ३ ॥

gauṇyasaṁbhavāc chabdāc ca || 3 ||

An attempted resolution: space does not really originate (there being no basic scriptural statement to that effect); the Taittirīya's talk of space 'arising' must be understood figuratively (gauṇa), because space's actual origination is impossible (production requires an inherent and non-inherent material cause, neither of which applies to space; nor can any difference between space 'before' and 'after' origination be shown); both ordinary usage and the Veda contain figurative expressions like 'make room' or 'the space inside a jar' — so this 'origination' language too should be taken as merely figurative.

स्याच् चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् ॥ ४ ॥

syāc caikasya brahmaśabdavat || 4 ||

The attempted resolution continues: how can the same word 'arose' (saṃbhūta) be used in its primary sense for fire, air, water and earth, but only figuratively for space? Answer offered: just as the one word 'brahman' is used figuratively of food and the rest ('through austerity, seek to know brahman') yet primarily of bliss (the real Brahman), so too 'arose' can be used both figuratively and primarily depending on context. On this view, even holding space unoriginated, the promise 'one alone, without a second' (that knowing one thing yields knowledge of all) still holds, since space shares Brahman's very location in space and time.

प्रतिज्ञाहानिर् अव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ५ ॥

pratijñāhānir avyatirekāt || 5 ||

Reply (rejecting the figurative reading above): No, this will not do. The promise that 'through one thing known, the unheard becomes heard' — one cognition yielding cognition of all — holds only if the entire world of effects actually arises (is non-different, avyatireka) from the one Brahman. If space is held not to originate, that very promise fails. Hence space too, like the other elements, genuinely arises from Brahman; the Taittirīya's statement is to be taken in its primary sense, not figuratively.

शब्देभ्यः ॥ ६ ॥

śabdebhyaḥ || 6 ||

And various scriptural texts also establish space's origination — for instance, 'as boundless as space, so boundless is the Self to be known' (using space as a simile for the Self) shows that space is a distinct effect, not identical with Brahman (for if space were Brahman itself, it could hardly serve as a simile to describe Brahman); phrases like 'all-pervading and eternal like space' point the same way (any apparent 'eternality' of space here being understood, like its 'immortality' elsewhere, in a qualified, non-ultimate sense).

यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् ॥ ७ ॥

yāvadvikāraṁ tu vibhāgo lokavat || 7 ||

And there is no ground to consider space's origination impossible — for wherever anything appears as an effect (vikāra) in the world, a distinction from other things is invariably found there (lokavat, 'as in ordinary experience'), and since space too is distinct from earth and the other elements, it too must be an effect. (By this same reasoning the effect-nature of direction, time, mind and atoms is likewise explained.) This rule does not apply to the Self (ātman): no scriptural passage names any cause prior to it, and the Self, being self-established, needs no such proof of effect-status — unlike space and the rest, which are all products.

एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः ॥ ८ ॥

etena mātariśvā vyākhyātaḥ || 8 ||

By this same explanation (given for space), the case of air (mātariśvan, one of the five elements) too is settled: the Chāndogya nowhere mentions air's origination, yet the Taittirīya clearly states 'from space, air' — so, exactly as with space, the same arguments establish air's genuine origination too; the scriptural denial of its ever 'setting' and its being called 'immortal' are to be understood as pertaining only to the lower, conditioned standpoint (apara-vidyā).

असंभवस् तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ ९ ॥

asaṁbhavas tu sato'nupapatteḥ || 9 ||

A possible worry (that if even things like space and air, once thought 'impossible' to originate, do in fact originate, perhaps Brahman too originates from something else) is set aside: it is impossible to suppose that Brahman, whose very nature is pure being (sat), originates from anything else. Pure being cannot arise merely from pure being (there being no distinguishing superiority of cause over effect in that case); nor is the origination of a universal from particulars ever observed (the reverse is what is seen); nor can existence arise from non-existence. Texts such as 'he has no begetter, and no ruler over him' likewise deny any generator of Brahman.

तेजोऽतस् तथा ह्य् आह ॥ १० ॥

tejo'tas tathā hy āha || 10 ||

Objection: The Chāndogya says fire arises directly from Brahman ('that produced fire'), while the Taittirīya gives a sequence, 'from air, fire' — this should be understood as merely the order of narration; there is no real obstacle to fire arising directly from Brahman. Reply: No — fire arises specifically from air (mātariśvan), since scripture explicitly states so; if fire arose directly from Brahman without air's mediation, this sequential statement would be pointless. Yet the Chāndogya's 'that produced fire' remains true too, in the sense of mediate causation (Brahman, having already become air, then produces fire) — so there is no real contradiction.

आपः ॥ ११ ॥

āpaḥ || 11 ||

And in the same sequence, water (āpaḥ) arises from fire, since scripture explicitly states so ('that produced water,' and 'from fire, water') — there is no doubt about this. Before describing the origination of earth, the sūtrakāra sums this up briefly in the single word 'āpaḥ' (waters).

पृथिवी ॥ १२ ॥

pṛthivī || 12 ||

Objection: Scripture says 'the waters thought — may we become many, may we procreate — they produced food (anna)' — is 'food' here rice, barley and the like (edible grain), or is it earth? Common usage and the continuation ('wherever it rains, food is most abundant') suggest ordinary grain. Reply: No — here 'food' means earth, because of the context (only the great elements — fire, water — are under discussion; a sudden introduction of grain would break that sequence), the colour attributed ('what is black belongs to food,' matching earth's predominant colour), and other scriptural passages ('from water, earth'; 'from earth, plants') all support this reading. Hence earth, arising from water, is what is meant by 'food' here.

अधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरेभ्यः ॥ १३ ॥

adhikārarūpaśabdāntarebhyaḥ || 13 ||

(This sūtra grounds the preceding one.) From the context (adhikāra), from the colour-description (rūpa), and from other scriptural passages — as explained above — it is thus established that the word 'food,' said to arise from water, here refers to earth itself.

तदभिध्यानाद् एव तु तल्लिङ्गात् सः ॥ १४ ॥

tadabhidhyānād eva tu talliṅgāt saḥ || 14 ||

Objection: Do the elements like space and the rest produce their own further derivatives independently, or does the Lord himself, abiding within them in each form, deliberately will ('may I become many') and thereby bring about each transformation? Statements of apparent independence, like 'from space, air,' suggest the elements act on their own (and elsewhere scripture even ascribes perception to elements, e.g. 'fire thought'). Reply: No — it is the Lord himself, abiding within each element, who by the will 'may I become many' produces each transformation, as shown by a telling clue (liṅga) in scripture: texts like 'he who dwells in the earth... whose body the earth is' show it is not the elements acting directly and consciously but the inner controller (antaryāmin), the Lord, acting within them. The seeming perception ascribed to water and fire is likewise due to the Lord's presence within them, since apart from 'Being' (sat) itself no other seer is admitted here.

विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ॥ १५ ॥

viparyayeṇa tu kramo'ta upapadyate ca || 15 ||

Now, consideration of the order of dissolution: does dissolution occur in a fixed order — the same order as creation, or the reverse? Reply: The order of dissolution is exactly the reverse of the order of creation — just as one descends a staircase by the reverse of the order by which one climbed it, so earth dissolves into water, water into fire, fire into air, air into space, and finally everything merges, each into its immediately subtler cause, ultimately into the supreme cause, Brahman. Since the cause cannot dissolve while its effect still exists, the effect must dissolve into its cause first — this reverse order is also described in the smṛtis.

अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिङ्गाद् इति चेन् नाविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

antarā vijñānamanasī krameṇa talliṅgād iti cen nāviśeṣāt || 16 ||

Objection: Since the existence of mind and intellect (vijñāna) is well established by scripture and smṛti ('know the intellect as the charioteer...'), and since in the Atharvan creation-account the organs (breath, mind, senses) are also listed between the elements and the Self, these too ought to be fitted somewhere into the elements' order of creation and dissolution — disrupting the sequence given above. Reply: No fault — if the organs are physical (made of the elements), they simply arise and dissolve along with the elements, needing no separate sequence; and even if held non-physical, the Atharvan passage is merely a list in the order of recitation, not actual causal sequence (elsewhere, in the Prajāpati passage, organs are listed in an order quite distinct from that of the elements). Hence no disruption occurs in the established order.

चराचरव्यपाश्रयस् तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस् तद्भावभावित्वात् ॥ १७ ॥

carācaravyapāśrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeśo bhāktas tadbhāvabhāvitvāt || 17 ||

Objection: Ordinary usage like 'Devadatta was born,' 'Devadatta died,' and the prescribed birth-rites (jātakarma) suggest that the individual soul (jīva) too is born and dies. Reply: No, the soul is not born and does not die, for scripture says 'only when the soul departs does this body die; the soul does not die.' The words 'birth' and 'death' apply primarily to moving and unmoving beings (i.e. to bodies), and their application to the embodied soul is merely figurative (bhākta, secondary) — for the soul's 'birth' and 'death' are always spoken of only in connection with a body's appearance and disappearance (no one ever observes a soul being born or dying apart from bodily connection).

नात्मा श्रुतेर् नित्यत्वाच् च ताभ्यः ॥ १८ ॥

nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ || 18 ||

Objection: Does the individual soul (jīva), like space and the rest, originate from the supreme Brahman, or does it remain unoriginated like Brahman itself? Some texts, using the simile of sparks from fire, describe the soul's origination from Brahman, and the promise 'through one thing known, all is known' seems to require it, while the soul's being differentiated (into each body) suggests it too, like other differentiated things, should be an effect. Reply: No, the soul does not originate, for there is no primary scriptural statement to that effect in the actual creation-account, and numerous texts explicitly affirm its eternity ('the wise one is neither born nor dies,' 'unborn, eternal, everlasting, ancient'). The spark-simile and texts of 'entering' are to be understood in terms of the relation of the unmodified Brahman to a limiting adjunct (upādhi) — through which it appears, as it were, as the individual soul — not as an actual production.

ज्ञोऽत एव ॥ १९ ॥

jño'ta eva || 19 ||

Objection: Is the Self, like the Vaiśeṣika view, intrinsically insentient and acquiring consciousness only adventitiously through its connection with mind (as suggested by the apparent absence of consciousness in deep sleep or fainting)? Or is it, as the Sāṅkhya holds, eternally conscious by its very nature? Reply: The Self is inherently a knower (jña), eternally conscious — precisely because it does not originate — for the supreme Brahman's very nature is declared to be consciousness ('Brahman is consciousness and bliss'), and the individual soul is none other than that very Brahman. The apparent absence of consciousness in deep sleep is due to the absence of any object to know, not any absence of the Self's own nature as knower ('the seer's power of seeing is never in fact lost').

उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ॥ २० ॥

utkrāntigatyāgatīnām || 20 ||

Now, consideration of the individual soul's magnitude: is it atomic in size, of medium size, or all-pervading (vibhu, like space)? Though the Self was shown to be unoriginated and eternally conscious, scriptural mentions of its 'departing' (utkrānti — leaving the body), 'going' (gati), and 'returning' (āgati) — 'when it departs from this body, it departs together with all these [organs]'; 'those who depart from this world go to the moon'; 'it returns from that world back to this world of action' — suggest that the soul is limited (paricchinna), since motion and return cannot be predicated of an all-pervading thing. Hence, on this initial view, the soul must be atomic in size.

स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः ॥ २१ ॥

svātmanā cottarayoḥ || 21 ||

And while 'departure' (utkrānti) might occur, in some sense, without actual motion (merely as the cessation of ownership of the body), the latter two terms — 'going' (gati) and 'returning' (āgati) — require actual motion by the subject itself (svātmanā), since the root 'gam' denotes an action situated in the agent, and motion is possible only for something finite (not medium-sized, and certainly not all-pervading) — hence this too supports the soul's atomic magnitude; and once 'going' and 'returning' are established as real motion, 'departure' too is shown to be a genuine leaving of the body.

नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेर् इति चेन् नेतराधिकारात् ॥ २२ ॥

nāṇuratacchruter iti cen netarādhikārāt || 22 ||

Objection: The Self is not atomic, since a contrary text — declaring it all-pervading — is also found: 'That great, unborn Self,' 'all-pervading like space, and eternal,' 'the infinite Brahman, consciousness and truth.' Reply: No such fault — these all-pervasiveness passages occur in a context primarily concerned with the other, i.e. with the supreme Self (Paramātman), not the individual soul; even a phrase like 'he who is made of consciousness, among the vital breaths' is, on close reading, really describing the supreme Self (in the manner of the sage Vāmadeva's identification). Hence this alternative magnitude-statement, pertaining to the supreme Self, does not contradict the individual soul's atomicity.

स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च ॥ २३ ॥

svaśabdonmānābhyāṁ ca || 23 ||

And also because the word 'atomic' (aṇu) is directly used of the soul: 'this atomic Self, to be known by thought, in which breath has entered five-fold' — the mention of breath here makes clear that this refers to the individual soul. And measurements (unmāna) such as 'the soul, to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair' and 'the least of beings too has been seen the size of the point of an awl' likewise indicate the soul's atomic size.

अविरोधश् चन्दनवत् ॥ २४ ॥

avirodhaś candanavat || 24 ||

Objection: If the soul is atomic in size, then, being located in only one part of the body, how could sensation pervading the entire body (e.g. coolness all over from bathing in the Ganges, or heat all over in the sun) be explained? Reply: Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though applied to only one spot on the body, produces a cooling pleasure throughout the whole body (because the skin, which it touches, itself pervades the entire body), so too an atomic soul, located at one point but connected via the skin, can likewise produce sensation throughout the whole body. Hence there is no contradiction.

अवस्थितिवैशेष्याद् इति चेन् नाभ्युपगमाद् धृदि हि ॥ २५ ॥

avasthitivaiśeṣyād iti cen nābhyupagamād dhṛdi hi || 25 ||

Objection: The sandal-paste example and the case of the soul are not truly parallel, since the sandal-paste's localization is directly perceptible, while the soul's localization can only be inferred — leaving open the doubt whether the soul's body-wide sensation results from a body-pervading organ (like skin), from all-pervasiveness (like space), or from being at one point (like the sandal drop). Reply: No such fault, because the soul's localization at one point is itself accepted by the Vedānta scriptures — many texts declare 'this Self is in the heart,' so there is in fact no disparity between the example and the case it illustrates.

गुणाद्वा लोकवत् ॥ २६ ॥

guṇādvā lokavat || 26 ||

Or alternatively, the atomic soul's body-wide effect can be explained by the pervasion of its quality (guṇa, i.e. consciousness) — just as a jewel or a lamp, though situated in one corner of a room, has a radiance that pervades the whole room and produces illumination throughout, so too the atomic soul's quality of consciousness pervades the whole body, though the soul itself is located at one point, producing sensation throughout.

व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ २७ ॥

vyatireko gandhavat tathā hi darśayati || 27 ||

And just as smell, though a quality, is seen to spread apart from (vyatireka) its own substrate (the fragrant substance itself) — the fragrance of a distant flower is perceived though the substance itself does not travel there — so too the atomic soul's quality of consciousness could likewise extend beyond its substrate; scripture itself shows this. Hence the rule that 'a quality can never exist apart from its substrate' is not universally valid — the example of fragrance breaks it.

पृथगुपदेशात् ॥ २८ ॥

pṛthagupadeśāt || 28 ||

And also because the soul's body-wide activity occurs solely through its quality of consciousness (while the soul itself remains atomic) — for scripture separately mentions the Self and the intellect (prajñā) as agent and instrument, as in 'having mounted the body by means of the intellect,' establishing that the soul is atomic, achieving pervasion of the body only through the spread of its quality of consciousness.

तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ॥ २९ ॥

tadguṇasāratvāt tu tadvyapadeśaḥ prājñavat || 29 ||

Reply (rejecting the atomicity view above): No, the soul is not atomic but all-pervading (vibhu) — for its origination is nowhere taught (the soul being eternal), and texts of 'entering' and of identity ('that art thou') show that the soul is none other than the supreme Brahman itself; and since Brahman is declared all-pervading, the soul must be so too. The 'skin-contact' explanation does not work either (a thorn-prick does not cause body-wide sensation, so contact with the pervasive skin cannot by itself explain body-wide feeling generally); and a quality cannot exist apart from its substance (smell too remains with its fragrant substance, merely unnoticed when the substance is too subtle to detect). Hence words like 'atomic' applied to the soul are due to its predominant identification with the intellect (its limiting adjunct, upādhi) — just as, in meditations involving such adjuncts, the supreme Self too is spoken of as 'smaller than a grain of rice or barley.'

यावदात्मभावित्वाच् च न दोषस् तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

yāvadātmabhāvitvāc ca na doṣas taddarśanāt || 30 ||

Objection: If the soul's apparent 'atomicity' and the like depend on its identification with the intellect (a limiting adjunct), then, being ultimately distinct from the intellect, this connection ought at some point to end — and once separated, the imperceptible soul would seem either non-existent or freed from transmigration prematurely. Reply: No such fault, because this connection with the intellect persists exactly as long as the soul remains subject to transmigration (yāvadātmabhāvitvāt) — it never ceases until true knowledge dispels transmigratory existence; this too is shown by scripture: 'accompanied by that same intellect, it wanders through both worlds.'

पुंस्त्वादिवत् त्व् अस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ॥ ३१ ॥

puṁstvādivat tv asya sato'bhivyaktiyogāt || 31 ||

Objection: In deep sleep and cosmic dissolution, all differentiations are said to merge completely ('having become one with Being, one then knows not') — how then can the intellect-connection persist throughout that time? Reply: Just as, in the world, the capacity for manhood exists potentially (as a seed) even in childhood though unmanifest, and becomes manifest (abhivyakti) only in youth — not newly created — so too, in deep sleep and dissolution, the connection with the intellect persists in potential form, becoming manifest again only upon waking or re-creation; otherwise the fault of causeless, sudden origination would follow.

नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वान्यथा ॥ ३२ ॥

nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo'nyataraniyamo vānyathā || 32 ||

And this internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa — mind, intellect, thought) must certainly be accepted, otherwise one of two faults becomes unavoidable: without positing it, whenever the Self, senses, and object are all in proximity, either cognition ought to occur invariably (perpetual perception) or, if it does not, non-cognition ought to occur invariably, despite the presence of all the conditions; or else one would have to posit an obstruction of power in the Self or in the sense-organ itself, which is untenable (the Self is changeless, and a sense-organ's power cannot spontaneously become blocked without cause). Hence that whose attention or inattention regulates perception and non-perception — namely 'mind' (manas), the internal organ — must be accepted.

कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् ॥ ३३ ॥

kartā śāstrārthavattvāt || 33 ||

Now, consideration of the soul's agency (kartṛtva): the individual soul is an agent (kartā), because this alone makes the injunctive scripture meaningful — injunctions like 'let him sacrifice, let him offer, let him give' are meaningful only if an agent (the soul) is capable of performing them; without agency, such teaching would be pointless. And a text such as 'he indeed is the seer, hearer, thinker, cognizer, agent — the conscious person (puruṣa)' likewise becomes meaningful on this basis.

