Nyaya Sutras

प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानाम् तत्त्वज्ञानात् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥ १ ॥

pramāṇaprameyasaṁśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātinigrahasthānānām tattvajñānāt niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ || 1 ||

The attainment of niḥśreyasa (the supreme good, liberation) comes through true knowledge (tattva-jñāna) of [these sixteen categories]: pramāṇa (a means of valid knowledge), prameya (an object of valid knowledge), saṁśaya (doubt), prayojana (purpose or motive), dṛṣṭānta (a familiar example), siddhānta (an established tenet), avayava (a member of the syllogism), tarka (hypothetical/confuting reasoning), nirṇaya (ascertainment), vāda (honest discussion), jalpa (wrangling debate), vitaṇḍā (cavil, debate with no thesis of one's own), hetvābhāsa (a fallacious reason), chala (quibbling), jāti (a futile rejoinder), and nigrahasthāna (a point of defeat in debate).

दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानाम् उत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥ २ ॥

duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ || 2 ||

Duḥkha (pain), janma (birth), pravṛtti (activity), doṣa (fault), and mithyājñāna (false knowledge) form a causal chain [false knowledge produces fault, fault produces activity, activity produces birth, birth produces pain]. With the successive cessation of each in reverse order upon the cessation of the one immediately preceding it [i.e., false knowledge ceases first, then fault, then activity, then birth, then finally pain] — from that immediately following cessation comes apavarga (final release, liberation).

Note: The compound orders the five as duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyājñāna, but the forward causal sequence runs the other way (mithyājñāna → doṣa → pravṛtti → janma → duḥkha); 'uttarottarāpāye' is read, per the standard Vātsyāyana-based interpretation, as cessation proceeding in reverse of that causal order, starting from the removal of false knowledge. Rendered accordingly rather than literally in listed order.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ३ ॥

pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni || 3 ||

Perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda) are the [four] pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge).

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानम् अव्यपदेश्यम् अव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ४ ॥

indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam || 4 ||

Perception (pratyakṣa) is that cognition (jñāna) which arises from the contact (sannikarṣa) of a sense organ (indriya) with its object (artha), which is not [dependent on or reducible to] verbal designation (avyapadeśya), which is unerring (avyabhicāri), and which is of a determinate, ascertained nature (vyavasāyātmaka).

Note: 'avyapadeśya' is the most debated word in this sutra across the whole Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika tradition: Vātsyāyana glosses it as meaning perception is not constituted by a name/word (ruling out naming as its defining feature), while some later readers take it to restrict pratyakṣa proper to the nonverbal/indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) stage. The translation keeps the plain sense ('not dependent on verbal designation') without adopting either later school's gloss.

अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधम् अनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च ॥ ५ ॥

atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividham anumānaṁ pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ ca || 5 ||

Now, inference (anumāna), which is preceded by that [i.e., by perception], is of three kinds: pūrvavat (reasoning from cause to effect), śeṣavat (reasoning from effect to cause, by elimination), and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (reasoning from a generally observed correlation).

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनम् उपमानम् ॥ ६ ॥

prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyasādhanam upamānam || 6 ||

Upamāna (comparison/analogy) is the establishing of the thing to be proved (sādhya — here, the connection between a name and its referent) through its similarity (sādharmya) to something already well known (prasiddha).

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ ७ ॥

āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ || 7 ||

Śabda (verbal testimony) is the instruction or statement (upadeśa) of a trustworthy, reliable person (āpta).

स द्विविधो दृष्टादृष्टार्थत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt || 8 ||

It [śabda] is of two kinds, on account of its object being either a seen [worldly, perceptible] matter or an unseen [supersensible, scriptural] matter.

आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गाः तु प्रमेयम् ॥ ९ ॥

ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanaḥpravṛttidoṣapretyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargāḥ tu prameyam || 9 ||

Ātman (the self), śarīra (the body), indriya (the sense organs), artha (the sense objects), buddhi (cognition), manas (the mind), pravṛtti (activity), doṣa (fault), pretyabhāva (rebirth after death), phala (fruit/result), duḥkha (pain), and apavarga (liberation) — these [twelve] indeed are prameya (the objects of valid knowledge).

इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानानि आत्मनः लिङ्गम् इति ॥ १० ॥

icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāni ātmanaḥ liṅgam iti || 10 ||

Desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), volition (prayatna), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), and cognition (jñāna) are the liṅga (inferential mark) of the self (ātman).

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् ॥ ११ ॥

ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīram || 11 ||

The body (śarīra) is the locus (āśraya) of activity/movement (ceṣṭā), of the sense organs (indriya), and of [their] objects (artha).

घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणि इन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः ॥ १२ ॥

ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakśrotrāṇi indriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ || 12 ||

The nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear (ghrāṇa, rasana, cakṣus, tvak, śrotra) are the sense organs (indriya), [each] arising from [one of] the elements (bhūta).

पृथिवी आपः तेजः वायुः आकाशं इति भूतानि ॥ १३ ॥

pṛthivī āpaḥ tejaḥ vāyuḥ ākāśaṁ iti bhūtāni || 13 ||

Earth (pṛthivī), water (ap), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), and ether/space (ākāśa) are the [five] elements (bhūta).

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणाः तदर्थाः ॥ १४ ॥

gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ tadarthāḥ || 14 ||

Smell (gandha), taste (rasa), form/colour (rūpa), touch (sparśa), and sound (śabda) are, respectively, the qualities (guṇa) of earth and the rest [the five elements, in order], and these are [also] the [sense organs'] objects (artha).

बुद्धिः उपलब्धिः ज्ञानं इति अनर्थान्तरम् ॥ १५ ॥

buddhiḥ upalabdhiḥ jñānaṁ iti anarthāntaram || 15 ||

Buddhi (cognition/intellect), upalabdhi (apprehension), and jñāna (knowledge) are not different in meaning [i.e., they are synonyms].

युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः मनसः लिङ्गम् ॥ १६ ॥

yugapajjñānānutpattiḥ manasaḥ liṅgam || 16 ||

The non-arising of simultaneous cognitions [the fact that two cognitions do not occur at the same instant] is the liṅga (inferential mark) of manas (the mind, the internal organ).

प्रवृत्तिः वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः ॥ १७ ॥

pravṛttiḥ vāgbuddhiśarīrārambhaḥ || 17 ||

Pravṛtti (activity) is the initiation (ārambha) of speech, cognition, and body [i.e., verbal, mental, and bodily activity].

प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणाः दोषाः ॥ १८ ॥

pravarttanālakṣaṇāḥ doṣāḥ || 18 ||

The doṣas (faults — passion, aversion, delusion) are characterized by [their capacity for] instigating activity (pravartanā).

पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः ॥ १९ ॥

punarutpattiḥ pretyabhāvaḥ || 19 ||

Pretyabhāva (the state after death, rebirth/transmigration) is being born again (punarutpatti).

प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितः अर्थः फलम् ॥ २० ॥

pravṛttidoṣajanitaḥ arthaḥ phalam || 20 ||

Phala (the fruit/result) is the thing (artha) produced by activity (pravṛtti) [together] with fault (doṣa).

बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् ॥ २१ ॥

bādhanālakṣaṇaṁ duḥkham || 21 ||

Duḥkha (pain) is characterized by affliction/torment (bādhanā).

तदत्यन्तविमोक्षः अपवर्गः ॥ २२ ॥

tadatyantavimokṣaḥ apavargaḥ || 22 ||

Apavarga (liberation) is the absolute, complete release (atyanta-vimokṣa) from that [pain].

समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेः विप्रतिपत्तेः उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः च विशेषापेक्षः विमर्शः संशयः ॥ २३ ॥

samānānekadharmopapatteḥ vipratipatteḥ upalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthātaḥ ca viśeṣāpekṣaḥ vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ || 23 ||

Saṁśaya (doubt) is a wavering cognition (vimarśa) seeking a distinguishing particular (viśeṣāpekṣa), arising from: (1) the apprehension of a property common to many things (samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatti); (2) conflicting views (vipratipatti); or (3) the lack of a fixed rule governing perception and non-perception (upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthā).

यं अर्थं अधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम् ॥ २४ ॥

yaṁ arthaṁ adhikṛtya pravartate tatprayojanam || 24 ||

Prayojana (purpose/motive) is that end (artha) with reference to which (adhikṛtya) one engages in activity (pravartate).

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिनर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं सः दृष्टान्तः ॥ २५ ॥

laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṁ yasminarthe buddhisāmyaṁ saḥ dṛṣṭāntaḥ || 25 ||

Dṛṣṭānta (a familiar/paradigm example) is that matter (artha) regarding which ordinary people (laukika) and experts/examiners (parīkṣaka) hold the same understanding (buddhisāmya).

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः सिद्धान्तः ॥ २६ ॥

tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṁsthitiḥ siddhāntaḥ || 26 ||

Siddhānta (an established tenet) is a settled conclusion (saṁsthiti) established with reference to a doctrinal system (tantra), a topic under discussion (adhikaraṇa), or a provisionally accepted assumption (abhyupagama).

Note: This opening definition compresses the four types elaborated in sutras 27-31 (tantra later splits into sarvatantra and pratitantra) into three heads. Rendered as the standard reading — a settled position with respect to a system, a topic, or an assumption — rather than expanding it here.

सः चतुर्विधः सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ २७ ॥

saḥ caturvidhaḥ sarvatantrapratitantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṁsthityarthāntarabhāvāt || 27 ||

It [siddhānta] is of four kinds, owing to the difference (arthāntarabhāva) among these settled positions (saṁsthiti): sarvatantra (common to all systems), pratitantra (peculiar to one's own system), adhikaraṇa (a tenet whose proof entails proof of another matter), and abhyupagama (a hypothetically admitted tenet).

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धः तन्त्रे अधिकृतः अर्थः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ॥ २८ ॥

sarvatantrāviruddhaḥ tantre adhikṛtaḥ arthaḥ sarvatantrasiddhāntaḥ || 28 ||

Sarvatantra-siddhānta (a tenet common to all systems) is a matter (artha) that is upheld (adhikṛta) within a doctrinal system (tantra) and is not contradicted (aviruddha) by any [other] system.

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रासिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ॥ २९ ॥

samānatantrasiddhaḥ paratantrāsiddhaḥ pratitantrasiddhāntaḥ || 29 ||

Pratitantra-siddhānta (a tenet peculiar to one's own system) is that which is established (siddha) in one's own system (samāna-tantra) but not established (asiddha) in an opposing system (para-tantra).

यत्सिद्धौ अन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः सः अधिकरणसिद्धान्तः ॥ ३० ॥

yatsiddhau anyaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ saḥ adhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ || 30 ||

Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta is that whose establishment (siddhi) entails the establishment of another topic (anya-prakaraṇa-siddhi).

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणं अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः ॥ ३१ ॥

aparīkṣitābhyupagamāttadviśeṣaparīkṣaṇaṁ abhyupagamasiddhāntaḥ || 31 ||

Abhyupagama-siddhānta (a hypothetically admitted tenet) is the examination of the particulars (viśeṣa-parīkṣaṇa) of a matter that is accepted (abhyupagama) without prior examination (aparīkṣita).

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि अवयवाः ॥ ३२ ॥

pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni avayavāḥ || 32 ||

Pratijñā (the proposition), hetu (the reason), udāharaṇa (the example), upanaya (the application), and nigamana (the conclusion) are the [five] avayavas (members of the syllogism).

साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा ॥ ३३ ॥

sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā || 33 ||

Pratijñā (the proposition) is the statement (nirdeśa) of that which is to be proved (sādhya).

उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं हेतुः ॥ ३४ ॥

udāharaṇasādharmyātsādhyasādhanaṁ hetuḥ || 34 ||

Hetu (the reason/probans) is that which establishes (sādhana) the thing to be proved (sādhya) through similarity (sādharmya) to the example (udāharaṇa).

तथा वैधर्म्यात् ॥ ३५ ॥

tathā vaidharmyāt || 35 ||

Likewise (tathā), [the hetu establishes the sādhya] through dissimilarity (vaidharmya) [to the example].

साध्यसाधर्म्यात्तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्तः उदाहरणम् ॥ ३६ ॥

sādhyasādharmyāttaddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭāntaḥ udāharaṇam || 36 ||

Udāharaṇa (the example) is a familiar instance (dṛṣṭānta) which, through similarity (sādharmya) to the thing to be proved (sādhya), possesses that very property (tad-dharma-bhāvin).

तद्विपर्ययात्वा विपरीतम् ॥ ३७ ॥

tadviparyayātvā viparītam || 37 ||

Or (vā), the reverse (viparīta) [example is stated] through the converse (viparyaya) of that [i.e., a negative instance showing absence of the property along with absence of the reason].

उदाहरणापेक्षः तथा इति उपसंहारः न तथा इति वा साध्यस्य उपनयः ॥ ३८ ॥

udāharaṇāpekṣaḥ tathā iti upasaṁhāraḥ na tathā iti vā sādhyasya upanayaḥ || 38 ||

Upanaya (the application) is the summation (upasaṁhāra) of the thesis (sādhya), made with reference to the example (udāharaṇa), [stated] either as 'so it is' (tathā) [for a positive example] or 'so it is not' (na tathā) [for a negative example].

हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् ॥ ३९ ॥

hetvapadeśātpratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṁ nigamanam || 39 ||

Nigamana (the conclusion) is the restatement (punarvacana) of the proposition (pratijñā), made by citing the reason (hetu-apadeśa).

अविज्ञाततत्वे अर्थे कारणोपपत्तितः तत्त्वज्ञानार्थं उहः तर्कः ॥ ४० ॥

avijñātatatve arthe kāraṇopapattitaḥ tattvajñānārthaṁ uhaḥ tarkaḥ || 40 ||

Tarka (hypothetical reasoning) is deliberation (ūha), undertaken with regard to a matter (artha) whose true nature is unknown (avijñāta-tattva), by way of ascertaining the [possible] ground or cause (kāraṇa-upapatti), for the sake of arriving at true knowledge (tattva-jñāna) of it.

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यां अर्थावधारणं निर्णयः ॥ ४१ ॥

vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyāṁ arthāvadhāraṇaṁ nirṇayaḥ || 41 ||

Nirṇaya (ascertainment/conclusion) is the determination (avadhāraṇa) of a matter (artha), reached after deliberation (vimṛśya) by means of the [opposing] side and counter-side (pakṣa-pratipakṣa).

प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः वादः ॥ १ ॥

pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigrahaḥ vādaḥ || 1 ||

Vāda (honest philosophical debate) is [debate carried on] by means of pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge, i.e. proof) and tarka (reasoning) as instruments of establishing and refuting [a position], not inconsistent with [either disputant's] siddhānta (accepted tenet), furnished with the five members [of the syllogism, the five-part inference], and consisting in the adoption of a pakṣa (thesis) and a pratipakṣa (counter-thesis).

यथोक्तोपपन्नः छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भः जल्पः ॥ २ ॥

yathoktopapannaḥ chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambhaḥ jalpaḥ || 2 ||

Jalpa (debate for victory, wrangling) is [debate] endowed with what has just been described [in the definition of vāda], [but which also] employs chala (quibbling), jāti (futile rejoinder), and nigrahasthāna (points of defeat) as further means of establishing and refuting [a position].