उपादानाद् विहारोपदेशाच् च ॥ ३४ ॥

upādānād vihāropadeśāc ca || 34 ||

And also because the soul's agency is shown by the description, in this very context, of the taking up (upādāna) of the organs ('having grasped the faculty of cognition from among these vital breaths') — possible only for an agent — and, in the same context, by the teaching of wandering (vihāra) in the dream state ('he moves about wherever he wishes,' 'he roams about in his own body as he pleases') — both of which establish the soul's agency.

व्यपदेशाच् च क्रियायां न चेन् निर्देशविपर्ययः ॥ ३५ ॥

vyapadeśāc ca kriyāyāṁ na cen nirdeśaviparyayaḥ || 35 ||

And also because scripture explicitly mentions the soul's agency in various worldly and Vedic activities — 'cognition (vijñāna) performs the sacrifice, and performs the rites too'; here the word 'vijñāna' denotes the soul itself, not the intellect (buddhi) as an instrument — since it is used in the nominative case (agreeing with the agent), whereas if the intellect as mere instrument were meant, the instrumental case ('by cognition') would be used, as seen elsewhere. Hence this shows the soul's own agency, distinct from the intellect.

उपलब्धिवदनियमः ॥ ३६ ॥

upalabdhivadaniyamaḥ || 36 ||

Objection: If the soul were an independent agent, distinct from the intellect, it should always act only in its own beneficial interest, not harmfully — yet it is seen, unpredictably, to act contrary to its own interest too, which seems inconsistent with genuine independent agency. Reply: Just as this Self, though independent, unpredictably experiences both the desirable and undesirable in perception (upalabdhi) — sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain — so too it will unpredictably perform both beneficial and harmful acts. And just as the Self's independence in perception still depends on the presence of the relevant instruments, so its independence in action likewise depends on place, time, cause and supporting conditions — such conditioned, unpredictable activity is not at odds with genuine agency.

शक्तिविपर्ययात् ॥ ३७ ॥

śaktiviparyayāt || 37 ||

And also because, if the word 'vijñāna' were taken to mean the intellect as agent, an inversion of powers (śaktiviparyaya) would follow — the intellect, which is normally known only as an instrument (karaṇa), would become the agent, and the ego-notion 'I go, I come' (which everywhere accompanies agency) would also have to belong to the intellect, requiring yet another instrument to be posited for that very intellect. This would reduce the dispute to a mere quarrel over terminology, while still requiring the acceptance of an agent distinct from the instrument.

समाध्यभावाच् च ॥ ३८ ॥

samādhyabhāvāc ca || 38 ||

And also because the meditation (samādhi) taught in Vedānta for realizing the Self ('the Self, indeed, is to be seen, heard, reflected upon, and meditated upon') would itself be unaccountable without the soul's own agency, since meditation too is an activity requiring an agent. This too establishes the soul's agency.

यथा च तक्षोभयथा ॥ ३९ ॥

yathā ca takṣobhayathā || 39 ||

This agency of the soul is not innate (svābhāvika) but caused by its limiting adjuncts (avidyā-kṛta) — otherwise (were agency innate, like heat in fire) the soul could never be free of it, and since agency is inherently painful, the attainment of the highest human goal would be blocked. As a carpenter (takṣan), tool in hand, is troubled while working, but on returning home, putting his tools aside, becomes free of activity, at ease and happy — so too the Self, entangled in the ignorance-constructed duality of waking and dreaming, is an agent and suffers, but in deep sleep, and ultimately upon Self-realization, becomes free of the body-mind complex, a non-agent, at peace. Both aspects of the carpenter — as toiling agent and as one at rest — thus serve as a parallel for the Self.

परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ४० ॥

parāt tu tacchruteḥ || 40 ||

Now, consideration: is the soul's agency (operating within the sphere of ignorance) independent of the Lord (Īśvara), or dependent on him? Reply: The soul's agency is subordinate to (parāyatta) the Lord, because scripture says so: 'it is he indeed who makes him whom he wishes to lead upward perform good deeds' — though the soul, driven by its own likes and dislikes and equipped with the means, appears to exercise agency on its own, the Lord, presiding over all activity as the inner controller, is in fact the ultimate causal agent behind it.

कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस् तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ॥ ४१ ॥

kṛtaprayatnāpekṣas tu vihitapratiṣiddhāvaiyarthyādibhyaḥ || 41 ||

Objection: If the Lord alone is the one who impels the soul to act, then the earlier faults of partiality and cruelty would recur, and the soul would also be charged with reaping results for deeds it did not do (akṛtābhyāgama). Reply: No — the Lord impels the soul only with reference to (kṛtaprayatnāpekṣa) effort already generated by its own prior deeds (just as rain yields fruit only according to the particular potency already present in each seed) — so no such fault of partiality arises. This is also proved by the fact that, otherwise, injunctions and prohibitions ('let one who desires heaven sacrifice,' 'a brāhmaṇa must not be killed') would serve no purpose at all — for if the Lord alone acted entirely independently, all such teaching would be pointless.

अंशो नानाव्यपदेशाद् अन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वम् अधीयत एके ॥ ४२ ॥

aṁśo nānāvyapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke || 42 ||

Now, consideration: in the relation of controller and controlled (upakārya-upakāraka) between the Lord and the soul, are the two related as master and servant, or as a fire and its sparks? Reply: The soul is a 'part' (aṃśa) of the Lord, comparable to a spark of fire — even though the partless (niravayava) Brahman cannot literally have parts, such language of distinction ('he is to be sought, he is to be known') is nonetheless appropriate. And some Vedic branches ('Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman the slaves, these gamblers too are Brahman alone') also indicate non-difference, showing the Brahman-nature of even lowly beings through such examples. Since both texts of difference and texts of non-difference are found, the soul's status is best understood as 'a part' — consciousness itself being no different between soul and Lord, just as heat is no different between fire and its spark.

मन्त्रवर्णात् ॥ ४३ ॥

mantravarṇāt || 43 ||

And also because a Vedic mantra shows this too: 'such is his glory; yet greater than this is the Person (puruṣa); a quarter (pāda) of him are all beings, three quarters are the immortal in heaven' — here 'beings' refers to living creatures, predominantly the embodied souls, and 'quarter' (pāda) is a synonym for 'part' (aṃśa). This too confirms the soul's status as a part of the Lord.

अपि स्मर्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

api smaryate || 44 ||

And also because this is affirmed in smṛti (the Bhagavad Gītā): 'an eternal portion of myself alone, having become an individual soul in the world of the living' [is the jīva]. The earlier objection (that only the master-servant relation is well known in ordinary usage) is not decisive, because scripture itself here establishes both the part-whole relation and the ruler-ruled relation: the Lord, possessed of unsurpassed limiting adjuncts, rules over souls possessed of inferior ones — there is no contradiction in this.

प्रकाशादिवत् तु नैवं परः ॥ ४५ ॥

prakāśādivat tu naivaṁ paraḥ || 45 ||

Objection: If the soul is a part of the Lord, then the suffering experienced by the soul should also affect the Lord, the whole to which it belongs (just as pain in a hand or foot pains the whole person, Devadatta). This would make right knowledge (of non-difference) counterproductive, since it would only extend the Lord's own suffering. Reply: No — just as sunlight or moonlight, pervading space, appears to bend and straighten along with the bending and straightening of a finger through which it passes, without the light itself actually bending (or as the sun's reflection in trembling water seems to tremble, though the sun itself does not), so too, though suffering appears in the soul — the 'part' constituted by ignorance-superimposed intellect and the rest — the supreme (Lord) is never actually pained by it. The soul's suffering, too, is fundamentally caused by ignorance, not real in the ultimate sense.

स्मरन्ति च ॥ ४६ ॥

smaranti ca || 46 ||

And smṛti too (Vyāsa and other sages) confirms this — that the supreme Self is not pained by the soul's suffering: 'he is remembered as eternal and without qualities; he is not tainted by results, as a lotus-leaf is not tainted by water; it is another, the one of the nature of action (the individual soul), who is bound by bondage and liberation.' Similarly texts like 'the inner Self of all beings, being external [transcendent] to the world's suffering, is not tainted by it' support this same point.

अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसम्बन्धाज् ज्योतिरादिवत् ॥ ४७ ॥

anujñāparihārau dehasambandhāj jyotirādivat || 47 ||

Objection: If one and the same supreme Self is the inner self of all beings, how can worldly and Vedic injunction (anujñā, e.g. 'one may approach one's wife in the fertile season') and prohibition (parihāra, e.g. 'one must not approach a guru's wife') apply at all? Reply: This is accounted for by the connection with a body (dehasambandha — the mistaken notion 'I am this body-mind complex') — just as, with one and the same fire, one variety ('the fire that consumes corpses') is to be avoided while another is not, so too, on account of embodiment, both injunction and prohibition remain meaningful even though the Self is really non-dual. (For one who has realized the truth, having no such bodily identification, no injunction or prohibition applies any longer.)

असन्ततेश् चाव्यतिकरः ॥ ४८ ॥

asantateś cāvyatikaraḥ || 48 ||

Objection: Even so, since one and the same Self is connected to many bodies, the results of one body's deeds should mix with another's (vyatikara), the 'owner' being one in all cases. Reply: No — because there is no continuity (asantati) between the soul-instances in each body: the Self as agent and enjoyer has no unbroken, continuous connection running through all bodies; the individual soul (jīva) is dependent on its limiting adjuncts (upādhi-tantra), and since there is no continuity among the adjuncts themselves, there is likewise no real continuity of 'the soul' across bodies. Hence no mixing of the results of deeds occurs.

आभास एव च ॥ ४९ ॥

ābhāsa eva ca || 49 ||

And this individual soul is merely a reflection (ābhāsa) of the supreme Self, like the sun reflected in water — it is neither the supreme Self directly, nor something entirely different from it. Hence, just as when one water-reflection of the sun trembles, another such reflection elsewhere does not tremble with it, so too one soul's connection to the results of its deeds does not affect another soul — this explains the non-mixing of deeds and their fruits. And since this reflection is itself a product of ignorance, the transmigratory existence based on it is likewise shown to be a product of ignorance — and it is precisely by setting this aside that the teaching of the soul's ultimate identity with Brahman becomes meaningful.

अदृष्टानियमात् ॥ ५० ॥

adṛṣṭāniyamāt || 50 ||

(Continuing the critique of the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of many, all-pervading selves): if many all-pervading selves are posited, then the pleasure or pain experienced by any one of them should be shared equally by all (since all selves are equally present everywhere); and even if one appeals to unseen merit/demerit (adṛṣṭa, karma) to explain individual variation — since adṛṣṭa too arises from a generic contact of mind with self, common to all — there remains no principled way to determine which adṛṣṭa belongs to which self. Hence even adṛṣṭa fails to remove this lack of regulation.

अभिसन्ध्यादिष्व् अपि चैवम् ॥ ५१ ॥

abhisandhyādiṣv api caivam || 51 ||

And this same fault applies equally to volitional acts (abhisandhi, e.g. 'may I attain this result, may I avoid that, let me strive thus, let me do this') and the like — since these too arise from the same generic self-mind contact common to all selves, they too fail to provide any principled basis for determining which unseen merit or self 'belongs' to which. So the same fault noted above persists here as well.

प्रदेशभेदाद् इति चेन् नान्तर्भावात् ॥ ५२ ॥

pradeśabhedād iti cen nāntarbhāvāt || 52 ||

Objection: Though the self is all-pervading, its contact with the body-bound mind would occur only within that portion of the self coinciding with its own body — so the regulation of volition, unseen merit, pleasure and pain could be explained by this difference of location. Reply: This too fails, because of mutual interpenetration (antarbhāva) — since all selves, being equally all-pervading, are equally present within every body, no exclusive 'location' can be assigned to any one self as distinct from another; and even a merely posited (not real) location cannot regulate an actual, real effect. Hence the very notion of all-pervading multiple selves proves incoherent — only the doctrine of the oneness of the Self (ātmaikatva) is shown to be free of every such fault. (Here Pāda 3 concludes.)

तथा प्राणाः ॥ १ ॥

tathā prāṇāḥ || 1 ||

Initial statement: just as space and the other elements were established as arising from Brahman, so too the vital breaths (prāṇas — the chief prāṇa and the group of sense- and action-organs) should be understood to arise from Brahman as well. Though the word 'tathā' ('likewise') in this sūtra does not make explicit what the comparison is (it cannot be with the individual soul, jīva, since the soul does not originate), texts such as 'from this Self all the vital breaths... arise' and 'from this arises breath, mind, and all the senses' make clear that, just as space and the other elements arise from the supreme Brahman, the vital breaths likewise arise from it.

गौण्यसंभवात् तत्प्राक् श्रुतेश् च ॥ २ ॥

gauṇyasaṁbhavāt tatprāk śruteś ca || 2 ||

Objection: Since texts describe a state prior to creation without breath, without mind ('without breath, without mind, pure...'), the scriptural statements of the vital breaths' origination should likewise be understood figuratively. Reply: No — this cannot be figurative, since that would undermine the promise 'through one thing known, all is known.' The passage 'without breath, without mind' refers to the ultimate root cause (Brahman) alone; it does not deny the pre-existence, relative to its own immediate substrate, of breath and the rest with respect to their proximate causes.

तत्पूर्वकत्वाद् वाचः ॥ ३ ॥

tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ || 3 ||

And also because the very same word 'arises' (jāyate), heard first in connection with breath and used there in its primary sense, occurs only once in the single sentence and is then connected with space and the other elements too — it is not reasonable that one word, spoken once, be primary in one connection and figurative in another. By this same logic, in 'all the breaths issue forth,' the later-occurring word 'issue forth' should likewise be taken in its primary sense for the earlier-mentioned breath and the rest to which it is connected.

सप्त गतेर् विशेषितत्वाच् च ॥ ४ ॥

sapta gater viśeṣitatvāc ca || 4 ||

Now, consideration of the number of vital breaths (apart from the chief breath, various texts count seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, or thirteen): Objection — there are exactly seven breaths, because it is specifically these seven that are singled out in connection with 'departure' (gati, at death): texts like 'seven breaths proceed from him' and 'seven breaths are in the head, two lead downward' single out precisely the number seven.

हस्तादयस् तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ॥ ५ ॥

hastādayas tu sthite'to naivam || 5 ||

Reply: No — there are eleven vital breaths (besides the chief breath), for texts also mention breaths beyond the seven — hands and the rest. When lesser and greater counts conflict, the greater number is to be accepted, since the lesser is included within it; the text 'these ten breaths are in the person, the self (ātman) is the eleventh' clearly gives the count as eleven (with 'ātman' here meaning the internal organ, mind); and by the distinction of functions too (five organs of perception, five of action, and one mind), eleven is shown to be the proper number — the count of seven serves only meditative or illustrative purposes in its own context.

अणवश् च ॥ ६ ॥

aṇavaś ca || 6 ||

And these (organ-)breaths too must be understood as subtle and finite (aṇu-parimāṇa) — not equal to a point-like atom, but subtle and delimited — for if they were gross, they would be visible to bystanders leaving the body at death, like a snake emerging from its hole (which does not happen); and if held to be all-pervading, the scriptural statements about departure, going, and returning would be contradicted, and the soul's characteristic dependence on the intellect as its predominant quality could not be explained either.

श्रेष्ठश् च ॥ ७ ॥

śreṣṭhaś ca || 7 ||

And it should also be understood, by extension (atideśa), that the chief vital breath too, like the other breaths, is a modification of Brahman — this extension being made specifically because a phrase in the 'Nāsadīya' hymn, 'it breathed windlessly,' might suggest that breath already existed in some form before creation (and hence is unborn); but the qualifier 'windless' and texts like 'without breath, without mind' make clear no actual breath is implied there. And the text 'breath indeed is both the eldest and the best' shows the chief breath to be 'eldest' (since it becomes functional from the very moment of conception) and 'best' (due to its superior quality, as in 'we could not live without you').

न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ॥ ८ ॥

na vāyukriye pṛthagupadeśāt || 8 ||

Objection: The chief breath is simply air (vāyu), since scripture says 'what is breath, that is air' and describes that same air divided into five forms — prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna; or, on another view, it is merely the collective functioning of the other organs. Reply: No, the chief breath is neither air itself nor mere organ-function, because it is described separately from both: 'breath alone is the fourth quarter of Brahman; it shines and burns together with air (vāyunā) and light' distinguishes breath from air (the instrumental case 'with air' implying a distinct entity); and breath is likewise mentioned separately from speech and the other organs. Hence the chief breath is a distinct principle, manifesting air in a special, individualized, five-fold form within the embodied being — neither mere air nor mere organ-function.

चक्षुरादिवत् तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः ॥ ९ ॥

cakṣurādivat tu tatsahaśiṣṭyādibhyaḥ || 9 ||

Objection: If the chief breath, like the eye, were merely an instrument for the soul, it should, like the eye's connection to form, have some distinct object-field of its own; but only eleven organs' functions (seeing, and so on) are enumerated, with no twelfth object-domain evident for breath. This sūtra's reply: breath, like the eye, is indeed an instrument (karaṇa) for the soul — comparable to a minister serving a king — not independent, since it is governed together with the eye and the other organs under the same authority (as in the 'dialogue of the vital breaths'), and shares the same generic properties (being composite, insentient, and so forth) as the other organs.

अकरणत्वाच् च न दोषस् तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ १० ॥

akaraṇatvāc ca na doṣas tathā hi darśayati || 10 ||

Continuing the objection: it might be expected that if breath too were merely an instrument, it should have its own specific function, else it would serve no purpose. Reply: No such fault arises, because breath, unlike the eye and the rest, is not an instrument for any particular external object; yet it does have its own distinct function, as scripture shows: in the 'dialogue of the vital breaths,' even after speech and the other organs depart in turn, life continues, merely diminished of that particular function; but the mere threat of breath's own departure brings the collapse of all the organs and the body itself. Breath's special function, then, is precisely to sustain and protect the entire body and its organs.

पञ्चवृत्तिर् मनोवत् व्यपदिश्यते ॥ ११ ॥

pañcavṛttir manovat vyapadiśyate || 11 ||

And also because the chief breath's special function is shown by its five modes (prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna) described in scripture — comparable, in being differentiated by their functions, to mind's five modes (right cognition, error, imagination, sleep, memory): prāṇa governs the upward function of exhalation; apāna the downward function of inhalation; vyāna, situated between the two, is the source of strength; udāna is the cause of departure at death; and samāna distributes the essence of food evenly throughout the body. This too establishes both breath's status as an instrument serving the soul and its own distinctive function.

अणुश् च ॥ १२ ॥

aṇuś ca || 12 ||

And this chief breath too, like the other (organ-)breaths, must be understood as atomic (subtle and finite) — being subtle because it pervades the whole body through its five modes, and finite (not all-pervading) because it is not perceived by bystanders at death, and because of the scriptural statements about departure, going and returning. The text describing breath's all-pervasiveness ('equal to an ant, equal to a mosquito... equal to this whole world') refers to the cosmic breath, identified with the collective divine principle Hiraṇyagarbha, not to the individual breath present in each separate being — so no fault arises.

ज्योतिर् आद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्प्राणवता शब्दात् ॥ १३ ॥

jyotir ādyadhiṣṭhānaṁ tu tadāmananātprāṇavatā śabdāt || 13 ||

Now, consideration: do these (organ-)breaths act, each in their own function, purely through their own power, or only when presided over by a deity? Reply: The organs — speech and the rest — act in their functions only when presided over by their respective deities, like fire and the rest, because scripture describes it so ('fire, having become speech, entered the mouth' — the phrase 'together with a breath' in the text pointing to this connection): this description of fire 'becoming' speech and 'entering' the mouth makes sense only on the assumption of the deity's overseeing role. Otherwise, even something capable of its own function (like a cart) is seen to move only when presided over by an ox and driver — mere capability is not enough for spontaneous action.

तस्य च नित्यत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

tasya ca nityatvāt || 14 ||

And even on this view (that deities preside over the organs), the embodied soul's status as enjoyer is not lost. (This resolves the objection: 'if deities alone preside, shouldn't they alone be the enjoyers, not the embodied soul?') The soul alone permanently enjoys experience in this body — only in the soul, not in the deities, is the accumulation of merit and demerit, and the experience of pleasure and pain, possible; deities, established in a state of supreme majesty, do not take on the role of enjoyer in a lowly body. And the vital breaths remain permanently connected with the body (they are shown to follow it even in departure and the like). Hence, even though deities govern the organs, the body's status as the locus of enjoyment is not lost — the deities preside only over the instrumental side, not the enjoying side.

त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशाद् अन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात् ॥ १५ ॥

ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadeśād anyatra śreṣṭhāt || 15 ||

Objection: Are speech and the other ten organs simply modes of the chief breath, or are they independent, distinct principles? Scripture brings the chief and other breaths together, declaring 'they all became forms of that one alone,' implying their identity with the chief; and the word 'breath' (prāṇa) is used for both alike — so speech and the rest might seem to be mere modes of the chief breath. Reply: No — speech and the other ten organs are distinct principles, different from the chief breath, because a distinct designation, 'indriya' (organ), is used specifically for them (the chief breath excluded, the remaining eleven alone are called 'organs') — such a distinction of designation can only be explained if there is a real distinction of the underlying entities; otherwise it would be contradictory for the same single entity to be called 'organ' in some contexts and not in others.

भेदश्रुतेर् वैलक्षण्याच् च ॥ १६ ॥

bhedaśruter vailakṣaṇyāc ca || 16 ||

And also because scripture describes speech and the other organs quite separately from breath — as in the passage where speech and the other organs are each in turn destroyed by the demons of evil, and only afterward, distinctly, the chief breath alone remains undefeated; and in texts like 'mind, speech, breath — he made these for himself,' where mind, speech and breath are each named separately. Hence speech and the other organs are shown to be entities genuinely distinct in character (vailakṣaṇya) from the chief breath.

संज्ञामूर्तिकॢप्तिस् तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् ॥ १७ ॥

saṁjñāmūrtikḷptis tu trivṛtkurvata upadeśāt || 17 ||

Objection: 'That deity (sat, Being) thought — having entered these three deities (fire, water, food) by means of this living self (jīva), I shall differentiate name and form' — a doubt arises whether it is the individual soul or the Lord who performs this differentiation of name and form (the threefold commingling, trivṛtkaraṇa). Given the phrase 'by this living self,' and given that in ordinary life it is individuals who assign names and shape forms (like pots and dishes), it might seem that this act belongs to the soul. Reply: No — the fashioning of names and forms belongs to the Lord alone, not to the soul, because the teaching of the threefold commingling ('let me differentiate,' in the first person) points unequivocally to the Lord's own unqualified agency here; the word 'by the living self' construes with 'having entered,' not with 'let me differentiate' — hence this is the Lord's own act, and the soul is merely his instrument (upādhi), comparable to a king's agent.

मांसादि भौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश् च ॥ १८ ॥

māṁsādi bhaumaṁ yathāśabdamitarayoś ca || 18 ||

Now, to allay a possible doubt, the teacher shows the exact scriptural account: when the threefold-commingled earth is eaten by a person, its effects arise exactly as scripture describes — 'food that is eaten is divided into three parts' — the grossest portion becomes excrement, the middling becomes flesh, and the subtlest becomes mind. In the same way, the effects of water and fire, drunk or eaten, are to be understood exactly as described: water's gross portion becomes urine, its middling becomes blood, its subtlest becomes breath; fire's gross portion becomes bone, its middling becomes marrow, its subtlest becomes speech.

वैशेष्यात् तु तद्वादस् तद्वादः ॥ १९ ॥

vaiśeṣyāt tu tadvādas tadvādaḥ || 19 ||

Objection: If all elemental substances are equally the result of this threefold commingling, on what basis can we still distinguish 'this is fire, this is water, this is food,' or 'this effect (flesh etc.) belongs to food, this to water, this to fire'? Reply: The word 'tu' ('but') sets this objection aside — even with the threefold commingling, such distinct designation remains valid precisely because of the predominance (vaiśeṣya) of one element in each compound: fire retains a predominance of the fiery portion, water of the watery, earth of the earthy. This threefold commingling exists only to account for such distinctions in ordinary usage (otherwise, like a three-strand rope twisted into apparent oneness, all practical distinction among the three elements would become impossible). The doubled phrase 'so it is said, so it is said' (tadvādas tadvādaḥ) signals the conclusion of the adhyāya (Book Two) as a whole.

तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम् ॥ १ ॥

tadantarapratipattau raṁhati saṁpariṣvaktaḥ praśnanirūpaṇābhyām || 1 ||

(Topic: "Attaining the Interval [between bodies]" — the soul's departure at death) When the individual soul (jīva, the embodied self) takes up another body, it moves on enveloped by the subtle parts of the elements, as is shown by the question ("Do you know how, at the fifth oblation, the waters come to be called 'man'?") and its explanation in the five-fires teaching (pañcāgni-vidyā) of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

त्र्यात्मकत्वात् तु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ २ ॥

tryātmakatvāt tu bhūyastvāt || 2 ||

But the soul is not enveloped by water alone — because water itself, like every element, is threefold in composition (each element containing portions of the other two, per the doctrine of "triplication," tri-vṛt-karaṇa); the term "water" merely names the predominant element among the subtle elements enveloping the soul.

प्राणगतेश् च ॥ ३ ॥

prāṇagateś ca || 3 ||

And also because the vital breaths (prāṇa) are said to depart along with the soul — which could not happen without some support — confirming that all the subtle elements, not water alone, accompany the departing soul as their basis.

अग्न्यादिश्रुतेर् इति चेन् न भाक्तत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

agnyādiśruter iti cen na bhāktatvāt || 4 ||

Objection: But scripture says that at death, speech and the other organs go to Agni (fire) and the other deities ("his speech enters into fire..."), suggesting the organs merge into the gods rather than travel with the soul. Reply: No, that statement is merely figurative (secondary usage) — it only means that fire's earlier assistance to speech now ceases, just as the statement that hair "goes to" plants at death is figurative, not literal.

प्रथमेऽश्रवणाद् इति चेन् न ता एव ह्य् उपपत्तेः ॥ ५ ॥

prathame'śravaṇād iti cen na tā eva hy upapatteḥ || 5 ||

Objection: But in the description of the first fire (heaven) in the five-fires teaching, "water" as the oblation-substance is not actually named — only "faith" (śraddhā) is — so how can it be established that "at the fifth oblation the waters become man"? Reply: No, because it is logically fitting that "faith" there itself means water; only this makes the whole sequence of question and answer, from beginning to end, hang together coherently.

अश्रुतत्वाद् इति चेन् नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतेः ॥ ६ ॥

aśrutatvād iti cen neṣṭādikāriṇāṁ pratīteḥ || 6 ||

Objection: Granting that the waters pass through the five fires, it is nowhere explicitly stated that souls "move on" enveloped by exactly those waters — this precise wording never occurs. Reply: No, because it is recognized from the parallel Kauṣītaki passage, which shows that it is precisely those who perform sacrifice and charitable works (iṣṭādi-kāriṇaḥ) who travel by the path of the fathers (pitṛyāna) to the moon.

भाक्तं वानात्मवित्त्वात् तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ७ ॥

bhāktaṁ vānātmavittvāt tathā hi darśayati || 7 ||

Or, their becoming "food" of the gods on the moon is itself figurative, since they are not knowers of the Self (anātma-vit) — scripture indeed shows this: "the gods do not eat or drink; they are satisfied merely by seeing this ambrosia [i.e. these ritualists]."

कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान् दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवं च ॥ ८ ॥

kṛtātyaye'nuśayavān dṛṣṭasmṛtibhyāṁ yathetamanevaṁ ca || 8 ||

(Topic: "At the Exhaustion of the Deed Done") When the fruit of the ritual action that carried it to the moon is exhausted, the soul descends still possessed of a residue of unexhausted karma (anuśayavān) — as shown by both direct scripture and smṛti (tradition); it descends by the very route it went up, and also, in some respects, otherwise.

चरणाद् इति चेन् न तदुपलक्षणार्थेति कार्ष्णाजिनिः ॥ ९ ॥

caraṇād iti cen na tadupalakṣaṇārtheti kārṣṇājiniḥ || 9 ||

Objection: But scripture says the descending soul's future womb is determined by "conduct" (caraṇa), not by any leftover karma. Reply, according to the teacher Kārṣṇājini: No, because the term "conduct" there is used only to indicate that residual karma, conduct being merely an outward sign of it.

आनर्थक्यम् इति चेन् न तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

ānarthakyam iti cen na tadapekṣatvāt || 10 ||

Objection: If residual karma alone determines the womb, then good conduct becomes pointless. Reply: No, because the result of ritual action (karma) depends on such conduct — action bears fruit only when accompanied by good conduct; hence conduct is not purposeless, even though residual karma is the deciding factor.

सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु बादरिः ॥ ११ ॥

sukṛtaduṣkṛte eveti tu bādariḥ || 11 ||

But according to the teacher Bādari, the word "conduct" (caraṇa) here directly denotes precisely the good and bad deeds (sukṛta/duṣkṛta) themselves — "conduct" and "action" being synonymous, not conduct merely pointing to something distinct.

अनिष्टादिकारिणाम् अपि च श्रुतम् ॥ १२ ॥

aniṣṭādikāriṇām api ca śrutam || 12 ||

(Topic: "Those Who Have Not Performed Sacrifice, Etc.") Scripture also states that even those who have NOT performed sacrifices and charitable works (anisṭādi-kāriṇaḥ) go to the moon — the Kauṣītaki says without distinction, "whoever departs from this world, all of them go to the moon" — raising the question of whether non-performers too ascend there.

संयमने त्व् अनुभूयेतरेषामारोहाव् अरोहौ तद्गतिदर्शनात् ॥ १३ ॥

saṁyamane tv anubhūyetareṣāmārohāv arohau tadgatidarśanāt || 13 ||

Reply: No — those who have not performed such works do not ascend to the moon at all; instead they experience suffering in Yama's abode of restraint (saṃyamana) and then descend again without any prior ascent — as shown by the description of their being subject to Yama.

स्मरन्ति च ॥ १४ ॥

smaranti ca || 14 ||

And smṛti (tradition) also confirms this — that the wicked fall under Yama's control in the abode of restraint.

अपि सप्त ॥ १५ ॥

api sapta || 15 ||

And smṛti also mentions seven hells (headed by Raurava) as the places where evildoers experience the fruit of their bad deeds — confirming that they cannot possibly reach the moon.

तत्रापि तद्व्यापारादविरोधः ॥ १६ ॥

tatrāpi tadvyāpārādavirodhaḥ || 16 ||

Even there, in those seven hells, though other figures such as Citragupta are named as overseers, there is no contradiction, because it is Yama's own governing agency operating through them as his agents.

विद्याकर्मणोर् इति तु प्रकृतत्वात् ॥ १७ ॥

vidyākarmaṇor iti tu prakṛtatvāt || 17 ||

Regarding the further Chāndogya statement "of these two paths, by neither of these...": "these two" refers to knowledge and ritual action (vidyā and karma, i.e. the devayāna and pitṛyāna), because these two are the very topic under discussion in the preceding context; those who follow neither fall into a third state of repeated birth-and-death as tiny creatures.

न तृतीये तथोपलब्धेः ॥ १८ ॥

na tṛtīye tathopalabdheḥ || 18 ||

In that third state (rebirth as insects and small creatures), the rule requiring "the fifth oblation" (necessary for producing a human body) does not apply, since scripture shows that such rebirth occurs even without that sequence of five oblations.

स्मर्यतेऽपि च लोके ॥ १९ ॥

smaryate'pi ca loke || 19 ||

Moreover, it is well known even from ordinary tradition and epic itihāsa that certain beings (Droṇa, Dhṛṣṭadyumna, Sītā, Draupadī) are born without the usual process of sexual union at all (a-yonija) — showing that the fixed rule of five oblations is not universal.

दर्शनाच् च ॥ २० ॥

darśanāc ca || 20 ||

And also because it is observed that moisture-born and sprout-born creatures (svedaja, udbhijja) come into being without that process at all — confirming the same conclusion.

तृतीयशब्दावरोधः संशोकजस्य ॥ २१ ॥

tṛtīyaśabdāvarodhaḥ saṁśokajasya || 21 ||

The moisture-born (svedaja) creature is to be understood as included under the third term "udbhijja" (sprout-born) in the Chāndogya's list of "three wombs" (aṇḍaja, jīvaja, udbhijja) — thereby reconciling it with the fourfold classification of beings found elsewhere.

तत्स्वाभाव्यापत्तिरुपपत्तेः ॥ २२ ॥

tatsvābhāvyāpattirupapatteḥ || 22 ||

(Topic: "Attaining a Similar Nature") In the descent-sequence ("he becomes ākāśa [space], from ākāśa wind, wind becomes smoke...") the soul attains a nature merely resembling (sādṛśya) space, wind, smoke etc., not literal identity with them, because only this is logically tenable — since space (ākāśa), being one, all-pervading and eternal, cannot literally be entered into by stages.

नातिचिरेण विशेषात् ॥ २३ ॥

nāticireṇa viśeṣāt || 23 ||

(Topic: "Not for Very Long") The soul does not remain long in the cloud/rain-like state before falling to earth as rain — only briefly — because scripture describes this state as "extremely hard to escape," implying it is both painful and short.

अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदभिलापात् ॥ २४ ॥

anyādhiṣṭhite pūrvavadabhilāpāt || 24 ||

(Topic: "Entering What Is Governed by Another Soul") When the descending soul, borne by rain, enters grain and plants already governed by other souls as their bodies, it merely comes into association with them, as before with wind and smoke — because the scriptural language describing this stage narrates no independent act generating new karma for the plant.

अशुद्धम् इति चेन् न शब्दात् ॥ २५ ॥

aśuddham iti cen na śabdāt || 25 ||

Objection: Being tainted by animal-killing, ritual action might be deemed "impure," so rebirth as a plant could be its fitting painful retribution. Reply: No, because dharma and adharma are determined by scripture alone — properly performed Vedic sacrificial action is not "impure," hence it cannot yield rebirth as a plant as its fitting retribution.

रेतःसिग्योगोऽथ ॥ २६ ॥

retaḥsigyogo'tha || 26 ||

Then the descending soul comes into contact with the semen of the one who eats that food and later emits it as seed ("whoever eats food and sheds seed, he becomes that again") — again mere contact, not literal identity, since one who has just eaten cannot literally, at that instant, become semen.

योनेःशरीरम् ॥ २७ ॥

yoneḥśarīram || 27 ||

Finally, from the womb, after the seed is deposited there, the body fit for the soul's residual karma is produced — establishing that only at this final stage, born from an actual womb, does the soul again take up a body accompanied by pleasure and pain; throughout the intermediate stages there was only successive association, not actual embodiment.

सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हि ॥ १ ॥

sandhye sṛṣṭirāha hi || 1 ||

(Topic: "The Twilight State") The dream state (sandhya, "the junction" between waking and deep sleep, suṣupti) also involves real creation by the self, as scripture says: "From his chariot he fashions chariot-yokings, from his roads, roads," concluding "he indeed is the maker" — showing genuine creative agency even in dream.

निर्मातारं चैके पुत्रादयश् च ॥ २ ॥

nirmātāraṁ caike putrādayaś ca || 2 ||

And moreover, some branches of the Veda describe the self as fashioner of desired objects in dream — "he who, awake among the sleeping, fashions desire after desire" — where sons and the like are understood as objects of desire (kāma).

मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

māyāmātraṁ tu kārtsnyenānabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt || 3 ||

But no — dream is mere illusion (māyā), because its object-world is never manifested in complete, actual form (it lacks the requisite place, time and cause of real objects, and it is negated upon waking) — unlike waking experience, which is not so negated.

पराभिध्यानात् तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ ॥ ४ ॥

parābhidhyānāt tu tirohitaṁ tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau || 4 ||

But this dream-illusion arises because the soul's essential identity with Brahman (the Absolute) is obscured through attention to something else, i.e., through ignorance (avidyā) — for from this obscuration indeed arise both its bondage and its opposite, liberation (mokṣa).

देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि ॥ ५ ॥

dehayogādvā so'pi || 5 ||

Or rather, this obscuration of the individual soul's (jīva's) knowledge and lordship — though he is essentially one with the Supreme Self (Paramātman) — occurs through his connection with a body and its adjuncts (senses, mind, intellect); this too is merely his condition, not an inherent difference from the Supreme.

सूचकश् च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः ॥ ६ ॥

sūcakaś ca hi śruterācakṣate ca tadvidaḥ || 6 ||

And dream is indeed premonitory of future good and evil, as scripture and dream-interpreters state — though the dreamt objects themselves (chariots etc.) are unreal, what they portend may be real; hence the earlier statement "he creates" is to be understood figuratively, indicating only causal occasion, like saying "the plough draws the oxen."

तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च ॥ ७ ॥

tadabhāvo nāḍīṣu tacchruterātmani ca || 7 ||

(Topic: "The Absence of Dream in Deep Sleep") The absence of dream-cognition in deep sleep (suṣupti) occurs not merely in the nerve-channels (nāḍī) or the pericardium alone, but ultimately in the Self (Brahman) — for the scriptural statements describing sleep variously via nāḍīs, the puritat (pericardium), and "becoming one with Sat/Being" all converge on the Self as the true resting-place.

अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ॥ ८ ॥

ataḥ prabodho'smāt || 8 ||

Since the Self alone is thus the true resting-place in deep sleep, it is for this very reason that awakening always occurs naturally from this same Self — as scripture indicates in reply to "whence does this breath come": "As tiny sparks fly out from fire, so from this Self all the vital breaths issue forth."

स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः ॥ ९ ॥

sa eva tu karmānusmṛtiśabdavidhibhyaḥ || 9 ||

(Topic: "[Proven] by Resumption of Action, Memory and Scriptural Injunction") It is that very same soul who, having merged in deep sleep, awakens again — not a different one — as shown by resumption of unfinished tasks, memory of past experience ("I saw that yesterday"), scriptural statements about creatures re-arising as themselves, and the injunctions of ritual and knowledge, which would be pointless if a different soul woke up each time.