सः प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनः वितण्डा ॥ ३ ॥

saḥ pratipakṣasthāpanāhīnaḥ vitaṇḍā || 3 ||

That [same jalpa], when devoid of the establishment of a pratipakṣa (counter-thesis) of one's own, is vitaṇḍā (cavil, purely destructive debate).

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीताः हेत्वाभासाः ॥ ४ ॥

savyabhicāraviruddhaprakaraṇasamasādhyasamakālātītāḥ hetvābhāsāḥ || 4 ||

Savyabhicāra (the erratic/inconclusive reason), viruddha (the contradictory reason), prakaraṇasama (the reason equal to the very question at issue), sādhyasama (the reason equal to the probandum itself), and kālātīta (the mistimed reason) — these are the [five] hetvābhāsas (semblances of a reason, i.e. fallacious probantia).

अनैकान्तिकः सव्यभिचारः ॥ ५ ॥

anaikāntikaḥ savyabhicāraḥ || 5 ||

Savyabhicāra is that [reason] which is anaikāntika — i.e., inconclusive, not restricted to a single necessary conclusion, admitting of the opposite conclusion as well.

सिद्धान्तं अभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः ॥ ६ ॥

siddhāntaṁ abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ || 6 ||

Viruddha is that [reason] which, after [the disputant] has accepted (professed) a siddhānta (tenet), is opposed to that very tenet.

यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता सः निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः ॥ ७ ॥

yasmātprakaraṇacintā saḥ nirṇayārthamapadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ || 7 ||

Prakaraṇasama is that [pseudo-reason] on account of which consideration/doubt (cintā) about the very matter under discussion (prakaraṇa) persists, although it is put forward as if for the sake of a [definite] decision (nirṇaya) — that is, a reason which is itself as much in question as the very thesis it is meant to settle.

साध्याविशिष्टः साध्यत्वात्साध्यसमः ॥ ८ ॥

sādhyāviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyatvātsādhyasamaḥ || 8 ||

Sādhyasama is that [reason] which is not distinct from the sādhya (that which is to be proved), because it itself has the character of being a sādhya — i.e., it stands in equal need of proof, and so is no more established than the thesis it is meant to establish.

कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः ॥ ९ ॥

kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ kālātītaḥ || 9 ||

Kālātīta is that [reason] which is adduced after kālātyaya (the lapse of its proper time) — that is, one presented at a point in the argument where its logical occasion for establishing the sādhya has already passed.

वचनविघातः अर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् ॥ १० ॥

vacanavighātaḥ arthavikalpopapattyā chalam || 10 ||

Chala (equivocation, quibbling) is the refutation of a statement (vacana-vighāta) by contriving an alternative meaning (artha-vikalpa) [other than the one the speaker intended].

तत्त्रिविधं वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलं उपचारच्छलं च इति ॥ ११ ॥

tattrividhaṁ vākchalaṁ sāmānyacchalaṁ upacāracchalaṁ ca iti || 11 ||

That [chala] is of three kinds: vākchala (verbal quibble, exploiting a word's lexical ambiguity), sāmānyacchala (quibble by false over-generalization), and upacāracchala (quibble by literalizing a figurative expression).

अविशेषाभिहिते अर्थे वक्तुः अभिप्रायातर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् ॥ १२ ॥

aviśeṣābhihite arthe vaktuḥ abhiprāyātarthāntarakalpanā vākchalam || 12 ||

Vākchala is the contriving of a meaning other than the speaker's intention, when a statement has been made without explicit qualification [and is therefore open to more than one sense].

सम्भवतः अर्थस्य अतिसामान्ययोगातसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम् ॥ १३ ॥

sambhavataḥ arthasya atisāmānyayogātasambhūtārthakalpanā sāmānyacchalam || 13 ||

Sāmānyacchala is the contriving of an unintended (impossible) meaning for a term whose actual reference is to a specific, possible thing, by illegitimately attaching to it an excessive/over-broad generality (ati-sāmānya).

धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे अर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधः उपचारच्छलम् ॥ १४ ॥

dharmavikalpanirdeśe arthasadbhāvapratiṣedhaḥ upacāracchalam || 14 ||

Upacāracchala is the denial of the [literal] existence of the referent, when a property has been expressed through upacāra (a figurative or secondary designation, dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśa).

वाक्छलं एव उपचारच्छलं ततविशेषात् ॥ १५ ॥

vākchalaṁ eva upacāracchalaṁ tataviśeṣāt || 15 ||

[Prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa):] Upacāracchala is nothing but vākchala, [differing from it] merely by virtue of some particular distinction (tad-viśeṣa) within it — i.e., it is only a sub-variety, not a genuinely separate type of chala.

Note: Sutra 15 states a prima facie objection (pūrvapakṣa): that upacāracchala is not a genuinely distinct category of chala but merely a sub-case of vākchala differing only in some minor particular (tad-viśeṣāt). This view is rejected in sutra 16.

न ततर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ १६ ॥

na tatarthāntarabhāvāt || 16 ||

[Reply (siddhānta):] No — because there is a difference of reference/content (artha-antara-bhāva) between the two, [so upacāracchala is not reducible to vākchala].

Note: Sutra 16 is the author's reply to the pūrvapakṣa of sutra 15: upacāracchala and vākchala are held to differ in kind because they turn on different sorts of semantic shift — vākchala exploits a word's plain lexical ambiguity, while upacāracchala denies the literal referent of a figurative/secondary (upacāra) usage — so the two remain distinct sub-types of chala despite the objector's claim.

अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साधर्म्यातेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः ॥ १७ ॥

aviśeṣe vā kiñcitsādharmyātekacchalaprasaṅgaḥ || 17 ||

Or [even granting] no [essential] difference [between them], then on the ground of some partial similarity (kiñcit sādharmya) [common to all sub-types], it would follow, undesirably (prasaṅga), that every kind of chala collapses into a single one — [showing that mere partial resemblance cannot be the criterion for distinguishing or merging categories].

Note: Sutra 17 adds a further dialectical safeguard: even setting aside the reply in sutra 16, using mere partial similarity (kiñcit sādharmya) as grounds for collapsing categories is untenable, since by the same logic all types of chala would reduce to one (an unwanted over-generalization, prasaṅga). This reinforces that real difference of content, not surface similarity, is the correct criterion for distinguishing upacāracchala from vākchala.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः ॥ १८ ॥

sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṁ pratyavasthānaṁ jātiḥ || 18 ||

Jāti is a pratyavasthāna (sophistical/futile rejoinder) raised merely on the ground of sādharmya (similarity) or vaidharmya (dissimilarity), [without genuine logical connection to the reason actually given].

विप्रतिपत्तिः अप्रतिपत्तिः च निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ १९ ॥

vipratipattiḥ apratipattiḥ ca nigrahasthānam || 19 ||

Nigrahasthāna (a point of defeat in debate) is [either] vipratipatti (misapprehension — a self-contradictory or erroneous grasp [of one's own or the matter's position]) or apratipatti (non-apprehension — a complete failure to understand [the matter at issue]).

तद्विकल्पात्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम् ॥ २० ॥

tadvikalpātjātinigrahasthānabahutvam || 20 ||

From the further subdivisions of these [i.e., of vipratipatti and apratipatti], there arise many kinds of jāti and nigrahasthāna.

Note: Sutra 20 is a brief transitional/summary remark: it notes only that jāti and nigrahasthāna admit of many further subdivisions. The full catalogue of those subtypes belongs to adhyāyas 5.1–5.2 of the text and has deliberately not been invented or anticipated here.

समानानेकधर्माध्यवसायातन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायात्वा न संशयः ॥ १ ॥

samānānekadharmādhyavasāyātanyataradharmādhyavasāyātvā na saṁśayaḥ || 1 ||

There is no doubt [merely] from the definite ascertainment (adhyavasāya) of a property common to several things, nor from the definite ascertainment of the property peculiar to one of two alternatives [taken by itself].

Note: Opens a fine-grained continuation of the saṃśaya (doubt) analysis begun at 1.1.23; adhyavasāya ('definite ascertainment') is here distinguished from mere upalabdhi ('awareness') — doubt requires the latter, not the former.

विप्रत्तिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायात्च ॥ २ ॥

viprattipattyavyavasthādhyavasāyātca || 2 ||

Nor [does doubt arise] from the ascertainment of the unsettled state (avyavasthā) produced by conflicting claims (vipratipatti).

विप्रत्तिपत्तौ च संप्रत्तिपत्तेः ॥ ३ ॥

viprattipattau ca saṁprattipatteḥ || 3 ||

And in a case of conflicting claims, [there is in fact no doubt on either side], because each party has its own settled conviction (saṁprattipatti) regarding its own position.

Note: Reading saṃprattipatti as each disputant's own firm conviction, continuing 2's point that mere external disagreement does not by itself constitute doubt in the cognizer; the compound admits other readings.

अव्यवस्था आत्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वात्च अव्यवस्थायाः ॥ ४ ॥

avyavasthā ātmani vyavasthitatvātca avyavasthāyāḥ || 4 ||

[Yet genuine doubt remains,] because this very unsettledness (avyavasthā) is firmly present (vyavasthita) in the cognizing self, and there is likewise an unsettledness even of what looked like that fixity.

Note: This line is textually dense; its function here (guarding sutras 1-3 against being read as denying doubt altogether) is an interpretive reconstruction, since the compound avyavasthāyāḥ avyavasthā admits alternative parsings.

तथा अत्यन्तसंशयः तद्धर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः ॥ ५ ॥

tathā atyantasaṁśayaḥ taddharmasātatyopapatteḥ || 5 ||

In the same way, there can be doubt that never ends (atyanta-saṁśaya), because of the continuous recurrence (sātatya) of the doubt-producing property.

यथोक्ताध्यवसायातेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशये न असंशयः न अत्यन्तसंशयः वा ॥ ६ ॥

yathoktādhyavasāyāteva tadviśeṣāpekṣātsaṁśaye na asaṁśayaḥ na atyantasaṁśayaḥ vā || 6 ||

Doubt, precisely as defined above, arises only in dependence on the need for that particular distinguishing feature (viśeṣa) that is still lacking — it is therefore neither the total absence of doubt, nor doubt that never ends.

Note: Resolves the tension raised in 2-5 by tying doubt strictly to the outstanding need for a distinguishing feature; read here as the siddhānta closing the sub-argument.

यत्र संशयः तत्र एवं उत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः ॥ ७ ॥

yatra saṁśayaḥ tatra evaṁ uttarottaraprasaṅgaḥ || 7 ||

Wherever this analysis of doubt applies, the same reasoning would otherwise lead to an unending succession of further consequences [a regress of doubt about doubt] — which sutra 6 forecloses.

प्रत्यक्षादीनां अप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः ॥ ८ ॥

pratyakṣādīnāṁ aprāmāṇyaṁ traikālyāsiddheḥ || 8 ||

[Objection —] Perception (pratyakṣa, direct sense-cognition) and the other pramāṇas (pramāṇa: a means/instrument of valid knowledge) have no authority (aprāmāṇya, lack of validity), because their establishment with respect to the three times (traikālya: before, after, or simultaneous with the object) cannot be shown.

Note: Opens the pūrvapakṣa (opponent's prima facie objection) — a global skeptic's 'three-time' regress argument against the validity of any pramāṇa — which is answered only from sutra 19 onward.

पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ न इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात्प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ ९ ॥

pūrvaṁ hi pramāṇasiddhau na indriyārthasannikarṣātpratyakṣotpattiḥ || 9 ||

For, if a pramāṇa's validity must be established prior [to its object], then perception could not arise from sense-object contact, since prior to that very contact the pramāṇa does not yet exist to be validated.

पश्चात्सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

paścātsiddhau na pramāṇebhyaḥ prameyasiddhiḥ || 10 ||

If its validity is established afterward [only once the object is already known], then the object could not be established by the pramāṇa, since it would already have been known independently, prior to any validation.

युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात्क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावः बुद्धीनाम् ॥ ११ ॥

yugapatsiddhau pratyarthaniyatatvātkramavṛttitvābhāvaḥ buddhīnām || 11 ||

If pramāṇa and object are established simultaneously, then — since each cognition (buddhi) is fixed to just one object — cognitions could never occur in succession; they would all have to arise at once.

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ १२ ॥

traikālyāsiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ || 12 ||

[The skeptic continues:] Since establishment in any of the three times is impossible, no refutation (pratiṣedha) either can be sustained — including this very argument.

Note: The skeptic here turns the trikālya-regress on his own refutation, anticipating the self-referential charge pressed further in 13-14, before Nyāya's reply begins at 19.

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधात्च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

sarvapramāṇapratiṣedhātca pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ || 13 ||

And since, [by the same logic,] all pramāṇas are being denied, even this act of denial cannot be sustained, for it too would need a pramāṇa to establish it.

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

tatprāmāṇye vā na sarvapramāṇavipratiṣedhaḥ || 14 ||

Or, if that denial is [claimed to be itself] valid, then not all pramāṇas stand refuted, since this one act of valid cognition survives as an exception — either way the universal skeptical thesis collapses.

Note: States the self-refutation dilemma facing the global skeptic: either the denial of all pramāṇas is itself unestablished, or, if valid, it disproves its own universal claim. Whether Gautama voices this as the skeptic's own anticipated escape or as an early Naiyāyika interjection is not fully settled by the terse wording and the TAG placement.

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधः च शब्दातातोद्यसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

traikālyāpratiṣedhaḥ ca śabdātātodyasiddhivattatsiddheḥ || 15 ||

Nor does the three-time argument really amount to a refutation, since a pramāṇa's establishment can be immediate and self-evidencing — like establishing the existence of a musical instrument (ātodya) from its sound (śabda), without first proving the instrument's existence at some prior time.

Note: The drum-from-its-sound analogy anticipates the lamp analogy given as Nyāya's formal reply in sutra 19; it is unclear whether this line belongs to the pūrvapakṣa's self-anticipated rejoinder (per its transmitted TAG) or is an early statement of the Naiyāyika's own position.

प्रमेया च तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् ॥ १६ ॥

prameyā ca tulāprāmāṇyavat || 16 ||

And there is a further problem: the object of knowledge (prameya) would need validating just as the accuracy of a balance (tulā) needs to be checked by a further standard.

प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः ॥ १७ ॥

pramāṇataḥ siddheḥ pramāṇānāṁ pramāṇāntarasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ || 17 ||

If a pramāṇa's establishment is held to require another pramāṇa, then it follows that pramāṇas in turn require yet a further pramāṇa to establish them, and so on without end.

तद्विनिवृत्तेः वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥ १८ ॥

tadvinivṛtteḥ vā pramāṇasiddhivatprameyasiddhiḥ || 18 ||

Or, if that regress is simply declared to stop at some self-established point, then the establishing of the object (prameya) could equally be declared self-evident without needing the establishing of a pramāṇa at all — which would undermine the very need to posit pramāṇas.

न प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १९ ॥

na pradīpaprakāśasiddhivattatsiddheḥ || 19 ||

[Siddhānta — Nyāya's reply:] No — because a pramāṇa's self-establishing is like the self-establishing of a lamp's light (pradīpa-prakāśa), which illuminates both itself and other things without requiring a further light to illuminate it first, and so incurs no infinite regress.

क्वचित्निवृत्तिदर्शनातनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्च क्वचितनेकान्तः ॥ २० ॥

kvacitnivṛttidarśanātanivṛttidarśanātca kvacitanekāntaḥ || 20 ||

For in some cases cessation [of doubt or of practical activity, once perceived] is observed, and in other cases non-cessation is observed — hence no single, one-sided rule (anekānta, the absence of one uniform rule) applies to how a pramāṇa establishes itself and its object.