मुग्धेर्ऽधसंपत्तिः परिशेषात् ॥ १० ॥

mugdher'dhasaṁpattiḥ pariśeṣāt || 10 ||

(Topic: "The Swoon") A swoon or fainting-fit (mūrchā) is a half-merging into Brahman — by elimination, since it is distinct from the other three states (waking, dream, full deep sleep) — for it resembles deep sleep in lacking awareness, yet differs from it (no rhythmic breathing, a trembling and frightened body, resistant to being roused), and it is not death either (since breath and warmth remain); hence it is a distinct, partial state.

न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि ॥ ११ ॥

na sthānato'pi parasyobhayaliṅgaṁ sarvatra hi || 11 ||

(Topic: "Scriptures Bearing Both Formed and Formless Marks") Brahman (the Absolute) cannot simultaneously possess both formed qualities ("all-doing, all-desiring") and formless qualities ("not gross, not subtle"), whether inherently or through the mere condition of adjuncts (upādhi, e.g. earth) — for a single entity cannot bear opposite properties at once, and an adjunct cannot impart a real quality to what it merely appears to qualify (as color-lac does not truly stain a crystal). Hence wherever either mark alone is taken, it is the qualityless (nirviśeṣa) Brahman that is meant — for all passages devoted to expounding Brahman's own nature ("without sound, without touch, without form, imperishable") teach precisely a Brahman stripped of all determination.

भेदाद् इति चेन् न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् ॥ १२ ॥

bhedād iti cen na pratyekamatadvacanāt || 12 ||

Objection: This is untenable, because scripture teaches different specific forms of Brahman for different meditations (four-footed Brahman, sixteen-part Brahman, Vaiśvānara whose body is the three worlds, etc.) — so Brahman must be accepted as having qualities too. Reply: No, because in each case scripture teaches only Brahman's non-difference with each such form, not real internal variety — e.g. "the being of light and immortality in this earth and the being of light and immortality in the body are one and the same Self." Such differences serve only meditation (upāsanā); the real intent is non-difference.

अपि चैवम् एके ॥ १३ ॥

api caivam eke || 13 ||

And moreover, some branches of scripture teach precisely such a vision of non-difference, prefaced by censure of the vision of difference: "This is to be attained by mind alone: there is no difference here at all; he who sees difference here goes from death to death" — and "having known the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the impeller, all is declared threefold Brahman" — comprehending the entire array of enjoyer, enjoyed, and controller as of the one nature of Brahman.

अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

arūpavadeva hi tatpradhānatvāt || 14 ||

The formless (nirākāra) understanding of Brahman is to be adopted, not the reverse, because Brahman is to be understood as devoid of form, this being the primary intent of the great Upaniṣadic passages: "not gross, not subtle, not short, not long," "without sound, without touch, without form, imperishable," "space indeed is the manifester of name and form; That which is between them is Brahman," "the heavenly Person, formless, within and without, unborn" — such statements are devoted primarily to the truth of formless Brahman; hence in such passages the formless Brahman, exactly as stated, is to be understood.

प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात् ॥ १५ ॥

prakāśavaccāvaiyarthyāt || 15 ||

The passages describing Brahman as having form are not without purpose either — being meant for meditation, like light: just as sunlight, pervading space, appears to take on the straight or crooked shape of a finger or other object it touches, due to the adjunct, without actually changing, so too Brahman appears, through connection with adjuncts like earth, to take on their form — and such teaching of Brahman's apparent form serves meditation and is thus meaningful; for it would not be right to treat some Vedic statements as meaningful and others as meaningless, all being equally valid means of knowledge.

आह च तन्मात्रम् ॥ १६ ॥

āha ca tanmātram || 16 ||

And scripture indeed declares Brahman to be pure undifferentiated consciousness alone, devoid of any distinct form: "As a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, entirely a mass of taste, so indeed is this Self without interior or exterior, entirely a mass of consciousness alone."

दर्शयति चाथो अपि स्मर्यते ॥ १७ ॥

darśayati cātho api smaryate || 17 ||

Scripture also shows this negatively — Brahman, being devoid of all determination, is described only by negating everything else: "the teaching about it is 'not this, not this'" — "other indeed is That than the known, and beyond the unknown too" — "from which words turn back, along with the mind, unable to reach it." And Bāṣkali, questioned by Bāḍhva, taught Brahman through silence alone: "he remained silent... 'we do tell you — you are just not understanding; this Self is quiescent.'" Smṛti likewise teaches it only by negating everything else: "I shall tell of That which is to be known... beginningless, supreme Brahman, said to be neither existent nor non-existent."

अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ॥ १८ ॥

ata eva copamā sūryakādivat || 18 ||

And precisely because this Self is of the nature of pure consciousness, devoid of determination, beyond speech and mind, taught only by negation — for this very reason the comparison "like the reflection of the sun in water" is used in the liberation-scriptures to convey its apparent, not real, differentiation caused by adjuncts: "As this one sun, though one, appears manifold, following the many waters, so does this unborn Self appear manifold, its diversity produced by the adjuncts in each body."

अत्र प्रत्यवस्थीयते अम्बुवदग्रहणात् तु न तथात्वम् ॥ १९ ॥

atra pratyavasthīyate ambuvadagrahaṇāt tu na tathātvam || 19 ||

Here an objection is raised: this water-and-sun analogy does not hold, because there is no comparable "grasping" — distinct, distant, material water is what reflects the sun's image; but the Self is not material, nor are its adjuncts distinct or spatially distant from it, being all-pervading and non-different from everything — hence the illustration is inapt.

वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवं दर्शनाच् च ॥ २० ॥

vṛddhihrāsabhāktvamantarbhāvādubhayasāmañjasyādevaṁ darśanāc ca || 20 ||

The reply: the illustration is indeed apt, with respect to the particular feature intended — no illustration can show total resemblance in every respect. The intended point is this: just as the sun's reflection in water grows, shrinks, moves and breaks up following the water's own changes, without the sun itself actually changing, so too Brahman, though in reality unchanging and one, appears — through inclusion within adjuncts like the body — to partake of the adjuncts' properties such as growth and diminution. Since example and exemplified agree in this intended respect, there is no contradiction.

प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः ॥ २१ ॥

prakṛtaitāvattvaṁ hi pratiṣedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ || 21 ||

(Topic: "The Limitation Stated in Context") The Bṛhadāraṇyaka, having taught "there are two forms of Brahman, the formed and the formless," then says "now, therefore, the teaching: not this, not this — for there is nothing beyond this," and thereafter speaks further. This negation negates only the contextually-established twofold formed/formless manifestation just described; Brahman itself remains as what is spoken of further — the negation strips away the phenomenal world, not Brahman, which alone survives as "the Real of the real."

तदव्यक्तमाह हि ॥ २२ ॥

tadavyaktamāha hi || 22 ||

That Brahman which remains as "the Real of the real" is unmanifest (avyakta), not graspable by the senses, since it is the witness of all that is perceivable — scripture says: "It is not grasped by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other gods (senses), nor by austerity or ritual action... it is unseeable, ungraspable," and smṛti likewise: "This is called unmanifest, inconceivable, unchangeable."

अपि संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ॥ २३ ॥

api saṁrādhane pratyakṣānumānābhyām || 23 ||

Moreover, yogins perceive this unmanifest Self, stripped of all phenomenal multiplicity, at the time of intense devotional practice (saṃrādhana — devotion, meditation, single-minded application) — known from both direct scriptural testimony and inference (smṛti): "The Self-existent pierced the sense-openings outward, so one sees outward, not the inner Self; a wise man, seeking immortality, with eyes turned inward, saw the inner Self" — and "through the grace of knowledge, one of purified nature then sees Him, meditating on the Partless One."

प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश् च कर्मण्यभ्यासात् ॥ २४ ॥

prakāśādivaccāvaiśeṣyaṁ prakāśaś ca karmaṇyabhyāsāt || 24 ||

And this meditator and meditated are not thereby established as ultimately different — just as light, space, or the sun appear to take on distinctive qualities relative to adjuncts like the finger, hand, or water, without losing their essential undifferentiated nature, so too this differentiation is caused only by the adjunct; in reality there is oneness alone — and Vedānta repeatedly, by frequent teaching, establishes the non-difference of the individual soul (jīva) and the Supreme Self (here also called Prājña, "the Wise/Conscious One").

अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् ॥ २५ ॥

ato'nantena tathā hi liṅgam || 25 ||

And hence, because non-difference is inherent while difference is caused only by ignorance (avidyā), the individual soul, having dispelled ignorance through knowledge (vidyā), attains oneness with the Supreme, Infinite, Conscious Self — as scripture indicates: "He who truly knows that supreme Brahman becomes Brahman itself — being Brahman, he attains Brahman."

उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् ॥ २६ ॥

ubhayavyapadeśāttvahikuṇḍalavat || 26 ||

In this same context of the meditator-meditated relationship, another view is introduced to sharpen one's own: in some places difference between the soul and the Supreme is spoken of (as meditator/meditated, goer/goal, controller/controlled), while elsewhere their non-difference is spoken of ("That art thou," "I am Brahman," "He is your inner Self, the immortal inner controller"). Given both kinds of statement, if non-difference alone were accepted, the statements of difference would be baseless — so the truth here must be like the snake and its coil: "snake" implies non-difference with the coiled form, while "length, coiling" imply difference; so it is here too.

प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

prakāśāśrayavadvā tejastvāt || 27 ||

Or else this should be understood on the model of light and its source: sunlight and the sun are not absolutely different, both being of the nature of heat/light, and yet are spoken of as distinct — so it is here too.

पूर्ववद्वा ॥ २८ ॥

pūrvavadvā || 28 ||

Or, as stated before ("like light etc. — no distinction"), it should be understood in that way — for since bondage is caused only by ignorance, liberation through knowledge is fitting; but if a soul were really bound, as a coil to the Supreme Self on the snake-model or as a part on the light-source model, then real bondage could not be removed and the liberation-scriptures would be pointless. Scripture does not treat difference and non-difference as equally ultimate — it teaches non-difference as what is truly established, merely repeating the already-known difference for another purpose. Hence "like light etc. — no distinction" is the correct conclusion.

प्रतिषेधाच् च ॥ २९ ॥

pratiṣedhāc ca || 29 ||

And also because scripture explicitly negates any other conscious being — "there is no other seer besides Him" — and "now, therefore, the teaching: not this, not this," "this Brahman is without prior, without posterior, without inner, without outer" — through this elimination of everything besides Brahman, with Brahman alone remaining, this same conclusion (non-difference) is established.

परमतस्सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः ॥ ३० ॥

paramatassetūnmānasaṁbandhabhedavyapadeśebhyaḥ || 30 ||

(Topic: "Something Beyond Brahman?") Objection: There must be something beyond (para) this Brahman — because scripture describes Brahman as a "bridge/dam" (setu, implying something on the far side), as "measured out" (unmāna, implying something beyond the measure), as in "relation" with something, and as spoken of with a "distinction" from something — these four expressions suggesting an entity beyond Brahman.

सामान्यात् तु ॥ ३१ ॥

sāmānyāt tu || 31 ||

Reply: No — because of the general scriptural teaching that everything originates from, and is non-different from, Brahman alone — "Being alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"; this statement, together with the promise that knowing the one brings knowledge of all, rules out anything apart from Brahman.

बुद्ध्यर्थः पादवत् ॥ ३२ ॥

buddhyarthaḥ pādavat || 32 ||

[Regarding the "measured out" expression — "this Brahman has four feet, eight hoof-parts, sixteen parts"] — this is for the sake of the intellect, meant for meditation, not indicating any literal boundary beyond which something else exists — like a "foot" (of a coin, kārṣāpaṇa): just as a coin is conventionally divided into quarters for practical convenience, though the whole coin is one undivided unit, so too, since minds of varying capacity cannot easily fix upon the infinite, unmodified Brahman, this "measuring" is devised through its manifestations, for meditational purposes only.

स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत् ॥ ३३ ॥

sthānaviśeṣātprakāśādivat || 33 ||

Here the resolution of both the "relation" and "difference" expressions is given together: both arise merely from the particular location of the adjunct (upādhi), as with light. The "relation" spoken of in deep sleep ("he becomes united with Sat/Being") means only that when the cognition arising from a particular adjunct subsides upon the adjunct's cessation, that cessation is figuratively called "relation with the Supreme," from the adjunct's standpoint, not due to real finitude. Likewise the "difference" spoken of is due only to Brahman's connection with different adjuncts, not to any real difference in its own nature — as with a single light or a single space appearing differentiated relative to different objects.

उपपत्तेश् च ॥ ३४ ॥

upapatteś ca || 34 ||

And this interpretation is logically fitting, and no other — for scripture describes deep sleep as attaining one's own true nature: "he becomes merged in his own [Self]," indicating a relation of essential identity, not like that between two separate finite things (a man and a city) — since the Self's true nature never actually departs; only its adjunct-caused obscuration is temporarily lifted. Likewise the difference can be of no other kind, since it would contradict the abundantly-attested teaching of the one Lord; and scripture itself shows how even a single space (ākāśa) bears location-based distinctions — "the space outside a person," "the space within a person," "the space within the heart."

तथान्यप्रतिषेधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

tathānyapratiṣedhāt || 35 ||

Having thus refuted the "bridge etc." arguments, the author now supports his own conclusion with a further reason: likewise, scripture's negation of anything else shows there is nothing beyond Brahman — "He alone is below," "all this is Brahman," "the Self alone is all this," "there is no diversity here at all," "there is nothing beyond that," "this Brahman is without prior, without posterior, without inner, without outer" — such statements, in their own authoritative contexts, cannot be reinterpreted otherwise; they rule out any entity beyond Brahman. And from the teaching that Brahman is the "Self within all," it follows that there is no inner self other than the Supreme Self.

अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ॥ ३६ ॥

anena sarvagatatvamāyāmaśabdādibhyaḥ || 36 ||

By this refutation of the "bridge etc." arguments and by the negation of anything else, the all-pervasiveness (sarvagatatva) of the Self is also established — otherwise it would not be: a literal "bridge" would render the Self finite, since a bridge is itself finite; and without negating anything else, the Self would again be delimited from other things. Its all-pervasiveness is known from words denoting "extension" (āyāma) and the like: "as far as this space extends, so far extends the space within the heart," "all-pervading like space, and eternal," "greater than heaven, greater than space," "eternal, all-pervading, fixed, immovable, everlasting" — such scriptural and smṛti maxims establish it.

फलमत उपपत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

phalamata upapatteḥ || 37 ||

(Topic: "The Fruit of Action") In this same Brahman's empirical state of division into ruler and ruled, another aspect is now discussed. Is the threefold fruit of action — desirable, undesirable, and mixed — experienced by creatures in saṃsāra (the cycle of transmigration), produced by the action (karma) itself, or by God (Īśvara)? It is first proposed that the fruit comes from God, because this is logically fitting — He, overseer of all, knowing the particulars of place and time, dispenses to agents a fruit befitting their action; whereas momentary, instantly-perishing action cannot logically produce a fruit arising only later, since something cannot arise from what no longer exists.

श्रुतत्वाच् च ॥ ३८ ॥

śrutatvāc ca || 38 ||

And not by reasoning alone do we conclude that God is the fruit-giver — it is also because scripture states it so: "He indeed, the great, unborn Self, eater of food, giver of wealth" — and similar such passages.

धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव ॥ ३९ ॥

dharmaṁ jaiminirata eva || 39 ||

But the teacher Jaimini holds that dharma (righteous action itself, i.e., the potency, apūrva, generated by ritual) is the giver of the fruit — for this very reason, both scriptural ("one should sacrifice desiring heaven," implying the sacrifice itself produces heaven) and rational (an injunction would be pointless if action itself were not fruit-producing).

पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४० ॥

pūrvaṁ tu bādarāyaṇo hetuvyapadeśāt || 40 ||

But the teacher Bādarāyaṇa maintains the previously-stated position, that God is the fruit-giver — because scripture describes Him as the cause of both dharma/adharma and their fruit: He "impels toward good action him whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, and impels toward bad action him whom He wishes to lead down" — the same idea recurring in the Bhagavad Gītā; throughout Vedānta, creation is everywhere described as caused by God, and the very fact that He creates each being in accordance with its own past action IS His being the cause of the fruit. The alleged defects (an undifferentiated cause producing varied, unequal, seemingly cruel effects) do not apply, since God always acts with reference to each being's own prior effort (karma).

सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् ॥ १ ॥

sarvavedāntapratyayaṁ codanādyaviśeṣāt || 1 ||

(Topic: "One Cognition Common to All Vedic Recensions") Cognitions taught under the same name in different Vedic recensions (śākhās) must be one and the same teaching, because the injunction, ritual context, etc. are not different between them — e.g. the same prāṇa-vidyā, pañcāgni-vidyā, vaiśvānara-vidyā, or śāṇḍilya-vidyā taught by branch after branch is a single teaching, not many.

भेदान् नेति चेद् एकस्याम् अपि ॥ २ ॥

bhedān neti ced ekasyām api || 2 ||

Objection: The Vājasaneyins add a sixth fire to the five-fire teaching, which the Chāndogyas omit, and add a fifth vital breath to the four the Chāndogyas name — so how can it be one teaching? Reply: No, because such variation in qualities is found even within a single recognized teaching — the five principal fires being recognized in both, the identity of teaching stands, and the additional elements are simply to be combined (upasaṃhāra) into the one teaching.

स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वे हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच् च सववच् च तन्नियमः ॥ ३ ॥

svādhyāyasya tathātve hi samācāre'dhikārāc ca savavac ca tanniyamaḥ || 3 ||

In support: just as the daily practice of Vedic recitation (svādhyāya) may look different across branches, though the qualification for it and the underlying custom remain the same, so too here the rule remains one — as with the "sava" (soma-rites), where minor procedural variation does not create a new rite.

दर्शयति च ॥ ४ ॥

darśayati ca || 4 ||

And scripture itself shows this unity of teaching, since all Vedic recensions point to the same one goal ("all the Vedas proclaim that one syllable/state"), and the same prāṇa-vidyā is meditated upon, under different names, across the Ṛg, Yajur, and Sāma traditions — confirming it is one teaching, variously named.

उपसंहारोर्ऽथाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च ॥ ५ ॥

upasaṁhāror'thābhedādvidhiśeṣavatsamāne ca || 5 ||

(Topic: "Combination of Qualities") This is the purpose-statement for the section: since sameness of teaching across recensions is thus established, qualities taught for it in one recension are to be combined into the same teaching wherever else it occurs, their purpose being identical — just as accessory elements taught for a single sacrifice like the Agnihotra are combined regardless of where they occur, being the same one sacrifice throughout.

अन्यथात्वं शब्दाद् इति चेन् नाविशेषात् ॥ ६ ॥

anyathātvaṁ śabdād iti cen nāviśeṣāt || 6 ||

(Topic: "A Difference in the Teaching?") Objection: The Vājasaneyins introduce the chief vital breath (mukhya-prāṇa) as the singer of the udgītha ("you sing the udgītha for us"), whereas the Chāndogyas identify it directly with the udgītha as object of meditation — hence a difference of doctrine. Reply: No, because the far more numerous shared elements (the gods-and-demons narrative, censure of the other organs, reliance on the chief breath, its identification with the udgītha) outweigh this, and even the difference in wording can be reconciled.