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिः असमग्रवचनात् ॥ २१ ॥

pratyakṣalakṣaṇānupapattiḥ asamagravacanāt || 21 ||

[Objection —] The definition of perception (pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa, from 1.1.4) is untenable, because its statement is incomplete (asamagra-vacana) — it fails to mention all the conditions actually required for perception to occur.

न आत्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ २२ ॥

na ātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣābhāve pratyakṣotpattiḥ || 22 ||

For instance, in the absence of the contact (sannikarṣa) between the self (ātman) and the mind (manas), perception does not arise — and this required contact goes unmentioned in the definition.

दिग्देशकालाकाशेषु अपि एवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ २३ ॥

digdeśakālākāśeṣu api evaṁ prasaṅgaḥ || 23 ||

The same problem would follow with respect to direction, place, time, and ether (dik, deśa, kāla, ākāśa) — further background conditions that the definition also fails to mention.

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वातात्मनः न अनवरोधः ॥ २४ ॥

jñānaliṅgatvātātmanaḥ na anavarodhaḥ || 24 ||

[Siddhānta reply begins —] Since the self is established through the mark (liṅga) of cognition — its connection to a perceptual event being inferred, not directly stated — there is no need to include it explicitly in the definition; the omission is not a defect.

तदयौगपद्यलिङ्गत्वात्च न मनसः ॥ २५ ॥

tadayaugapadyaliṅgatvātca na manasaḥ || 25 ||

And, because the non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of cognitions is itself the mark establishing the mind's operation, the mind (manas) too need not be separately included in the definition.

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वात्च इन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य स्वशब्देन वचनम् ॥ २६ ॥

pratyakṣanimittatvātca indriyārthayoḥ sannikarṣasya svaśabdena vacanam || 26 ||

And, since it is the direct/proximate cause of perception, the contact (sannikarṣa) between sense-organ and object is the one condition stated by its own specific term in the definition — unlike the more remote conditions discussed above.

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां च इन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

suptavyāsaktamanasāṁ ca indriyārthayoḥ sannikarṣanimittatvāt || 27 ||

And this is confirmed by the fact that for those whose mind is asleep or engaged elsewhere (supta-vyāsakta-manas), perception fails to occur even with sense-object contact present, because the contact of mind [with sense and object] is also a cause of perception.

तैः च अपदेशः ज्ञानविशेषाणाम् ॥ २८ ॥

taiḥ ca apadeśaḥ jñānaviśeṣāṇām || 28 ||

And by means of those several causal conditions, the specific varieties of cognition (jñāna-viśeṣa) can be accounted for — for instance, why perception occurs in some cases and not others.

व्याहतत्वातहेतुः ॥ २९ ॥

vyāhatatvātahetuḥ || 29 ||

The objection is not a valid ground (ahetu), because it is self-contradictory (vyāhatatva): it would require listing every remote condition endlessly, which the objector himself cannot do.

न अर्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् ॥ ३० ॥

na arthaviśeṣaprābalyāt || 30 ||

No; any apparent exception, such as a distracted mind still noticing something, is due to the predominance of a particular, especially salient object (artha-viśeṣa-prābalya) overriding the distraction, not a flaw in the account of causes.

प्रत्यक्षं अनुमानं एकदेशग्रहणातुपलब्धेः ॥ ३१ ॥

pratyakṣaṁ anumānaṁ ekadeśagrahaṇātupalabdheḥ || 31 ||

[Objection —] Perception is really just inference (anumāna: reasoning from a mark to what it indicates), because what is apprehended is only ever one part (ekadeśa) of an object — e.g. one visible side of a pot — never the whole at once.

न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावतपि उपलम्भात् ॥ ३२ ॥

na pratyakṣeṇa yāvattāvatapi upalambhāt || 32 ||

[Siddhānta —] No, because perception itself apprehends as much of the object as is in fact required; the whole is genuinely perceived, not merely inferred from a part.

न चैकदेशोपलब्धिरवयविसद्भावात् ॥ ३३ ॥

na caikadeśopalabdhiravayavisadbhāvāt || 33 ||

And it is not merely the apprehension of a part, because the composite whole (avayavin: the single entity constituted by its parts, e.g. a pot as one thing over and above its pieces) genuinely exists.

साध्यत्वातवयविनि सन्देहः ॥ ३४ ॥

sādhyatvātavayavini sandehaḥ || 34 ||

[Objection continues —] Since the existence of the avayavin is precisely what is to be proven (sādhya), asserting it here is question-begging, and its existence remains in doubt.

सर्वाग्रहणं अवयव्यसिद्धेः ॥ ३५ ॥

sarvāgrahaṇaṁ avayavyasiddheḥ || 35 ||

[Siddhānta —] The fact that the whole is not apprehended all at once, from every side simultaneously, does not follow from the avayavin's non-establishment; it has some other explanation, and is no proof that the whole fails to exist.

Note: The compound sarvāgrahaṇaṁ avayavyasiddheḥ is elliptical; following its siddhānta TAG, it is read here as denying that non-simultaneous apprehension of a whole proves the whole's non-existence, though a reading closer to the opponent's own inference is also grammatically possible.

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेः च ॥ ३६ ॥

dhāraṇākarṣaṇopapatteḥ ca || 36 ||

And the avayavin's reality is further shown by the intelligibility of holding and pulling (dhāraṇa-ākarṣaṇa) an object as a single unit by grasping only one part of it — which only makes sense if the parts belong to one real whole.

सेनावनवत्ग्रहणं इति चेत्न अतीन्द्रियत्वातणूनाम् ॥ ३७ ॥

senāvanavatgrahaṇaṁ iti cetna atīndriyatvātaṇūnām || 37 ||

If it is objected that perceiving something as a unified whole is merely like perceiving an army or a forest — a mere collective name for many separate things, with no additional single real entity — this does not hold, because, unlike in that case, the constituent atoms (aṇu) are themselves beyond the range of the senses (atīndriya, super-sensible), whereas each tree or soldier in a forest or army is directly visible.

रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यः व्यभिचारातनुमानं अप्रमाणम् ॥ ३८ ॥

rodhopaghātasādṛśyebhyaḥ vyabhicārātanumānaṁ apramāṇam || 38 ||

[A fresh objection, now defending against a skeptic about inference —] From cases such as obstruction (rodha), impairment (upaghāta), and mere resemblance (sādṛśya), on account of their deviation (vyabhicāra: failure of the invariable connection an inference-mark should have), inference (anumāna) too is without authority (apramāṇa).

Note: Opens a new sub-debate defending anumāna, distinct from the preceding avayavin discussion. The precise technical sense of rodha/upaghāta/sādṛśya as stock examples of misleading inference is not fully recoverable from the sutra text alone.

न एकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्यः अर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ३९ ॥

na ekadeśatrāsasādṛśyebhyaḥ arthāntarabhāvāt || 39 ||

[Siddhānta —] No — these are not real cases of vyabhicāra; whether from seeing only a part, from alarm (trāsa), or from resemblance, what is actually cognized in each case is a different real state of affairs (arthāntara), not a genuine failure of the inferential mark.

Note: The precise referent of ekadeśatrāsa is uncertain; rendered here as 'seeing only a part' together with 'alarm/fright', following the compound's most natural split, but the intended stock example is not fully certain from the sutra alone.

वर्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः ॥ ४० ॥

vartamānābhāvaḥ patataḥ patitapatitavyakālopapatteḥ || 40 ||

[A further objection, on the reality of the present moment —] The present (vartamāna) does not exist, because for something in the act of falling, only the time 'already fallen' (patita, past) and 'yet to fall' (patitavya, future) apply consistently; no coherent instant of 'presently falling' can be pinned down.

तयोः अपि अभावः वर्तमानाभावे तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ४१ ॥

tayoḥ api abhāvaḥ vartamānābhāve tadapekṣatvāt || 41 ||

[Siddhānta —] Then even those two, past and future, would cease to exist, since — if the present does not exist — they in turn depend upon it as their reference point; denying the present destroys past and future as well.

न अतीतानागतयोः इतरेतरापेक्षा सिद्धिः ॥ ४२ ॥

na atītānāgatayoḥ itaretarāpekṣā siddhiḥ || 42 ||

Nor can past and future be established through mere mutual dependence on each other, without reference to a present, as one might try to rescue them.

वर्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४३ ॥

vartamānābhāve sarvāgrahaṇaṁ pratyakṣānupapatteḥ || 43 ||

If the present did not exist, nothing at all could be apprehended, because perception itself would then be impossible.

कृतताकर्त्तव्यतोपपत्तेः तु उभयथा ग्रहणम् ॥ ४४ ॥

kṛtatākarttavyatopapatteḥ tu ubhayathā grahaṇam || 44 ||

Rather, because the notions of 'already done' (kṛtatā) and 'yet to be done' (kartavyatā) are themselves intelligible only relative to an ongoing present act, apprehension occurs correctly in both respects together, confirming that the present is genuinely grasped in cognition.

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यातुपमानासिद्धिः ॥ ४५ ॥

atyantaprāyaikadeśasādharmyātupamānāsiddhiḥ || 45 ||

[On upamāna, analogy or comparison — a pramāṇa by which an unfamiliar thing is recognized through a stated resemblance to a familiar one —] because the similarity involved may be total, near-total, or merely partial, upamāna cannot be established as a distinct pramāṇa; no degree of similarity by itself suffices to justify it.

Note: Content reads as an objection to upamāna's status as an independent pramāṇa, though the transmitted TAG marks this sutra 'siddhānta' and the next (46) 'pūrvapakṣa' — the reverse of what the argument's flow suggests; translation follows the logical content over the TAG.

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यातुपमानसिद्धेः यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः ॥ ४६ ॥

prasiddhasādharmyātupamānasiddheḥ yathoktadoṣānupapattiḥ || 46 ||

[Reply —] Because upamāna is established through a well-recognized similarity (prasiddha-sādharmya), one that need not be total or exact, the faults just stated do not in fact apply.

प्रत्यक्षेण अप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ४७ ॥

pratyakṣeṇa apratyakṣasiddheḥ || 47 ||

This is confirmed by the fact that something not currently perceived (apratyakṣa) can be established by means of something that is perceived (pratyakṣa) — as when a described resemblance lets us recognize an unseen thing once we do see it.

न अप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थं उपमानस्य पश्यामः ॥ ४८ ॥

na apratyakṣe gavaye pramāṇārthaṁ upamānasya paśyāmaḥ || 48 ||

We see no other function for upamāna as regards an unperceived gavaya (a wild ox — the stock example: told 'a gavaya is like a cow,' a traveler later recognizes one in the forest) than precisely this: establishing recognition through stated resemblance, which no other pramāṇa performs.

तथा इति उपसंहारातुपमानसिद्धेः न अविशेषः ॥ ४९ ॥

tathā iti upasaṁhārātupamānasiddheḥ na aviśeṣaḥ || 49 ||

Because of the concluding cognition 'this is indeed so' (tathā iti upasaṁhāra), when the resemblance-statement is finally matched against the perceived animal, upamāna is established as a genuine pramāṇa — it is not without distinction from, that is, it is not reducible to, the other pramāṇas.

शब्दः अनुमानं अर्थस्य अनुपलब्धेः अनुमेयत्वात् ॥ ५० ॥

śabdaḥ anumānaṁ arthasya anupalabdheḥ anumeyatvāt || 50 ||

[Objection —] Verbal testimony (śabda: word, or scriptural/authoritative testimony, here treated as a candidate independent pramāṇa) is really only inference, because its object or meaning (artha) is not directly perceived but is rather something to be inferred (anumeya).

उपलब्धेः अद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् ॥ ५१ ॥

upalabdheḥ advipravṛttitvāt || 51 ||

This is reinforced, since the apprehension of word-meaning does not proceed by any second, distinct process — it works the same single way that inferential cognition does.

Note: The compound advipravṛttitva ('not operating in two ways') is terse; rendered here as denying any procedural difference between grasping word-meaning and grasping an inferential mark, in support of the śabda = anumāna thesis argued in 50 and 52.

सम्बन्धात्च ॥ ५२ ॥

sambandhātca || 52 ||

And also because of the fixed connection (sambandha: the relation linking a sign to what it signifies — here word to meaning, as smoke is linked to fire in inference).

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्यात्शब्दातर्थसम्प्रत्ययः ॥ ५३ ॥

āptopadeśasāmarthyātśabdātarthasampratyayaḥ || 53 ||

[Siddhānta —] The cognition of meaning from a word arises through the power of the instruction of a trustworthy person (āpta: one whose word is authoritative, being reliable, knowledgeable, and honest) — not through an inferential mark's invariable connection.

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेः च सम्बन्धाभावः ॥ ५४ ॥

pūraṇapradāhapāṭanānupalabdheḥ ca sambandhābhāvaḥ || 54 ||

And, since we do not observe filling, burning, or cutting merely upon hearing the words 'water', 'fire', or 'knife', there is no such natural, invariable connection between word and object of the kind found between an inferential mark and what it indicates.

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानातप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५५ ॥

śabdārthavyavasthānātapratiṣedhaḥ || 55 ||

Because of the merely conventional fixation (vyavasthā) of word and meaning, the thesis that śabda is anumāna stands refuted.

न सामयिकत्वात्शब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य ॥ ५६ ॥

na sāmayikatvātśabdārthasampratyayasya || 56 ||

No, the word-meaning relation being merely conventional does not save the objection, because the cognition of word-meaning rests on convention (sāmayikatva) alone — and convention, unlike a natural causal link, is precisely what distinguishes it from inference.

Note: The bare 'na' opening this siddhānta sutra is read as reinforcing 54-55 (denying that the word-meaning relation works like an inferential invariable connection) rather than as reopening the objection; the terse phrasing allows some ambiguity.

जातिविशेषे च अनियमात् ॥ ५७ ॥

jātiviśeṣe ca aniyamāt || 57 ||

And also because there is no fixed rule (aniyama) governing a word's application to every individual instance of a particular class (jāti-viśeṣa), as an inferential mark reliably governs every instance of its class.

तदप्रामाण्यं अनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ॥ ५८ ॥

tadaprāmāṇyaṁ anṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyaḥ || 58 ||

[A fresh challenge to testimony's reliability —] Its (śabda's) invalidity (aprāmāṇya) would follow from the faults of falsehood (anṛta), self-contradiction (vyāghāta), and needless repetition (punarukta) found in some testimony.

Note: Though transmitted with a 'siddhānta' TAG, the content states a fresh objection against śabda's reliability, which sutras 59-68 then answer point by point; translation follows the content.

न कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् ॥ ५९ ॥

na karmakartṛsādhanavaiguṇyāt || 59 ||

No — such faults arise from a defect in the action, agent, or means in a particular case (karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaiguṇya), not from any flaw in verbal testimony as such.

अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात् ॥ ६० ॥

abhyupetya kālabhede doṣavacanāt || 60 ||

Granting the charge of self-contradiction for the sake of argument, the apparent fault is resolved by noting that the injunctions in question apply to a difference in time (kāla-bheda).

अनुवादोपपत्तेः च ॥ ६१ ॥

anuvādopapatteḥ ca || 61 ||

And the charge of needless repetition is resolved because what appears repetitive is intelligible as restatement (anuvāda: a legitimate repetition of something already enjoined, for a further purpose).