न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् ॥ ७ ॥

na vā prakaraṇabhedāt parovarīyastvādivat || 7 ||

Or rather, no — identity of teaching is not tenable here on reflection; difference of teaching is correct, because of the difference in the point of approach (prakaraṇa) — the Chāndogya directs a "breath" meditation only onto the syllable Om, a mere component of the udgītha, while the Vājasaneyaka identifies the entire udgītha-function, together with its agent (the singer-priest), with breath — a genuinely different scope of meditation, like the "abhyudaya" and "paśukāma" formulas, which despite verbal similarity prescribe different things owing to their different openings.

संज्ञातश् चेत् तद् उक्तम् अस्ति तु तद् अपि ॥ ८ ॥

saṁjñātaś cet tad uktam asti tu tad api || 8 ||

Objection: Both are alike called "udgītha-vidyā," so sameness of name establishes sameness of teaching. Reply: No — as already explained, the prakaraṇa-difference argument, being grounded directly in scriptural wording, outweighs mere popular sameness of name, which lies outside the text itself (just as distinct rites can share one collective name, "kāṭhaka"); only where no other ground of difference exists (as in the Saṃvarga-vidyā) does sameness of name alone establish oneness of teaching.

व्याप्तेश् च समञ्जसम् ॥ ९ ॥

vyāpteś ca samañjasam || 9 ||

(Topic: "Pervasion") In "one should meditate on the syllable Om as the udgītha," the apposition of "syllable" and "udgītha" is best understood as qualifier-and-qualified, not superimposition, exception, or identity — because of pervasion: since Om pervades the whole Veda while "udgītha" names a Sāmavedic particular, "udgītha" here specifies which aspect of the all-pervading syllable is meant, like "bring the blue lotus," where the qualifier narrows the reference.

सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे ॥ १० ॥

sarvābhedādanyatreme || 10 ||

(Topic: "Non-Difference Everywhere") Elsewhere too (e.g. Kauṣītaki), where the superiority of breath is taught in the "dialogue of the vital breaths" but specific qualities like "you are the best" are not repeated, they should still be understood as applying there, because the object of meditation is nowhere different — being recognized as the same single teaching on breath everywhere, such qualities extend to it wherever that same meditation occurs, by the reasoning of the previous topic.

आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ॥ ११ ॥

ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya || 11 ||

(Topic: "Qualities Beginning with 'Bliss'") Qualities such as bliss (ānanda), being a mass of consciousness, all-pervasiveness, and being the Self of all, wherever taught of Brahman (the Absolute) as such, belong to Brahman as the principal reality, and are to be understood everywhere — since the same undivided Brahman is meant in every case, on the same reasoning as Devadatta's valor being recognized wherever he is, once truly known.

प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे ॥ १२ ॥

priyaśirastvādyaprāptirupacayāpacayau hi bhede || 12 ||

But qualities like "having the dear as its head" (from the Taittirīya's bliss-sheath passage) do not apply elsewhere — for dear, joy, delight, bliss are found only relative to one another and different enjoyers, showing mutual increase and decrease, possible only where real differentiation exists, whereas Brahman is without such differentiation ("one only, without a second"); these are qualities of the subtle sheath (kośa), not of Brahman, a mere device to direct the mind toward Brahman, not meant as objects of contemplation themselves.

इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात् ॥ १३ ॥

itare tvarthasāmānyāt || 13 ||

But the other qualities, genuinely descriptive of Brahman's own nature (bliss, being a mass of consciousness, etc.), are to be understood everywhere, since the sameness of the reality being taught is the ground — their sole purpose being simply to convey understanding of Brahman's nature, unlike the sheath-qualities meant only for gradual approach.

आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् ॥ १४ ॥

ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt || 14 ||

(Topic: "The Inward Progression Culminating in Puruṣa") In the Kaṭha's series — "beyond the senses are the objects, beyond the objects the mind, beyond the mind the intellect... beyond the intellect nothing — that is the highest state" — Puruṣa (the Person/Self) alone is taught as beyond everything else, not each successive item with equal significance, because only knowledge of Puruṣa has a stated purpose, liberation (mokṣa); the entire ascending series exists only to lead contemplation (dhyāna) toward the Self as its true goal.

आत्मशब्दाच् च ॥ १५ ॥

ātmaśabdāc ca || 15 ||

And also because of the word "Self" — being used specifically of Puruṣa, describing this hidden Self as hard to know, requiring subtle intellect, and culminating in "he attains the supreme abode of Viṣṇu" — the whole progression is oriented solely toward the Self, confirming that Puruṣa alone, not each rung of the ladder, is the ultimate goal.

आत्मगृहीतिर् इतरवद् उत्तरात् ॥ १६ ॥

ātmagṛhītir itaravad uttarāt || 16 ||

(Topic: "The Reference to 'Self'") In the Aitareya's cosmogony ("The Self alone indeed was this in the beginning... He thought, 'let me create the worlds'..."), is it the Supreme Self meant by "Self," or some lesser individual creator? The narrative flow (active, effortful creation like an ordinary limited agent) might suggest a limited being — but it is the Supreme Self alone that is meant, as elsewhere, and on the strength of the sequel in this very passage.

अन्वयाद् इति चेत् स्याद् अवधारणात् ॥ १७ ॥

anvayād iti cet syād avadhāraṇāt || 17 ||

Objection: But the anthropomorphic narrative flow suggests otherwise. Reply: No — on the strength of the determinative statement, the Supreme Self is rightly meant, since the assertion of the Self's oneness prior to creation ("Being alone was this... one only, without a second") fits only the Supreme; the anthropomorphic narrative too must be construed consistently with the intended purport — the identity of the individual self with Brahman, as the sequel clearly shows; hence "Self" here denotes the Supreme, without exception.

कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् ॥ १८ ॥

kāryākhyānādapūrvam || 18 ||

(Topic: "Since It Is a Mere Narration of an Already-Established Practice") In the udgītha-passage on sipping water before and after eating, is the injunction about the sipping itself, or the accompanying "thought of non-fireless-ness" (regarding the food as offered to the inner fire)? It is the latter that is newly enjoined, not the sipping, which is merely an already-established, well-known practice; the identification of eaten food with an oblation to the inner fire (prāṇa) is what is genuinely new (apūrva) and hence what is actually enjoined.

समान एवं चाभेदात् ॥ १९ ॥

samāna evaṁ cābhedāt || 19 ||

(Topic: "The Same Teaching Within a Single Branch") In the Vājasaneyaka's Agnirahasya, the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā is taught with certain qualities ("meditate on the Self as mind-formed, breath-bodied, made of light"), and in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka of the same branch again with other qualities ("this mind-formed, light-formed, truth-formed person... ruler of all, lord of all") — are these one teaching, with combination of qualities, or two? They are one, and the qualities are to be combined, since the object meditated upon is non-different — one passage teaches the vidyā, the other adds further qualities, avoiding needless repetition.

सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ॥ २० ॥

sambandhādevamanyatrāpi || 20 ||

(Topic: "Because of Connection with a Single Passage — So Elsewhere Too") The Bṛhadāraṇyaka's Satya-Brahman passage gives two "secret names" for one reality — one divine (the sun and its indwelling person), one personal (the person in the right eye). Should both secret teachings apply to both aspects together, or should each remain assigned to its own? [Prima facie:] since it is one continuous teaching about the single reality of Truth under both aspects, both secret names, like the qualities combined in the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, should apply to both.

न वा विशेषात् ॥ २१ ॥

na vā viśeṣāt || 21 ||

Reply: No, there is no such combination, because of a specific textual indication — the location-specific wording: "he who is the person in that orb — his secret name is 'that'"; "he who is the person in the right eye — his secret name is 'I'" — the demonstrative pronoun ties each secret name only to its own proximate referent; each teaching thus belongs to its own particular locus, like instruction given to a seated teacher not applying to him while standing.

दर्शयति च ॥ २२ ॥

darśayati ca || 22 ||

And an indicatory sign also shows this difference — "his form is the very form of that one; his eyes the very eyes of that one; his name the very name of that one" — this explicit extension of the solar person's qualities to the eye-person shows the qualities were originally distinct, needing to be explicitly transferred; hence the two secret teachings remain separate.

संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः ॥ २३ ॥

saṁbhṛtidyuvyāptyapi cātaḥ || 23 ||

(Topic: "'Gathering' and 'Pervading Heaven'") The Rāṇāyanīyas' khila hymns describe Brahman's cosmic glories — "gathering, born of Brahman first, pervaded high heaven." Should these be combined into the Brahma-vidyās (like Śāṇḍilya-vidyā) taught in the same tradition's Upaniṣad? No, because each vidyā is tied to its own specific locus of meditation (heart, in Śāṇḍilya-, Dahara-, and Upakosala-vidyā), whereas these cosmic glories belong to the divine order, without a comparable shared locus — hence, despite all being connected with Brahman, the mismatch of loci prevents combination.

पुरुषविद्यायामपि चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् ॥ २४ ॥

puruṣavidyāyāmapi cetareṣāmanāmnānāt || 24 ||

(Topic: "In the Puruṣa-Vidyā Too — Since the Other Tradition's Elements Are Not Named") The Tāṇḍins and Paiṅgins have a "Puruṣa-vidyā" conceiving human life as a sacrifice; the Taittirīyas have a similar "Puruṣa-yajña." Should one tradition's elements be carried into the other? No, because the other version is not recognizably the same in form — the Taittirīya correlates the sacrificial elements quite differently, and its genitive construction shows man is the "sacrificer," not the "sacrifice" itself — hence the two remain distinct teachings.

वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् ॥ २५ ॥

vedhādyarthabhedāt || 25 ||

(Topic: "Because of the Difference of Purpose of the Piercing-Mantra Etc.") Several Upaniṣads open with mantras or rites seemingly unrelated to the vidyā that follows (a "piercing the heart" mantra; opening Pravargya and Agniṣṭoma passages). Should such material, by mere proximity, be regarded as belonging to the adjacent teaching? No, because their purpose differs — they have their own distinct application (e.g. sorcery, or an independent rite), and mere textual proximity, being weak evidence, cannot establish that they belong to the neighboring vidyā.

हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् कुशाच्छन्दस्स्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

hānau tūpāyanaśabdaśeṣatvāt kuśācchandasstutyupagānavattaduktam || 26 ||

(Topic: "In 'Shedding' — Since 'Receiving' Is Implied by the Wording") Various texts describe, on the path to Brahman, either shedding of good and bad deeds alone, or both shedding and their being "received" by friends and enemies. Where only "shedding" is mentioned, should "receiving" be understood as implied too? Yes — since the Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa shows "receiving" is a natural corollary of "shedding," wherever the latter is mentioned "receiving" is implied too, a device of glorifying the vidyā's power, just as an unspecified "kuśa" grass in one text is specified elsewhere as "audumbara."

सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात् तथा ह्य् अन्ये ॥ २७ ॥

sāṁparāye tartavyābhāvāt tathā hy anye || 27 ||

(Topic: "At the Time of Departure — Since There Is Nothing Left to Cross") In the Kauṣītaki's couch-vidyā, the soul's shedding of good and bad deeds en route to Brahman seems to occur midway on the journey. Should this be taken literally, or as occurring at the very moment of departure from the body? It occurs at the moment of departure, since nothing remains to be attained by the enlightened soul for which deeds need to linger; being the fruit of knowledge's power, this shedding occurs as soon as knowledge becomes operative — hence, though narrated later, it in fact precedes the journey, as other branches too describe it in that same prior stage.

छन्दत उभयाविरोधात् ॥ २८ ॥

chandata ubhayāvirodhāt || 28 ||

And this is also confirmed because, if the shedding were accepted as occurring midway on an already-begun journey, then after the body has fallen, the voluntary practice of its means (restraint, discipline) — requiring a living body and free will — would be impossible; hence such practice, and the resulting shedding, must belong to the living, prior stage — preserving the harmony of cause and effect and the agreement between different branches' accounts.

गतेर् अर्थवत्त्वम् उभयथान्यथा हि विरोधः ॥ २९ ॥

gater arthavattvam ubhayathānyathā hi virodhaḥ || 29 ||

(Topic: "The Meaningfulness of the Journey") In some meditations the path of the gods (devayāna) is mentioned near the shedding of merit and demerit, in others not. Should the journey be understood as applying without distinction everywhere, or selectively? Selectively — in some cases meaningful, in others not; for applying it universally leads to contradiction: where one "attains the highest sameness" after shedding all deeds, a journey to another place is inconsistent, since a being free of all determination cannot "travel" anywhere — so there we hold the journey to be without real purpose.

उपपन्नस् तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेर् लोकवत् ॥ ३० ॥

upapannas tallakṣaṇārthopalabdher lokavat || 30 ||

This twofold state is reasonable, because the factor making a journey meaningful is present in some cases, absent in others: qualified meditations like the paryaṅka-vidyā involve ascending a couch, conversing with Brahman, attaining specific fragrances — there the journey is meaningful. But in unqualified Self-realization, where one has already burned all seeds of affliction, nothing remains but the exhaustion of already-operative karma — there the journey is pointless, just as reaching a village needs a road, but regaining health does not. [To be elaborated further in the fourth chapter.]

अनियमस्सर्वेषामविरोधश्शब्दानुमानाभ्याम् ॥ ३१ ॥

aniyamassarveṣāmavirodhaśśabdānumānābhyām || 31 ||

(Topic: "No Fixed Rule — Applies to All Qualified Meditations Without Contradiction, per Scripture and Inference") Among meditations where the journey is meaningful, some explicitly mention the devayāna, others do not. Is it restricted to those explicitly named, or applied universally? There is no fixed restriction — it applies without distinction to all such meditations yielding a result of ascent, per scripture and smṛti: scripture extends the devayāna, taught for knowers of the five fires, to forest-dwellers who worship "faith and austerity" too; and its double mention in two places serves only local clarity, not restriction.

यावदधिकारम् अवस्थितिर् आधिकारिकाणाम् ॥ ३२ ॥

yāvadadhikāram avasthitir ādhikārikāṇām || 32 ||

(Topic: "As Long as the Divine Commission Lasts") Do certain knowers of Brahman remain embodied even after their present body falls, because of a special office (adhikāra) they hold (as itihāsa-purāṇa shows for figures like Apāntaratamas/Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana, Vasiṣṭha, Sanatkumāra, who take multiple births)? Yes — appointed by the Supreme Lord to offices sustaining the world-order, such enlightened beings continue in embodiment, despite true knowledge, only as long as their commission lasts — like the sun presiding over the world for a thousand cosmic ages before attaining the state free of rising and setting; this does not compromise knowledge as sole means of liberation, since the seed of NEW births is already burned by knowledge, while only their prior commission-driven karma continues until exhausted.

अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधस्सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् ॥ ३३ ॥

akṣaradhiyāṁ tvavarodhassāmānyatadbhāvābhyāmaupasadavattaduktam || 33 ||

(Topic: "The Negational Understandings of the Imperishable Are All Combined Everywhere") Various passages teach the Imperishable (akṣara), the supreme Brahman, through negation of particular attributes, differently worded in different places. Should all such negations be combined everywhere, or kept separate? All combined everywhere, since the manner of teaching Brahman through negation is uniform and it is the same one Brahman taught throughout — just as mantras belonging to one priestly school are used by another too, since both serve the one principal rite, so too these attributes, subordinate to the one Imperishable, connect with It universally.

इयदामननात् ॥ ३४ ॥

iyadāmananāt || 34 ||

(Topic: "Because of the Teaching of 'This Much' — Two") The mantra of "two birds, close companions on one tree, one eating the fruit, the other watching without eating" (found variously among the Atharvaṇikas, Śvetāśvataras, and Kaṭhas, where both are said to "drink") — is this one teaching or two, given the apparent variation? One and the same teaching, since both mantras present the same, definitely twofold, object of knowledge — the Supreme accompanied by the individual soul; "non-enjoying" refers to the Supreme, and "drinking" is figuratively extended to Him by association with the soul — hence no real difference, and the teaching is one, with qualities to be combined throughout.

अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनोऽन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिर् इति चेन् नोपदेशवत् ॥ ३५ ॥

antarā bhūtagrāmavatsvātmano'nyathā bhedānupapattir iti cen nopadeśavat || 35 ||

(Topic: "'The Inner Self' — Repeated") The Vājasaneyins twice, in successive sections, teach "the Self within all, to be directly realized as Brahman." One teaching or two? [Reply:] One, because of non-distinction in what is taught — the "Self within all" asked and answered both times is identical, since two "Selves within all" cannot exist in one body. [Or, per the illustration "like the group of elements": just as one god is hidden within, and the inner Self of, the entire array of beings.] Hence oneness of teaching, given identity of what is taught.

व्यतिहारो विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् ॥ ३६ ॥

vyatihāro viśiṁṣanti hītaravat || 36 ||

(Topic: "The Interchange of 'I' and 'Thou' — Meant for Active Meditation, Like Other Qualities") Both the sun-person and Deity passages teach an "interchange" of pronouns ("that am I; I am that"). Is a single one-directional understanding sufficient, or must the mind hold both directions? The interchange itself is meant for active contemplation, since scripture deliberately states both directions — pointless repetition if only one were meant; the ultimate effect is the same firm establishment of oneness, as with meditating on the Lord through qualities like "true desires" for meditational purposes.

सैव हि सत्यादयः ॥ ३७ ॥

saiva hi satyādayaḥ || 37 ||

(Topic: "That Very Same Teaching — 'Truth' Etc.") The Vājasaneyaka, having taught the "Truth-vidyā," immediately continues with a passage on Truth identified with the sun and the eye-person. Two separate teachings, or one? One and the same, because of pronominal cross-reference drawing on what precedes; different results mentioned in each part do not indicate two vidyās — being a single meditation, all qualities stated in different parts are to be combined into the one whole practice.

कामादीतरत्र तत्र चाऽयतनादिभ्यः ॥ ३८ ॥

kāmādītaratra tatra cā'yatanādibhyaḥ || 38 ||

(Topic: "'Desire' Etc. — There Too, Because of Sameness of Locus") The Chāndogya's Dahara-vidyā calls its Self "free from evil... of true desires, true resolve," while the parallel Vājasaneyaka passage calls it "ruler of all." Should qualities be combined both ways? Yes, because of sameness of locus, object, and the shared "bridge" function preventing worlds from mixing — though some difference of emphasis exists (Chāndogya leaning toward qualified Brahman, Vājasaneyaka toward unqualified), the shared "ruler"-qualities merely display Brahman's majesty, not establish a different practice.

आदरादलोपः ॥ ३९ ॥

ādarādalopaḥ || 39 ||

(Topic: "Because of the Emphasis Shown — No Omission When the Meal Is Absent") The Vaiśvānara-vidyā ties five breath-oblations to the arrival of food, later termed "Agnihotra." If food fails entirely, does the "prāṇa-Agnihotra" lapse too? No, because of the emphasis shown elsewhere — a parallel Jābāla text stresses eating only after guests, treating its neglect as severely blameworthy — showing such regard that total omission would be even less tolerable; hence, when food is lacking, the rite should be performed with water or another substitute, not omitted altogether.

उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ॥ ४० ॥

upasthite'tastadvacanāt || 40 ||

Because, when food is present, it is from that very food that the rite must be performed, as scripture states — presupposing the food's arrival as already established, showing these oblations are meant specifically for the food obtained for eating; so ordinarily its use is mandatory, and only in its total absence is a substitute considered, per the reasoning already given.

तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ ४१ ॥

tannirdhāraṇāniyamastaddṛṣṭeḥ pṛthagghyapratibandhaḥ phalam || 41 ||

(Topic: "No Fixed Rule for Determining Which to Combine — Since the Separately-Stated Fruit Is Unconditional") Meditative cognitions attached to ritual parts (like "meditate on Om as the udgītha") — permanently obligatory like ritual accessories, or optional like an independent act tied to its own fruit? Optional, because scripture shows both knower and non-knower equally performing the ritual, and shows a distinct fruit for the meditation ("what is done with knowledge becomes that much more potent") — this comparative implies action lacking meditation is still valid, only less potent, fitting only if meditation is optional.

प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् ॥ ४२ ॥

pradānavadeva taduktam || 42 ||

(Topic: "Just as with 'Giving' — Already Stated") Just as in gift-giving rites an optional element is tied to its own independent fruit, so too here — this has already been explained by the preceding topic's reasoning, on a comparable case.

लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि ॥ ४३ ॥

liṅgabhūyastvāttaddhi balīyastadapi || 43 ||

(Topic: "Because of the Preponderance of Indicatory Marks — That Is Stronger, and This Too Follows") The Agnirahasya describes, alongside the ritual "brick-built" fire, meditative "mind-built" fires (mind-fire, speech-fire, breath-fire, etc.). Are these accessories absorbed into the ritual, or independently meditative? [First proposed:] Independent, because of the preponderance of indicatory marks (liṅga) supporting purely meditative character here — e.g. "whatever creatures conceive with the mind, that is their true making" — such marks being stronger than mere ritual context (prakaraṇa), per the established principle.

पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात्स्यात् क्रियामानसवत् ॥ ४४ ॥

pūrvavikalpaḥ prakaraṇātsyāt kriyāmānasavat || 44 ||

This is not correct: rather, a special option belonging to the preceding ritual context is intended, because of context — like the "mental" Soma-cup rite. Since the whole passage occurs within the ritual fire's context, this alternative is confined to that ritual subject, not independent; for indicatory marks here admit another, non-literal explanation, and where possible without real conflict, they cannot override context — just as, in a ten-night rite, purely mental grasping-rites still remain, by context, part of the ritual sequence.

अतिदेशाच् च ॥ ४५ ॥

atideśāc ca || 45 ||

And also because of extension (atideśa): "of these [36,000 mind-built fires], each is as great as that former [ritual] one" — such extension operates only where an underlying common category exists, and this very extension of the ritual fire's greatness confirms the mind-built fires' ritual character.

विद्यैव तु निर्धारणाद्दर्शनाच् च ॥ ४६ ॥

vidyaiva tu nirdhāraṇāddarśanāc ca || 46 ||

[Reply, reversing the argument:] But indeed these are of the nature of knowledge alone (not ritual accessories), because of the explicit determinative statement and direct observation — scripture states plainly, "they indeed are 'knowledge-built' fires" and "by knowledge alone are these piled for the knower."

श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच् च न बाधः ॥ ४७ ॥

śrutyādibalīyastvāc ca na bādhaḥ || 47 ||

And this independence is not overridden, because direct scriptural statement, indicatory mark, and syntax are stronger than context — "they indeed are knowledge-built" (statement), "ever piled even while sleeping" (mark), "by knowledge alone piled" (syntax) — being unambiguous, these outweigh context and cannot be set aside by it.

अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश् च तदुक्तम् ॥ ४८ ॥

anubandhādibhyaḥ prajñāntarapṛthaktvavaddṛṣṭaś ca taduktam || 48 ||

And also, because of the connective clause etc. — like the separateness of other independent meditations — as already observed: the Avekṣā rite, though occurring within the Rājasūya context, is elevated beyond it because of its connection with all three social classes and its being a "king's sacrifice."

न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः ॥ ४९ ॥

na sāmānyādapyupalabdhermṛtyuvanna hi lokāpattiḥ || 49 ||

Nor is this independence overridden by mere general analogy, given the direct evidence already established on stronger, specific grounds — like the word "death": just as its shared use for both the solar person and fire does not entail their identity, so too a mere general analogy cannot override the specific, stronger evidence already established here.

परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात् त्व् अनुबन्धः ॥ ५० ॥

pareṇa ca śabdasya tādvidhyaṁ bhūyastvāt tv anubandhaḥ || 50 ||

And further on, similar wording shows the same knowledge-primary purpose — "this world indeed is that constructed fire" — stressing the primacy of knowledge over ritual there too; and the connective clause exists because the meditation requires more fire-components to be accomplished, not because of dependence on ritual action.

एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् ॥ ५१ ॥

eka ātmanaḥ śarīre bhāvāt || 51 ||

(Topic: "One Self — Because It Is Present Throughout the Body") [Resuming the main subject.] The existence of a Self distinct from the body is here established [first, an objection]: the materialist (Cārvāka) view holds there is no self apart from the body, since whatever exists only when the body exists must be a property of the body — like heat and light of fire — and vital functions, consciousness, memory (deemed properties of "self") are found only within the body, never apart; hence the conscious body alone is the "self," with no separate self capable of liberation.

व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत् ॥ ५२ ॥

vyatirekastadbhāvabhāvitvānna tūpalabdhivat || 52 ||

[Reply:] Not so — there IS a difference from the body, because these properties occur only in dependence on the Self, not merely on the body's presence — for consciousness etc. are absent even when a dead body remains, unlike bodily properties like form/color, which persist after death and are perceivable by others, unlike consciousness and memory. Moreover, cognition, being of the nature of the perceiver, cannot take itself as its own object (as fire does not burn itself) — hence just as the existence of this perception is accepted, its difference from body and elements must be accepted too. Thus the existence of a Self distinct from the body is established beyond objection.

अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् ॥ ५३ ॥

aṅgāvabaddhāstu na śākhāsu hi prativedam || 53 ||

(Topic: "Ritual-Bound Practices — Not by Branch, in Each Veda") [Resuming the vidyā-combination topic.] Meditative attitudes tied to ritual accessories like the udgītha are taught with variant details in different Vedic branches. Should such attitudes be restricted to one's own branch, or applied across all branches' versions? [First proposed:] Restricted to one's own branch, because of proximity — the general injunction naturally specifies to the particular version in one's own branch.

मन्त्रादिवद्वाविरोधः ॥ ५४ ॥

mantrādivadvāvirodhaḥ || 54 ||

[Reply:] No, no conflict — it is like mantras etc.: just as mantras, acts, and qualities from one branch are seen taken up by others (a stone-mantra used by other branches; prayāja offerings governed by another branch's rules; a Ṛg-vedic hymn used in Yajur-vedic ritual) — so too, since the ritual accessories themselves are shared across branches, the attitudes attached to them should likewise be recognized as shared.

भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्वं तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ५५ ॥

bhūmnaḥ kratuvajjyāyasvaṁ tathā hi darśayati || 55 ||

(Topic: "The Superiority of the 'Whole' Vaiśvānara — Like a Sacrifice, per Scripture") The story of Prācīnaśāla describes both piecemeal and whole, integrated meditation on Vaiśvānara. Should both be practiced, or the whole alone? The "whole" (bhūman) is primarily intended, not the piecemeal parts — like a sacrifice, where the entire rite is the single intended unit; confirmed by the passage's unity from start to end — the six sages fail at piecemeal understanding, King Aśvapati refutes piecemeal meditation, teaches the integrated one, and states the fruit only for the whole. Hence the integrated meditation alone is superior.

नाना शब्दादिभेदात् ॥ ५६ ॥

nānā śabdādibhedāt || 56 ||

(Topic: "Various — Because of the Difference of Wording Etc.") Given the "whole" is superior in the Vaiśvānara case, should other, differently-worded meditations likewise be combined, since the object worshipped is ultimately the same? No, they remain various, because of difference of wording — this is already established as a cause of difference of practice, and likewise difference of quality — since distinct qualities are prescribed in each context, and there is no single overarching injunction (unlike Vaiśvānara-vidyā) to unify them into one composite practice.

विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ॥ ५७ ॥

vikalpo'viśiṣṭaphalatvāt || 57 ||

(Topic: "Option — Because the Fruit Is Undifferentiated") Given these are distinct meditations, should they be combined at will, or practiced one at a time as options? As options, because their fruit is undifferentiated: all aim equally at direct realization of the Lord; once attained through one, a second is pointless, and simultaneous practice would scatter concentration — hence one should take up any one of these equally-fruited meditations and pursue it single-mindedly until its fruit, direct realization, is attained.

काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात् ॥ ५८ ॥

kāmyāstu yathākāmaṁ samuccīyeranna vā pūrvahetvabhāvāt || 58 ||

(Topic: "Optional-Desire Meditations May Be Combined at Will, or Not — Since the Prior Reason Is Absent") Meditations undertaken for a specific desired fruit (e.g. "he who thus worships the Wind does not weep for his sons") secure their own fruit through unseen potency, like ritual acts, without requiring direct realization of the object; hence these may be combined at will or not, since the previous reason restricting to strict option (sameness of fruit as realization) does not apply.

अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः ॥ ५९ ॥

aṅgeṣu yathāśrayabhāvaḥ || 59 ||

(Topic: "As with the Substrate, Regarding Meditations Tied to Accessories") Meditative attitudes attached to ritual accessories like the udgītha, taught across all three Vedas — should they be combined in every performance, or practiced freely? [First proposed:] They follow the manner of their substrate — just as the ritual accessories themselves are combined together in an actual performance, the meditative attitudes attached to them should likewise be combined, being governed by their substrate.

शिष्टेश् च ॥ ६० ॥

śiṣṭeś ca || 60 ||

And also because they are taught together across all three Vedas — just as the ritual accessories are recognized as shared across all three without distinction, so too the attitudes attached to them.

समाहारात् ॥ ६१ ॥

samāhārāt || 61 ||

And also because of collective-gathering statements — "having taken up the gathering at the Hotṛ's seat, the Udgātṛ repairs his own defect from the Hautra-function" — this, on the strength of the unified understanding of Om and Udgītha, indicates that attitudes taught in one Veda should be gathered into performances under another.

गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश् च ॥ ६२ ॥

guṇasādhāraṇyaśruteś ca || 62 ||

And also because scripture shows the shared quality (Om) common to all three Vedic functions — "with Om one announces, with Om one recites, with Om one sings" — since the substrate is shared, the attitudes dependent on it are shared too; or, since the accessories are declared common by an all-encompassing injunction, the attached attitudes should accompany them together in every performance.

न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः ॥ ६३ ॥

na vā tatsahabhāvāśruteḥ || 63 ||

[Reply:] No — meditations dependent on a substrate need not follow the substrate's joint occurrence, because there is no scriptural statement of their joint occurrence — while the accessories' joint occurrence IS explicitly stated, the meditations' is not. Objection: does not the performance-injunction itself entail joint occurrence? Reply: No, because these meditations serve the individual practitioner, not the ritual — some elements serve the ritual, some meditations, though resting on such accessories, serve the individual; joint occurrence of the substrate cannot be inferred to entail joint occurrence of what depends on it, absent explicit scriptural statement.

दर्शनाच् च ॥ ६४ ॥

darśanāc ca || 64 ||

And scripture also shows their non-joint-occurrence — "he indeed, the knower, is Brahmā who protects the sacrifice, sacrificer, and all priests" — for if all attitudes were combined in every performance, all priests would equally be "all-knowing," making it pointless to single out one knowledgeable Brahmā-priest as protector of the rest; hence such meditations are to be practiced by choice, combined or as options, not obligatorily joined.

पुरुषार्थो ऽतः शब्दाद् इति बादरायणः ॥ १ ॥

puruṣārtho 'taḥ śabdād iti bādarāyaṇaḥ || 1 ||

(Topic: "The Human Goal") According to the teacher Bādarāyaṇa, the highest human goal (liberation, mokṣa) results from this Vedānta-taught knowledge of the Self (ātman) independently, because of the wording of scripture — passages like "the knower of the Self crosses over sorrow" and "he who knows that supreme Brahman becomes Brahman itself" show that knowledge alone is the cause of the human goal.

शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादो यथान्येष्व् इति जैमिनिः ॥ २ ॥

śeṣatvātpuruṣārthavādo yathānyeṣv iti jaiminiḥ || 2 ||

But according to Jaimini: since the Self, as agent (kartṛ), is subordinate (śeṣa) to ritual action (karma), knowledge of it too is connected with action, like the sacrificial ladle; hence the glorification of the fruit of this knowledge is a mere eulogy (arthavāda), just as, elsewhere, reward-statements attached to ritual accessories are mere eulogies, not independent injunctions.

Note: This sutra (Jaimini's pūrvapakṣa view, well attested in printed editions as brahma-sutra 3.4.2: śeṣatvāt puruṣārthavādo yathānyeṣv iti jaiminiḥ) carries NO citation tag at all in this Wikisource transcription -- it appears as plain untagged text between sutra 3.4.1's Bhashya and sutra 3.4.3's citation, itself followed by its own untagged Bhashya block. Identified and inserted here by textual position and content, not by an extraction regex match.

आचारदर्शनात् ॥ ३ ॥

ācāradarśanāt || 3 ||

[Continuing Jaimini's view] Because of the observed conduct of even Brahman-knowers still engaged in ritual — "King Janaka performed a sacrifice with abundant gifts," and passages showing teachers like Uddālaka instructing their sons in household duties — showing that knowers of Brahman remain connected with ritual action; were knowledge alone sufficient for the human goal, why would they undertake such laborious rites?

तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ४ ॥

tacchruteḥ || 4 ||

And because scripture itself states this: "what one does with knowledge, faith, and meditation on the mystic connection becomes that much more potent" — showing knowledge to be subordinate to, an enhancer of, action, not independently productive of the human goal.

समन्वारम्भणात् ॥ ५ ॥

samanvārambhaṇāt || 5 ||

And because of the joint undertaking of knowledge and action: "he takes hold together of knowledge and action" — showing their combination in producing the fruit, not the independence of knowledge alone.

तद्वतो विधानात् ॥ ६ ॥

tadvato vidhānāt || 6 ||

And because ritual action is enjoined for one possessing that complete Vedic knowledge: "having studied the Veda from the teacher's household, as prescribed... continuing Vedic recitation" — showing ritual duty prescribed for one who possesses full understanding of the Veda's meaning; hence knowledge alone does not independently produce the fruit.

नियमात् ॥ ७ ॥

niyamāt || 7 ||

And because of the scriptural rule enjoining continued action even for the knower: "one should wish to live a hundred years performing action" and "this indeed is a sacrificial session lasting till old age, namely the Agnihotra" — such rules also show knowledge to be subordinate to action.

अधिकोपदेशात् तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ८ ॥

adhikopadeśāt tu bādarāyaṇasyaivaṁ taddarśanāt || 8 ||

[Reply, restoring Bādarāyaṇa's view:] But "mere eulogy" does not hold, because of the teaching of something additional/higher — what is taught in Vedānta as the object of knowledge is not merely the transmigrating agent-self, but the un-transmigrating Supreme Lord, devoid of agency, characterized as "free from evil"; and that knowledge does not promote ritual action but destroys it. Hence Bādarāyaṇa's position stands firm, unshaken by such pseudo-reasons as "subordination."

तुल्यं तु दर्शनम् ॥ ९ ॥

tulyaṁ tu darśanam || 9 ||

But observed conduct is equally available to support the opposite conclusion — the very same "observed conduct" also shows Brahman-knowers NOT engaged in ritual: "the sages Kāvaṣeyas said: why should we study, why sacrifice?... having known that Self, Brāhmaṇas renounce desire for sons, wealth, and worlds, living as mendicants" — and Yājñavalkya too, having attained knowledge, renounced everything and departed.

असार्वत्रिकी ॥ १० ॥

asārvatrikī || 10 ||

And the scriptural statement cited ("what is done with knowledge becomes more potent") does not apply universally, being connected with the specific context under discussion there — the udgītha-vidyā — not knowledge of Brahman in general.

विभागः शतवत् ॥ ११ ॥

vibhāgaḥ śatavat || 11 ||

And the "joint undertaking" statement is to be understood as a division — knowledge pertains to one person (the seeker of liberation), action to another (the seeker of worldly ends) — like "let a hundred be given by these two," meaning divided giving; and this passage does not concern the seeker of liberation at all, its context concluding with the desirer of worldly ends, while the non-desirer is introduced separately thereafter.

अध्ययनमात्रवतः ॥ १२ ॥

adhyayanamātravataḥ || 12 ||

Regarding "one who studied the Veda from the teacher's household" — that passage establishes ritual duty merely for one who has studied, not necessarily one with full understanding of its meaning; knowledge of the Self taught in the Upaniṣads, independently meaningful in its own right, does not itself become a cause of ritual qualification, just as knowledge of one rite does not qualify one for a different rite.

नाविशेषात् ॥ १३ ॥

nāviśeṣāt || 13 ||

And regarding the "rule" cited ("one should wish to live a hundred years performing action") — there is no distinction there between knower and non-knower; the rule applies without distinction to both, and hence cannot be taken as specifically establishing knowledge's subordination to action.

स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा ॥ १४ ॥

stutaye'numatirvā || 14 ||

Or, another distinction: although the context might construe "one performing action" as "the knower performing action," even so, the permission of action there is for the sake of glorifying knowledge — as scripture goes on to say, "action does not cling to a man" — meaning: even performing action throughout life, action does not bind the wise, because of knowledge's power; thus knowledge is being praised, not subordinated.

कामकारेण चैके ॥ १५ ॥

kāmakāreṇa caike || 15 ||

And some passages show certain knowers proceeding by free choice, without obligation to ritual — knowers who, having directly realized the fruit of knowledge, see no purpose in means to other ends: "the ancient knowers did not desire progeny, [saying] 'what shall we do with progeny, we whose Self is this world?'" And the fruit of knowledge, realized directly in this very life, is unlike ritual fruit, which arises only after a lapse of time.

उपमर्दं च ॥ १६ ॥

upamardaṁ ca || 16 ||

And moreover, scripture teaches that the entire apparatus of ritual duty — action, instruments, and fruit, all born of ignorance — dissolves by the power of knowledge: "when everything has become the Self alone for him, then by what should he see what..." — whereas anticipating ritual qualification as preceded by such knowledge would lead only to the destruction of ritual qualification itself; hence knowledge's independence is established here too.

ऊर्ध्वरेतस्सु च शब्दे हि ॥ १७ ॥

ūrdhvaretassu ca śabde hi || 17 ||

And also because knowledge is taught for those in the celibate/renunciate life-stages (ūrdhvaretas āśramas), where household-type ritual cannot apply at all — and such life-stages are not unattested in the Veda, being known through Vedic terms: "the three branches of dharma," "those who in the forest worship faith and austerity," "let him renounce right from studentship" — hence knowledge stands independent of ritual action on this ground too.

परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदनाच्चापवदति हि ॥ १८ ॥

parāmarśaṁ jaiminiracodanāccāpavadati hi || 18 ||

(Topic: "Mere Allusion") According to Jaimini, the terms cited above ("the three branches of dharma," etc.) are mere allusions to other life-stages, not injunctions, since none contains an actual injunctive word and each admits another primary meaning in context; moreover, scripture explicitly disparages such stages: "he who abandons the fire is a slayer of the gods... there is no world for one without a son."

अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणस्साम्यश्रुतेः ॥ १९ ॥

anuṣṭheyaṁ bādarāyaṇassāmyaśruteḥ || 19 ||

According to Bādarāyaṇa: the other life-stages ARE to be practiced, because of the parallel scriptural allusion — the allusion to the household stage here is exactly parallel to the allusion to the other stages; just as the household stage, explicitly enjoined elsewhere, is here merely alluded to and yet valid, so too the other stages, explicitly enjoined elsewhere, are here merely alluded to for reinforcement — the terms are not genuinely ambiguous, since determining indications are present throughout.

विधिर् वा धारणवत् ॥ २० ॥

vidhir vā dhāraṇavat || 20 ||

Or, more strongly, this is indeed an injunction, not mere allusion — like the "holding" injunction in the fire-carrying rite: just as "holding the kindling-stick below... holding it above for the gods" is accepted as a fresh injunction because it is new (apūrva), so too here, the passage on other life-stages, despite its allusive appearance, is a genuine injunction, since it too introduces something new.

स्तुतिमात्रम् उपादानाद् इति चेन् नापूर्वत्वात् ॥ २१ ॥

stutimātram upādānād iti cen nāpūrvatvāt || 21 ||

(Topic: "Not Mere Eulogy") Objection: Passages using ritual accessory-terms like "udgītha" figuratively (e.g. "this indeed is the essence of essences... the udgītha") are mere eulogies. Reply: No, because of their conveying something new (apūrva) — mere eulogy would be pointless here, since such statements, occurring apart from any ritual injunction's immediate context, cannot serve to glorify a distant element already covered elsewhere; rather, they must themselves be taken as conveying an injunction of meditation.

भावशब्दाच् च ॥ २२ ॥

bhāvaśabdāc ca || 22 ||

And also because of the explicit injunctive words found: clear injunctive terms like "one should meditate on the udgītha" are found, which would be rendered pointless if such passages served mere eulogy; and results are specifically stated for each such context — hence such udgītha-related passages are indeed for the injunction of meditation.

पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन् न विशेषितत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

pāriplavārthā iti cen na viśeṣitatvāt || 23 ||

(Topic: "Not for the Recurring Recitation Cycle") Objection: Upaniṣadic narratives (e.g. "Yājñavalkya had two wives") are meant for the recurring narrative-recitation cycle (pāriplava) of the Aśvamedha, being of narrative character. Reply: No, because of specification — the pāriplava injunction specifies only certain particular narratives, not narrative in general; if mere narrative-character sufficed, all narratives would be included, making that specification pointless.

तथा चैकवाक्योपबन्धात् ॥ २४ ॥

tathā caikavākyopabandhāt || 24 ||

And this is confirmed because of their connection into a single sentence-unit with the adjacent knowledge-teaching: absent a role in the pāriplava, these narratives fittingly introduce the neighboring meditation-teaching — the Maitreyī narrative connects with "the Self indeed is to be seen"; the Pratardana narrative with "I am breath, the conscious self"; the Janaśruti narrative with "the Wind indeed is the swallower."

अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा ॥ २५ ॥

ata eva cāgnīndhanādyanapekṣā || 25 ||

(Topic: "No Need for Fire-Kindling Etc.") For this very reason — that the human goal results from knowledge itself, as established earlier — knowledge, in accomplishing its own end, does not require life-stage rituals such as fire-kindling; this restates the conclusion of the first section, with a view to the discussion to follow.

सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेर् अश्ववत् ॥ २६ ॥

sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruter aśvavat || 26 ||

(Topic: "All Are Required — Because of the Scriptural Mention of Sacrifice Etc., Like a Horse") But knowledge is not wholly independent of the life-stage rituals; rather it requires them all: once arisen, knowledge needs nothing further for its own fruit, but for its very origination it depends on them, because scripture states so — "Brāhmaṇas seek to know that Self through Vedic recitation, sacrifice, gift, penance, and fasting." The illustration "like a horse" indicates fitness for a specific function — a horse unsuited for plowing but suited for drawing a chariot.

शमदमाद्युपेतस् स्यात् तथापि तु तद्विधेस् तदङ्गतया तेषाम् अप्य् अवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

śamadamādyupetas syāt tathāpi tu tadvidhes tadaṅgatayā teṣām apy avaśyānuṣṭheyatvāt || 27 ||

[Anticipated objection answered:] Even granting such statements might be mere anuvāda glorifying knowledge, still a seeker of knowledge should possess tranquility and self-control, for scripture enjoins these too as means to knowledge — "therefore let one so knowing become tranquil, controlled, withdrawn, forbearing, composed; he sees the Self in the self alone" — and being enjoined, their practice is necessary; hence sacrifice and other rituals too are necessary, since scripture so states.

सर्वान् नानुमतिश् च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात् ॥ २८ ॥

sarvān nānumatiś ca prāṇātyaye taddarśanāt || 28 ||

(Topic: "Permission to Eat Anything — At Risk of Life, Since This Is Observed") The "dialogue of the vital breaths" says "for the knower there is nothing that is not food" — an injunction, or mere eulogy? It applies only in emergency of loss of life (prāṇātyaya), as observed elsewhere — scripture shows the sage Cākrāyaṇa, in dire distress, eating leftover food to save his life, yet refusing water from an outcaste — showing the permission applies only in life-threatening emergency, not ordinary circumstances even for the wise.

अबाधाच् च ॥ २९ ॥

abādhāc ca || 29 ||

And also because [food-purity rules] remain unbaffled: rules like "purity of mind follows from purity of food" are not contradicted by this interpretation, but remain intact.

अपि स्मर्यते ॥ ३० ॥

api smaryate || 30 ||

And this emergency-only exception is also confirmed by smṛti: "one who eats whatever food, from wherever, when facing loss of life, is not tainted by sin, like a lotus-leaf by water" — while elsewhere smṛti condemns habitual consumption of forbidden things — confirming that mere emergency permits what is otherwise avoided.

शब्दश् चातोऽकामकारे ॥ ३१ ॥

śabdaś cāto'kāmakāre || 31 ||

And there is also a direct scriptural prohibition, confirming this is not a matter of free choice: "therefore a Brāhmaṇa should not drink liquor" (Kaṭha-saṃhitā) — this fits better precisely if the earlier passage is a mere eulogy; hence such passages are eulogies, not injunctions overriding purity rules.

विहितत्वाच् चाऽश्रमकर्मापि ॥ ३२ ॥

vihitatvāc cā'śramakarmāpi || 32 ||

(Topic: "Life-Stage Duties, Too, Since They Are Enjoined") Given that life-stage rituals are means to knowledge, should one settled solely on a life-stage but without desire for knowledge still perform the permanent (nitya) rites? Yes, they remain obligatory simply because unconditionally enjoined ("he offers the Agnihotra as long as he lives") — there is no limit to a valid injunction's reach.

सहकारित्वेन च ॥ ३३ ॥

sahakāritvena ca || 33 ||

And also because they serve as concurrent aids to knowledge — enjoined as such ("Brāhmaṇas seek to know that Self through Vedic recitation, sacrifice..."), as already stated; but this auxiliary role is not modeled on ritual accessories like the prayājas contributing to a ritual's own fruit, since knowledge is not itself injunction-produced nor its fruit newly accomplished — these serve only toward the ORIGINATION of knowledge.

सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् ॥ ३४ ॥

sarvathāpi ta evobhayaliṅgāt || 34 ||

In every respect — whether taken as independently obligatory duties or as auxiliaries to knowledge — it is the very same rites (Agnihotra etc.) meant, because of a twofold indicatory mark (scriptural and smṛti): scripture shows these rites, already accomplished in established form, merely directed toward the desire to know; smṛti confirms this too — hence no real difference of rite, only a difference of the "connection" (obligatory vs. auxiliary) attached to the same rite.

अनभिभवं च दर्शयति ॥ ३५ ॥

anabhibhavaṁ ca darśayati || 35 ||

And scripture also shows their power to prevent being overwhelmed by afflictions, a supporting indicatory mark of their auxiliary role: "for this Self is not destroyed, whom one attains through brahmacarya..." — showing one so equipped is not overcome by passion; hence sacrifice and other life-stage duties are established as both obligatory rituals and auxiliaries to knowledge.

अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ॥ ३६ ॥

antarā cāpi tu taddṛṣṭeḥ || 36 ||

(Topic: "Even One In-Between") Do those between life-stages — widowers and others lacking the requisite means, settled in none of the four stages — have qualification for knowledge? Yes, even without a fixed life-stage, because this is observed in scripture — figures like Raikva and Vācaknavī, of this very sort, are shown as knowers of Brahman.

अपि स्मर्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

api smaryate || 37 ||

And it is also recorded in smṛti-itihāsa that figures like Saṃvarta, following practices such as living naked, without regard to life-stage duties, attained great yogic power.

विशेषानुग्रहश् च ॥ ३८ ॥

viśeṣānugrahaś ca || 38 ||

And, for such persons too, assistance from knowledge is possible through unobjectionable, person-independent practices — japa, fasting, worship — smṛti confirming "by japa alone a Brāhmaṇa is perfected... he is called a Maitra Brāhmaṇa"; and merit accumulated across former births also assists ("perfected over many births, he then attains the highest goal"); and knowledge, having a directly-perceived fruit, qualifies even a seeker through the mere absence of prohibition.

अतस् त्व् इतरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच् च ॥ ३९ ॥

atas tv itarajjyāyo liṅgāc ca || 39 ||

But for this very reason, life-stage observance is indeed the superior means to knowledge, firmly attested by both scripture and smṛti; smṛti says: "thus a knower of Brahman... is attained; a twice-born should not remain without a life-stage even for a single day; having remained a year without one, let him perform one severe penance" — such indications confirm the superiority of the life-stage path.

तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेर् अपि नियमात् तद्रूपाभावेभ्यः ॥ ४० ॥

tadbhūtasya tu nātadbhāvo jaiminer api niyamāt tadrūpābhāvebhyaḥ || 40 ||

(Topic: "One Who Has Attained That State Does Not Revert") Having established the celibate/renunciate life-stages exist, can one who has attained such a state fall away, from desire to resume former duties or from passion? No — one established in such a state cannot revert in any way, because of the rule ("let him not return"), and the absence of any statement of that reverse form — only statements of ASCENT exist, never descent. And "even" indicates Jaimini agrees with Bādarāyaṇa here, for firmer conviction.

न चाधिकारिकम् अपि पतनानुमानात् तदयोगात् ॥ ४१ ॥

na cādhikārikam api patanānumānāt tadayogāt || 41 ||

(Topic: "Not Even the Prescribed Penance") If a lifelong celibate (naiṣṭhika brahmacārī) breaks his vow through carelessness, does he undergo the prescribed penance for an ordinary "fallen student"? No, that does not apply to him, since smṛti implies such a fall is unremediable: "for one who ascends to lifelong celibacy and then falls, I see no penance... he is a self-slayer" — only the ordinary student, for whom no such description exists, is eligible for the lesser penance.

उपपूर्वम् अपीत्य् एके भावमशनवत् तद् उक्तम् ॥ ४२ ॥

upapūrvam apīty eke bhāvamaśanavat tad uktam || 42 ||

But some teachers hold it is merely a lesser offense (upapātaka), not grave, so the lifelong celibate too is subject to some penance, like an ordinary student — analogous to eating impure food (causing lapse and re-consecration, not harsher penalty). Those denying any penance lack textual basis; the view that some penance exists is preferable, with "no penance" meant to instill great effort, not literal denial. Similar considerations apply to forest-dwellers and renunciants who break their vows.

बहिस् तूभयथापि स्मृतेर् आचाराच् च ॥ ४३ ॥

bahis tūbhayathāpi smṛter ācārāc ca || 43 ||

(Topic: "Outside — Either Way") Whether the fall of a celibate/renunciate be a grave or lesser sin, either way the learned should place him outside society, because of smṛti's severe condemnation ("having ascended and then fallen... he is a self-slayer") and the observed practice of the learned, who do not associate with such persons in sacrifice, study, or marriage.

स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेर् इत्य् आत्रेयः ॥ ४४ ॥

svāminaḥ phalaśruter ity ātreyaḥ || 44 ||

(Topic: "The Sacrificer's — Because the Fruit Is So Stated") Do meditations attached to ritual accessories belong to the sacrificer (yajamāna) or the officiating priest (ṛtvij)? According to Ātreya: they belong to the sacrificer, because the fruit is stated for him — "he causes rain for him who thus meditates on the fivefold sāman during a drought" — such fruit properly belongs to the sacrificer, qualified for the whole combined performance.

आर्त्विज्यम् इत्य् औडुलोमिः तस्मै हि परिक्रीयते ॥ ४५ ॥

ārtvijyam ity auḍulomiḥ tasmai hi parikrīyate || 45 ||

According to Auḍulomi: no, such meditations belong to the priestly function, since the priest is engaged precisely for that whole ritual; scripture shows a priest, Baka Dālbhya, performing such a function as Udgātṛ for the Naimiṣeya sacrificers; the fruit being stated for the sacrificer is no objection, since the priest acts on the sacrificer's behalf, the fruit-relation following accordingly.

सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् ॥ ४६ ॥

sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa tṛtīyaṁ tadvato vidhyādivat || 46 ||

(Topic: "Injunction of a Further Auxiliary — as a Third") The Bṛhadāraṇyaka: "Having given up learnedness, one should wish to abide in childlikeness; having given up both childlikeness and learnedness, then he becomes a sage (muni)." Is "sagehood" here enjoined? [First it might seem covered under "learnedness."] It is indeed enjoined, as a third auxiliary to knowledge, being new (apūrva) — "muni" denotes a superior degree of knowledge, distinguishable from mere learnedness; this pertains to the qualified seeker, on the model of auxiliary injunctions given to one possessing the primary qualification.

कृत्स्नभावात् तु गृहिणोपसंहारः ॥ ४७ ॥

kṛtsnabhāvāt tu gṛhiṇopasaṁhāraḥ || 47 ||

But then why does the Chāndogya's parallel passage conclude specifically with a householder? Because of the completeness of this stage's demands: many laborious duties are enjoined for the householder specifically, and the other stages' duties also apply to him as far as possible — hence no contradiction in the Chāndogya's culmination with the householder.

मौनवद् इतरेषाम् अप्य् उपदेशात् ॥ ४८ ॥

maunavad itareṣām apy upadeśāt || 48 ||

Just as sagehood and householder-life are the two stages directly attested here, so too the other two (forest-dwelling, studentship) are indicated, their scriptural attestation already shown earlier; hence, all four life-stages being attested without distinction, choice among them proceeds equally by option or combination.

अनाविष्कुर्वन्न् अन्वयात् ॥ ४९ ॥

anāviṣkurvann anvayāt || 49 ||

(Topic: "Not Displaying — By Contextual Connection") "Having given up learnedness, one should wish to abide in childlikeness" — does "childlikeness" mean literal childish traits, or an inner unpretentious disposition? The latter is meant — "not displaying [one's learning]" — by contextual connection: the principal matter here is the practice of knowledge, not served by literal childish conduct; rather an unassuming disposition serves it, as smṛti confirms — "let the learned man live disguised, conducting himself unnoticed."

ऐहिकम् अप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ५० ॥

aihikam aprastutapratibandhe taddarśanāt || 50 ||

(Topic: "In This Very Life — When No Obstruction Is at Hand") Does knowledge always arise within this very lifetime, or sometimes only in a later one? [First it might seem always in this life.] Knowledge arises in this life if no obstruction exists from other currently-operative karma; but with such obstruction, it arises only later — as observed: Vāmadeva attained realization while still in the womb; and the Gītā describes a seeker's connection with understanding accumulated across former births.

एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस् तदवस्थावधृतेस् तदवस्थावधृतेः ॥ ५१ ॥

evaṁ muktiphalāniyamas tadavasthāvadhṛtes tadavasthāvadhṛteḥ || 51 ||

(Topic: "Thus No Variation in the Fruit of Liberation — Because of the Fixed Nature of That State") Just as variation is observed in when knowledge's fruit arises, one might suspect variation of degree in liberation's fruit too. But no such variation exists, because of the fixed, uniform nature of that state — liberation is one and the same throughout Vedānta, since Brahman alone constitutes it, admitting no multiplicity. Liberation, not newly produced but merely disclosed by knowledge as one's ever-perfect true nature, cannot admit degrees — as smṛti confirms: "there is no higher or lower goal for anyone; only where quality differs do they speak of inequality." This doubled phrase marks the conclusion of the chapter.

आवृत्तिर् असकृदुपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

āvṛttir asakṛdupadeśāt || 1 ||

This opens the discussion of nididhyāsana (repeated, sustained meditation): the meditation (upāsanā, meditative worship) on Brahman (the Absolute Reality) enjoined by scripture must be practiced again and again, not just once, because scripture gives its teaching on it repeatedly.

लिङ्गाच् च ॥ २ ॥

liṅgāc ca || 2 ||

And also because of other scriptural indications (liṅga) — such as words like 'practice' (abhyāsa) — which likewise point to repeated meditation.

आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ॥ ३ ॥

ātmeti tūpagacchanti grāhayanti ca || 3 ||

In meditations on Brahman as the ātman (one's innermost Self), scripture approaches and teaches it as 'I' — that is, the meditator is to identify himself with Brahman as his own Self, not regard it as something separate.

न प्रतीके न हि सः ॥ ४ ॥

na pratīke na hi saḥ || 4 ||

This self-identification does not apply to meditation on a symbol (pratīka, such as the mind regarded as Brahman); for that symbol is not truly the Self.

ब्रह्मदृष्टिर् उत्कर्षात् ॥ ५ ॥

brahmadṛṣṭir utkarṣāt || 5 ||

Conversely, where something lower (like the mind) is meditated upon as Brahman, one should regard that support as elevated into Brahman — because this brings exaltation (utkarṣa) to the support, and does not lower Brahman.

आदित्यादिमतयश् चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

ādityādimatayaś cāṅga upapatteḥ || 6 ||

And notions such as 'the sun is the udgītha' [used in ritual chant-meditations] pertain to the subsidiary elements (aṅga) of the sacrifice, since that interpretation is reasonable (upapatti).

आसीनः संभवात् ॥ ७ ॥

āsīnaḥ saṁbhavāt || 7 ||

The meditator should sit while meditating, because only in a seated posture is sustained one-pointed concentration possible (sambhava).

ध्यानाच् च ॥ ८ ॥

dhyānāc ca || 8 ||

Also because the practice is called dhyāna (contemplation), which by its very nature implies steady, unmoving concentration.

अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य ॥ ९ ॥

acalatvaṁ cāpekṣya || 9 ||

And also having regard to the scriptural requirement of motionlessness/steadiness (acalatva) of body and mind during meditation.

स्मरन्ति च ॥ १० ॥

smaranti ca || 10 ||

Smṛti (tradition texts, such as the Bhagavad Gītā's teaching on yogic posture) likewise confirms that meditation is to be done seated.

यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् ॥ ११ ॥

yatraikāgratā tatrāviśeṣāt || 11 ||

Meditation may be practiced in any place where one-pointed concentration (ekāgratā) is attained, since scripture makes no distinction as to a required location.

आप्रयाणात् तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् ॥ १२ ॥

āprayāṇāt tatrāpi hi dṛṣṭam || 12 ||

Meditation on Brahman must be continued until death (āprayāṇa), for this too is seen taught in scripture.

तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोर् अश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् ॥ १३ ॥

tadadhigama uttarapūrvāghayor aśleṣavināśau tadvyapadeśāt || 13 ||

On attaining that [Brahman-]knowledge (jñāna), future karma (āgāmi karma, karma yet to arise) does not cling to the knower, and past accumulated karma (sañcita karma) is destroyed — because scripture (śruti) expressly declares this.

इतरस्याप्य् एवम् असंश्लेषः पाते तु ॥ १४ ॥

itarasyāpy evam asaṁśleṣaḥ pāte tu || 14 ||

Likewise, past accumulated merit (puṇya, good karma) also does not cling to the knower; but [the actual dropping-away of this accumulated karma is completed] only at the falling of the body, that is, at death.

अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः ॥ १५ ॥

anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tadavadheḥ || 15 ||

But it is only those previous (sañcita) karmas whose fruition has not yet begun (anārabdha-kārya) that are destroyed by knowledge — for scripture sets precisely this limit (avadhi). Karma already in fruition, prārabdha karma (already-commenced karma), is not destroyed by knowledge; it must run its course.

अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् ॥ १६ ॥

agnihotrādi tu tatkāryāyaiva taddarśanāt || 16 ||

But rites such as the Agnihotra (fire-sacrifice) are performed [by the seeker] only as a means toward that same knowledge, since scripture shows this connection.

अतोऽन्यापि ह्य् एकेषाम् उभयोः ॥ १७ ॥

ato'nyāpi hy ekeṣām ubhayoḥ || 17 ||

For according to some [Vedic] schools, there are other duties too besides the Agnihotra, which serve as aids to both — to ritual action (karma) and to knowledge (jñāna).

यद् एव विद्ययेति हि ॥ १८ ॥

yad eva vidyayeti hi || 18 ||

For scripture says, 'whatever is done with knowledge (vidyā) [and faith] becomes more potent' — showing that ritual action performed together with knowledge itself becomes a means to knowledge.

भोगेन त्व् इतरे क्षपयित्वाथ संपद्यते ॥ १९ ॥

bhogena tv itare kṣapayitvātha saṁpadyate || 19 ||

But the other karma — the prārabdha, already commenced — must be exhausted through actual experience (bhoga) of its fruits; only then does the knower attain mokṣa (final liberation, union with Brahman).

वाङ्मनसि दर्शनाच् छब्दाच् च ॥ १ ॥

vāṅmanasi darśanāc chabdāc ca || 1 ||

Opening the topic of the process of dying: at death, speech (vāk) merges into the mind, as scripture both shows and directly states.

अत एव सर्वाण्यनु ॥ २ ॥

ata eva sarvāṇyanu || 2 ||

For this same reason, all the other sense-organs likewise merge in succession into the mind.

तन्मनः प्राण उत्तरात् ॥ ३ ॥

tanmanaḥ prāṇa uttarāt || 3 ||

That mind, in turn, merges into prāṇa (the vital breath / life-force), as the subsequent portion of the scriptural passage shows.

सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ॥ ४ ॥

so'dhyakṣe tadupagamādibhyaḥ || 4 ||

That prāṇa merges into the presiding self, the jīva (individual soul), because scripture speaks of prāṇa's 'approach' to it, among other indications.

भूतेषु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

bhūteṣu tacchruteḥ || 5 ||

[The jīva, together with prāṇa,] then rests upon the [subtle] elements, because scripture states this.

नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि ॥ ६ ॥

naikasmin darśayato hi || 6 ||

This is not absorption into a single element alone, for two [scriptural] texts show it to occur across several of the elements.

समाना चासृत्युपक्रमाद् अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य ॥ ७ ॥

samānā cāsṛtyupakramād amṛtatvaṁ cānupoṣya || 7 ||

This process is common (samānā) to both the knower and the non-knower up to the very onset of the soul's departure (āsṛti); but mere elemental dissolution does not confer immortality without genuine spiritual attainment.

तदापीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात् ॥ ८ ॥

tadāpīteḥ saṁsāravyapadeśāt || 8 ||

Because scripture describes the non-knower's elements as merely being drawn into / absorbed with the self [rather than departing together with it] and speaks of 'going forth again,' this state is termed saṃsāra (the cycle of transmigration and rebirth) — that is, it is not liberation.

सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश् च तथोपलब्धेः ॥ ९ ॥

sūkṣmaṁ pramāṇataś ca tathopalabdheḥ || 9 ||

The subtle elements accompanying the departing soul — forming the liṅga-śarīra (subtle body that transmigrates from life to life) — are also minute in extent, since they are known to be perceived as such.

नोपमर्देनातः ॥ १० ॥

nopamardenātaḥ || 10 ||

For this very reason [their subtlety], these accompanying elements of the liṅga-śarīra are not destroyed along with the gross body (sthūla śarīra) at death.

अस्यैव चोपपत्तेर् ऊष्मा ॥ ११ ॥

asyaiva copapatter ūṣmā || 11 ||

And the warmth (ūṣmā) felt in a living body is also evidence of this same subtle vital presence, since that is the reasonable explanation.

प्रतिषेधाद् इति चेन् न शारीरात् स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम् ॥ १२ ॥

pratiṣedhād iti cen na śārīrāt spaṣṭo hyekeṣām || 12 ||

If it be objected that scripture denies any such accompanying subtle body — no; that denial concerns the gross body (śārīra), for some [Vedic recensions] explicitly affirm the subtle elements' departure.

स्मर्यते च ॥ १३ ॥

smaryate ca || 13 ||

And this is also confirmed by smṛti (tradition, e.g. the Purāṇas and epics).

तानि परे तथा ह्य् आह ॥ १४ ॥

tāni pare tathā hy āha || 14 ||

For the fully liberated knower, scripture states that these very faculties merge directly into the Supreme (para) Brahman, not merely into the individual jīva.

अविभागो वचनात् ॥ १५ ॥

avibhāgo vacanāt || 15 ||

This merging is without division (avibhāga): the released faculties do not remain separate but merge indistinguishably into Brahman, as scripture declares.

तदोकोग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात् तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच् ॥ १६ ॥

tadokograjvalanaṁ tatprakāśitadvāro vidyāsāmarthyāt taccheṣagatyanusmṛtiyogāc || 16 ||

Then, at death, the tip of the heart blazes up, and by its light the door [of departure, at the crown of the head] is illumined — through the power of the meditator's knowledge (vidyā) and through his recollection of the departure-path taught as part of that meditation.

रश्म्यनुसारी ॥ १७ ॥

raśmyanusārī || 17 ||

The departing soul then follows the sun's rays (raśmi) — the first stage of the arcirādi-mārga (the path of light, i.e. the devayāna).

निशि नेति चेन् न सम्बन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वाद् दर्शयति च ॥ १८ ॥

niśi neti cen na sambandhasya yāvaddehabhāvitvād darśayati ca || 18 ||

If it be objected that this is not possible at night [when solar rays are absent] — no; because the connecting channel [between the heart and the sun] persists as long as the body exists, and scripture shows this too.

अतश् चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे ॥ १९ ॥

ataś cāyane'pi dakṣiṇe || 19 ||

For that same reason, even during the sun's southern course (dakṣiṇāyana), a knower who dies then can still take the path of light.

योगिनः प्रति स्मर्येते स्मार्ते चैते ॥ २० ॥

yoginaḥ prati smaryete smārte caite || 20 ||

These two restrictions of time [night/day, dakṣiṇāyana/uttarāyaṇa] are stated with reference to a different class of yogis, and belong to smṛti — not to the śruti teaching about the Brahman-knower discussed here.

अर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः ॥ १ ॥

arcirādinā tatprathiteḥ || 1 ||

Opening the topic of the devayāna: the knower of qualified Brahman departs by the path beginning with light (arcis) — the well-known arcirādi-mārga — since this is what scripture repeatedly celebrates.

वायुमब्दादविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् ॥ २ ॥

vāyumabdādaviśeṣaviśeṣābhyām || 2 ||

Harmonizing the general and specific scriptural statements about the path's stages, [it is established that] the soul goes to wind (vāyu) from the cloud.

तटितोऽधि वरुणः संबन्धात् ॥ ३ ॥

taṭito'dhi varuṇaḥ saṁbandhāt || 3 ||

Above the stage of lightning (taḍit) comes Varuṇa, because of his mythological connection with it.

आतिवाहिकास् तल्लिङ्गात् ॥ ४ ॥

ātivāhikās talliṅgāt || 4 ||

These stages [light, day, and so on] are conductors (ātivāhika) who guide the soul onward, not places of dwelling, because scriptural indications show this.

वैद्युतेनैव ततस् तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

vaidyutenaiva tatas tacchruteḥ || 5 ||

From that stage onward, the soul is led further by the being residing in lightning, as scripture directly states.

कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

kāryaṁ bādarirasya gatyupapatteḥ || 6 ||

According to Ācārya Bādari, the Brahman reached at the path's end is the effected/conditioned Brahman (Brahmaloka) — since 'going' to a destination makes sense only for something located in space, not for the infinite, unconditioned Brahman.

विशेषितत्वाच् च ॥ ७ ॥

viśeṣitatvāc ca || 7 ||

And also because scripture qualifies/specifies the destination [e.g. 'in the world of Brahmā'], indicating a particular, hence conditioned, Brahman.

सामीप्यात् तु तद्व्यपदेशः ॥ ८ ॥

sāmīpyāt tu tadvyapadeśaḥ || 8 ||

But this destination is called 'Brahman' only by way of courtesy, on account of its proximity (sāmīpya) to the true, highest Brahman.

कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परम् अभिधानात् ॥ ९ ॥

kāryātyaye tadadhyakṣeṇa sahātaḥ param abhidhānāt || 9 ||

At the dissolution of that effected world [Brahmaloka, at the end of a cosmic cycle], the souls there attain, together with its presiding deity [Hiraṇyagarbha], the supreme Brahman itself, reaching apunarāvṛtti (non-return, final freedom from rebirth) — as scripture states.

स्मृतेश् च ॥ १० ॥

smṛteś ca || 10 ||

And this is confirmed by smṛti also [e.g. the Bhagavad Gītā's teaching that even the world of Brahmā is subject to return, but attaining the Supreme is not].

परं जैमिनिर् मुख्यत्वात् ॥ ११ ॥

paraṁ jaiminir mukhyatvāt || 11 ||

Ācārya Jaimini holds that the supreme (para) Brahman itself is reached directly [not merely a conditioned Brahmaloka first], because the word 'Brahman' should be taken in its primary sense (mukhyatva).

दर्शनाच् च ॥ १२ ॥

darśanāc ca || 12 ||

And because scripture directly shows this too [some texts describing arrival at Brahman itself, with no mention of an intervening Brahmaloka].

न च कार्ये प्रत्यभिसन्धिः ॥ १३ ॥

na ca kārye pratyabhisandhiḥ || 13 ||

Moreover, it would be unreasonable for the meditator's aim to be merely a conditioned/effected world, when scripture declares the sought fruit to be the highest liberation.

अप्रतीकालम्बनान् नयतीति बादरायण उभयथा च दोषात् तत्क्रतुश् च ॥ १४ ॥

apratīkālambanān nayatīti bādarāyaṇa ubhayathā ca doṣāt tatkratuś ca || 14 ||

Bādarāyaṇa (the sūtra-author's own reconciling view) holds that this path leads only those who meditated on Brahman itself without relying on an external symbol (pratīka) — since taking either Bādari's or Jaimini's view universally leads to difficulty — and the destiny attained ultimately accords with the nature of one's own meditation (tat-kratu, 'as is one's resolve, so is one's attainment').

विशेषं च दर्शयति ॥ १५ ॥

viśeṣaṁ ca darśayati || 15 ||

And scripture also shows a further distinction in destiny corresponding to different kinds of meditators, confirming this reconciling view.

संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् ॥ १ ॥

saṁpadyāvirbhāvaḥ svena śabdāt || 1 ||

Opening the topic of mukti (liberation, here videha-mukti — liberation attained after the fall of the body): upon attaining Brahman, the released soul does not gain anything new, but simply manifests (āvirbhāva) its own true, ever-existing nature — as scripture states.

मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

muktaḥ pratijñānāt || 2 ||

This manifestation of one's own true nature refers to the state of the liberated (mukta) soul, since scripture expressly promises this outcome.

आत्मा प्रकरणात् ॥ ३ ॥

ātmā prakaraṇāt || 3 ||

The 'own form' manifested is the Self (ātman), that is, Brahman itself, as the context (prakaraṇa) of the passage makes clear.

अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

avibhāgena dṛṣṭatvāt || 4 ||

This is confirmed because scripture presents the liberated self's nature as undivided (avibhāga) from, that is, non-different from, the Supreme Brahman.

ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिर् उपन्यासादिभ्यः ॥ ५ ॥

brāhmeṇa jaiminir upanyāsādibhyaḥ || 5 ||

Ācārya Jaimini holds that the liberated soul manifests with the very powers/glories belonging to Brahman itself, on the grounds of the textual introduction (upanyāsa) and other evidence.

चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वाद् इत्य् औडुलोमिः ॥ ६ ॥

cititanmātreṇa tadātmakatvād ity auḍulomiḥ || 6 ||

Ācārya Auḍulomi holds that the liberated soul manifests as pure consciousness (citi) alone, since that is its essential nature.

एवम् अप्य् उपन्यासात् पूर्वभावाद् अविरोधं बादरायणः ॥ ७ ॥

evam apy upanyāsāt pūrvabhāvād avirodhaṁ bādarāyaṇaḥ || 7 ||

Bādarāyaṇa reconciles both views: even granting that the essential nature is pure consciousness, there is no contradiction, since textual evidence points to the prior [full nature of Brahman] as well — thus the liberated soul's essence is consciousness, yet, being non-different from Brahman, it can also manifest all of Brahman's powers at will.

संकल्पाद् एव तच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ८ ॥

saṁkalpād eva tacchruteḥ || 8 ||

In the liberated state, whatever the soul wills (saṅkalpa) is accomplished by that will alone, without need of any instrument — as scripture declares.

अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः ॥ ९ ॥

ata eva cānanyādhipatiḥ || 9 ||

For this very reason [the self-sufficiency of its will], the liberated soul is subject to no other lord/ruler (ananya-adhipati).

अभावं बादरिर् आह ह्य् एवम् ॥ १० ॥

abhāvaṁ bādarir āha hy evam || 10 ||

Ācārya Bādari holds that the liberated soul has no body or organs (abhāva), for scripture describes the liberated state as bodiless.

भावं जैमिनिर् विकल्पामननात् ॥ ११ ॥

bhāvaṁ jaiminir vikalpāmananāt || 11 ||

Ācārya Jaimini holds that the liberated soul does have bodies [indeed, many at will], since scripture teaches this manifold possibility (vikalpa).

द्वादशाहवद् उभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः ॥ १२ ॥

dvādaśāhavad ubhayavidhaṁ bādarāyaṇo'taḥ || 12 ||

Bādarāyaṇa reconciles this too: as the twelve-day (dvādaśāha) sacrifice is classed under two categories owing to sharing features of both, so the liberated state may be with or without body depending on the aspect considered — both views hold true in their own context.

तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवद् उपपत्तेः ॥ १३ ॥

tanvabhāve sandhyavad upapatteḥ || 13 ||

In the bodiless state, the liberated soul's experience of its willed enjoyments is like that of the intermediate, dream-like state (sandhyā) — mere cognition without physical organs — since this is the reasonable explanation.

भावे जाग्रद्वत् ॥ १४ ॥

bhāve jāgradvat || 14 ||

In the state of having a [willed] body, the liberated soul's experience is instead like the waking state (jāgrat), that is, vivid, through actual instruments.

प्रदीपवदावेशस् तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ १५ ॥

pradīpavadāveśas tathā hi darśayati || 15 ||

The one liberated soul's entering/pervading (āveśa) many bodies at once, when it wills to be manifold, is like a single lamp [whose light fills many vessels without itself being divided] — for scripture shows this to be so.

स्वाप्ययसंपत्योर् अन्यतरापेक्षम् आविष्कृतं हि ॥ १६ ॥

svāpyayasaṁpatyor anyatarāpekṣam āviṣkṛtaṁ hi || 16 ||

[Answering the objection that non-duality leaves nothing else to be known, so how can plurality be experienced:] this experience of plurality is declared with reference to either the state of deep sleep (svāpyaya) or the waking-like state of attainment (saṃpatti) — as is clearly shown [in the immediately preceding sūtras on the dream-like and waking-like modes of the soul's experience].

जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणाद् असंनिहितत्वाच् च ॥ १७ ॥

jagadvyāpāravarjaṁ prakaraṇād asaṁnihitatvāc ca || 17 ||

But the liberated soul's lordship excludes control over the functioning of the universe (jagad-vyāpāra — its creation, sustenance and dissolution) — because the context (prakaraṇa) [shows such power to belong to Īśvara alone] and because that power is nowhere found stated as available (asannihitatva) to liberated souls.

प्रत्यक्षोपदेशाद् इति चेन् नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः ॥ १८ ॥

pratyakṣopadeśād iti cen nādhikārikamaṇḍalasthokteḥ || 18 ||

If it be objected that scripture directly teaches unrestricted lordship for the liberated [e.g. 'he attains self-rule'] — no; because this is stated with reference to the presiding deity residing within the orb [of the sun and the like], on whom that attainment of self-rule depends.

विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिम् आह ॥ १९ ॥

vikārāvarti ca tathā hi sthitim āha || 19 ||

For the ever-liberated Supreme Lord (nitya-mukta Parameśvara) alone is beyond all transformation (vikāra-āvarti), not confined to the changeable [Brahmaloka]; scripture indeed states his dual status, both transcendent and immanent.

दर्शयतश् चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ॥ २० ॥

darśayataś caivaṁ pratyakṣānumāne || 20 ||

Both direct scriptural statement (śruti) and reasoned tradition (smṛti) alike show this beyond-change status of the Supreme Light.

भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच् च ॥ २१ ॥

bhogamātrasāmyaliṅgāc ca || 21 ||

Also because scriptural indications (liṅga) show that liberated souls are equal to Īśvara only in the enjoyment [of bliss] (bhoga-mātra-sāmya), not in the power of universal governance.

अनावृत्तिः शब्दाद् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ॥ २२ ॥

anāvṛttiḥ śabdād anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt || 22 ||

There is no return to saṃsāra (the cycle of rebirth) — so declares scripture; there is no return — so declares scripture. This sūtra's repetition is the traditional signal marking the conclusion not merely of this topic but of the entire Brahma Sūtra: once the liberated soul has attained union with Brahman, it never again returns to worldly bondage.