वाक्यविभागस्य च अर्थग्रहणात् ॥ ६२ ॥

vākyavibhāgasya ca arthagrahaṇāt || 62 ||

And also because the meaning is grasped through the correct analysis of the sentence into its constituent parts (vākya-vibhāga).

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् ॥ ६३ ॥

vidhyarthavādānuvādavacanaviniyogāt || 63 ||

All this rests on the correct application (viniyoga) of the three kinds of Vedic statement: injunction (vidhi), explanatory or laudatory passage (arthavāda), and restatement (anuvāda).

विधिः विधायकः ॥ ६४ ॥

vidhiḥ vidhāyakaḥ || 64 ||

An injunction (vidhi) is that which enjoins an action to be performed.

स्तुतिः निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्पः इति अर्थवादः ॥ ६५ ॥

stutiḥ nindā parakṛtiḥ purākalpaḥ iti arthavādaḥ || 65 ||

Praise (stuti), censure (nindā), an account of what someone else has done (parakṛti), and ancient legend (purākalpa) — these together constitute arthavāda, an explanatory or laudatory passage which does not itself enjoin, but supports an injunction.

विधिविहितस्य अनुवचनं अनुवादः ॥ ६६ ॥

vidhivihitasya anuvacanaṁ anuvādaḥ || 66 ||

The repetition of what has already been enjoined by an injunction is anuvāda (restatement).

न अनुवादपुनरुक्तयोः विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः ॥ ६७ ॥

na anuvādapunaruktayoḥ viśeṣaḥ śabdābhyāsopapatteḥ || 67 ||

[A further objection —] There is no real difference between anuvāda and mere needless repetition (punarukta), since both simply involve repeating words (śabda-abhyāsa).

Note: Content is again an objection, threatening to collapse the anuvāda/punarukta distinction just used in 61, despite the transmitted 'siddhānta' TAG; it is answered in 68.

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवतभ्यासात्न अविशेषः ॥ ६८ ॥

śīghrataragamanopadeśavatabhyāsātna aviśeṣaḥ || 68 ||

[Reply —] There is no lack of distinction; just as in the instruction 'go faster, go faster' (śīghrataragamana-upadeśa), the repetition serves a real purpose, intensifying the instruction each time, rather than being idle.

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवत्च तत्प्रामाण्यम् आप्तप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ६९ ॥

mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyavatca tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt || 69 ||

And scripture's authority is like the authority of mantra (ritual utterance) and of Āyurveda (the science of medicine) — in each case resting on the reliability of the trustworthy source (āpta-prāmāṇya).

न चतुष्ट्वम् ऐतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् ॥ १ ॥

na catuṣṭvam aitihyārthāpattisambhavābhāvaprāmāṇyāt || 1 ||

[The pramāṇas, means of valid knowledge,] are not [only] four, because aitihya (tradition/hearsay), arthāpatti (presumption), sambhava (inclusion), and abhāva (negation) are also [independently] valid means of knowledge.

शब्दे ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावातनुमाने अर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तर भावात्च अप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ ॥

śabde aitihyānarthāntarabhāvātanumāne arthāpattisambhavābhāvānarthāntara bhāvātca apratiṣedhaḥ || 2 ||

There is no objection [to the fourfold count], because aitihya is not a distinct entity from śabda (verbal testimony), and arthāpatti, sambhava, and abhāva are not distinct entities from anumāna (inference).

अर्थापत्तिः अप्रमाणं अनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

arthāpattiḥ apramāṇaṁ anaikāntikatvāt || 3 ||

Arthāpatti (presumption) is not a valid means of knowledge, because it is inconclusive (anaikāntika, not invariably concomitant with truth).

अनर्थापत्तौ अर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् ॥ ४ ॥

anarthāpattau arthāpattyabhimānāt || 4 ||

[This fault does not attach to genuine arthāpatti]; it arises only where arthāpatti is falsely presumed though it does not actually obtain.

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यं च अनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

pratiṣedhāprāmāṇyaṁ ca anaikāntikatvāt || 5 ||

And [by the very same logic] this refutation [of arthāpatti] would itself also be invalid, since it too would be inconclusive.

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न अर्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

tatprāmāṇye vā na arthāpattyaprāmāṇyam || 6 ||

Or else, if that refutation is [granted to be] valid, then arthāpatti [being of the same logical character] cannot be said to be invalid.

न अभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः ॥ ७ ॥

na abhāvaprāmāṇyaṁ prameyāsiddheḥ || 7 ||

Abhāva (negation, non-perception establishing absence) has no validity as a pramāṇa, because its object (prameya) is not established [as a real existent thing to be known].

लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वातलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धेः ॥ ८ ॥

lakṣiteṣvalakṣaṇalakṣitatvātalakṣitānāṁ tatprameyasiddheḥ || 8 ||

Among things possessing a defining mark, [absence] is known through the non-presence of that mark; and for things not [otherwise] characterized, their status as a knowable object (prameya) is established precisely through that [same non-perception].

Note: Highly compressed compound (lakṣiteṣv-alakṣaṇalakṣitatvāt-alakṣitānāṁ); rendered per the most common construal (abhāva as pramāṇa even for unmarked entities), but the exact syntactic split is uncertain without the bhāṣya.

असति अर्थे न अभावः इति चेत्न अन्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः ॥ ९ ॥

asati arthe na abhāvaḥ iti cetna anyalakṣaṇopapatteḥ || 9 ||

If it be objected that 'where the object does not exist, there can be no [cognition of] abhāva' — no, because that [cognition] is accounted for by a different defining mark [namely, non-perception itself].

तत्सिद्धेः अलक्षितेषु अहेतुः ॥ १० ॥

tatsiddheḥ alakṣiteṣu ahetuḥ || 10 ||

Since that [cognition of absence] is established [only] with reference to previously marked/characterized things, [the reason given] does not hold as a ground for [abhāva regarding] unmarked things.

न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ११ ॥

na lakṣaṇāvasthitāpekṣasiddheḥ || 11 ||

No, because it is established with reference to [things] existing under their own defining character.

प्राकुत्पत्तेः अभावोपपत्तेः च ॥ १२ ॥

prākutpatteḥ abhāvopapatteḥ ca || 12 ||

And [abhāva is also established] prior to origination, through the very accounting for of that [prior] non-existence.

आदिमत्वातैन्द्रियकत्वात्कृतकवतुपचारात्च ॥ १३ ॥

ādimatvātaindriyakatvātkṛtakavatupacārātca || 13 ||

[Sound is non-eternal (anitya)] because it has a beginning (ādimattva), because it is apprehended by the senses (aindriyakatva), and because it is spoken of in usage like a produced (kṛtaka) thing.

न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वात्नित्येषु अपि अनित्यवतुपचारात्च ॥ १४ ॥

na ghaṭābhāvasāmānyanityatvātnityeṣu api anityavatupacārātca || 14 ||

[This is not vitiated,] because merely sharing a general character — as with the [abstract] general absence of a pot — does not entail eternality; and even eternal things are, in [certain contexts of] usage, figuratively spoken of as non-eternal.

Note: The ghaṭābhāva-sāmānya-nityatva compound is terse and its exact dialectical target (which objection it answers) is not fully recoverable without Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya; rendered per the most plausible reading defending the kṛtakavad-upacāra hetu of sutra 13.

तत्त्वभाक्तयोः नानात्वविभागातव्यभिचारः ॥ १५ ॥

tattvabhāktayoḥ nānātvavibhāgātavyabhicāraḥ || 15 ||

There is no fallacy of deviation [in the reason given], because of the clear distinction in kind between literal (tattva) usage and figurative/secondary (bhakti) usage.

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् ॥ १६ ॥

santānānumānaviśeṣaṇāt || 16 ||

...through the qualification proper to the inference concerning a continuum (santāna, a seemingly continuous stream) [the non-eternality thesis is shown to extend even to what appears as an unbroken flow of sound].

कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥ १७ ॥

kāraṇadravyasya pradeśaśabdenābhidhānāt || 17 ||

...because the material cause-substance (kāraṇa-dravya) [of sound] is denoted, in ordinary usage, by the word 'pradeśa' (a portion) [confirming that sound is treated as a produced effect].

प्राकुच्चारणातनुपलब्धेः आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धेः च ॥ १८ ॥

prākuccāraṇātanupalabdheḥ āvaraṇādyanupalabdheḥ ca || 18 ||

[Sound is non-eternal] because it is not perceived prior to its utterance, and because no covering or obstruction (āvaraṇa) or the like is ever perceived [that could otherwise account for its prior non-perception if it were eternal].

तदनुपलब्धेः अनुपलम्भातावरणोपपत्तिः ॥ १९ ॥

tadanupalabdheḥ anupalambhātāvaraṇopapattiḥ || 19 ||

[Objection:] From that very non-perception [of an obstruction], the existence of an [imperceptible] obstruction is [in fact] established.

अनुपलम्भातनुपलब्धिसद्भावात्न आवरणानुपपत्तिः अनुपलम्भात् ॥ २० ॥

anupalambhātanupalabdhisadbhāvātna āvaraṇānupapattiḥ anupalambhāt || 20 ||

No — [an obstruction] cannot be established thus, because from mere non-perception one obtains only the existence of non-perception [and nothing more]; the very impossibility of a [hidden] obstruction follows from that same non-perception.

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वातनुपलब्धेः अहेतुः ॥ २१ ॥

anupalambhātmakatvātanupalabdheḥ ahetuḥ || 21 ||

Since non-perception (anupalabdhi) consists essentially in [mere] absence of cognition, it cannot serve as a valid reason [for positing a hidden obstruction].

अस्पर्शत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

asparśatvāt || 22 ||

...because [sound] is devoid of tangibility (asparśatva) [and hence cannot be covered or obstructed by anything material].

न कर्मानित्यत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

na karmānityatvāt || 23 ||

No, because motion/action (karma) [too] is non-eternal [so the analogy cited does not support the eternality thesis].

न अणुनित्यत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

na aṇunityatvāt || 24 ||

No, because of the eternality of atoms (aṇu) [an atom's imperceptibility has a different ground, so the analogy fails to support sound's eternality].

सम्प्रदानात् ॥ २५ ॥

sampradānāt || 25 ||

...on account of the [grammatical] dative relation (sampradāna) [ordinary usage speaks of sound as being 'given' or 'produced' for a recipient, which is evidence of its being a produced effect].

Note: Single-word sutra (sampradānāt); precise application of the grammatical dative-case argument is not fully recoverable without the bhāṣya, so the gloss is a plausible reconstruction rather than a certain reading.

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेः अहेतुः ॥ २६ ॥

tadantarālānupalabdheḥ ahetuḥ || 26 ||

Because of non-perception in the interval between them, [the opponent's reason] does not hold.

अध्यापनातप्रतिषेधः ॥ २७ ॥

adhyāpanātapratiṣedhaḥ || 27 ||

Because of [the continued fact of] teaching/instruction (adhyāpana), there is no [valid] objection [to non-eternality — the repeated instruction of sound each time confirms it is freshly produced].

उभयोः पक्षयोः अन्यतरस्य अध्यापनातप्रतिषेधः ॥ २८ ॥

ubhayoḥ pakṣayoḥ anyatarasya adhyāpanātapratiṣedhaḥ || 28 ||

Whichever of the two positions [is adopted, eternalist or non-eternalist], the mere fact of teaching does not amount to a valid refutation of the other.

अभ्यासात् ॥ २९ ॥

abhyāsāt || 29 ||

...on account of repetition/recitation (abhyāsa) [repeated recitation likewise shows that sound is freshly produced on each occasion].

न अन्यत्वे अपि अभ्यासस्य उपचारात् ॥ ३० ॥

na anyatve api abhyāsasya upacārāt || 30 ||

No, because even though [each recitation produces] a different [sound-instance], the word 'repetition' is used of them only figuratively.

अन्यतन्यस्मातनन्यत्वातनन्यतिति अन्यताभावः ॥ ३१ ॥

anyatanyasmātananyatvātananyatiti anyatābhāvaḥ || 31 ||

[Restating the opponent's ground:] 'This is not different from that, and that is not different from this, therefore [they are] not different' — thus [the eternalist maintains] the absence of otherness [between recurring instances of what is heard as 'the same' sound, in support of its permanence].

Note: Though tagged सिद्धान्तसूत्र in the source, the content restates what reads as the eternalist's (pūrvapakṣa) claim of non-difference between recurring sound-tokens, which sutra 32 then refutes; the dialectical framing is genuinely ambiguous without the bhāṣya.

तदभावे न अस्ति अनन्यता तयोः इतरेतरापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ३२ ॥

tadabhāve na asti ananyatā tayoḥ itaretarāpekṣasiddheḥ || 32 ||

In the absence of that [plurality of distinct instances], there can be no non-difference (ananyatā) between the two, since [the very notion of non-difference] is established only through their mutual dependence on one another.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः ॥ ३३ ॥

vināśakāraṇānupalabdheḥ || 33 ||

[This turns on] the non-perception of any cause of destruction [for sound after it ceases to be heard].

Note: Terse two-word sutra whose dialectical role is ambiguous: it may state the eternalist's ground (absence of a perceived destroyer, hence sound persists unheard) which sutra 37 then turns into a reductio, rather than standing as an independent Naiyāyika conclusion.

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः ॥ ३४ ॥

aśravaṇakāraṇānupalabdheḥ satataśravaṇaprasaṅgaḥ || 34 ||

Since no cause is perceived for [the intervals of] its non-hearing either, it would [absurdly] follow that sound ought to be heard continuously [if it were truly eternal] — a consequence [the eternalist] falls into (prasaṅga).

उपलभ्यमाने च अनुपलब्धेः असत्त्वातनपदेशः ॥ ३५ ॥

upalabhyamāne ca anupalabdheḥ asattvātanapadeśaḥ || 35 ||

And when something [else present in the same locus] is still being perceived while [sound] is not, [to posit sound's continued but hidden] existence on that ground alone is without valid basis (anapadeśa).

पाणिनिमित्तप्रश्लेषात्शब्दाभावे न अनुपलब्धिः ॥ ३६ ॥

pāṇinimittapraśleṣātśabdābhāve na anupalabdhiḥ || 36 ||

By reason of the conjunction of a specific instrumental cause [such as the hand striking, e.g. in producing a drumbeat], [it is that absence of conjunction, and] not [some persisting but hidden] sound, [that accounts for] its non-perception.

Note: 'Pāṇinimittapraśleṣāt' is opaque outside its bhāṣya context; rendered per the standard drum/hand-strike example used elsewhere in this debate, but the precise reference is not fully certain.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः च अवस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ ३७ ॥

vināśakāraṇānupalabdheḥ ca avasthāne tannityatvaprasaṅgaḥ || 37 ||

And since no cause of destruction is perceived, if [sound] were nonetheless to persist [permanently, as the eternalist holds], the absurd consequence would follow that it is [perpetually] eternal [contrary to what is actually observed].

अस्पर्शत्वातप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३८ ॥

asparśatvātapratiṣedhaḥ || 38 ||

Because of [sound's] intangibility (asparśatva), there is no [valid] objection [to its simply ceasing, without there being any perceptible destroying cause].

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेः च समासे ॥ ३९ ॥

vibhaktyantaropapatteḥ ca samāse || 39 ||

And because a different case-ending occurs [for a word] when it stands within a compound (samāsa) [grammatical evidence that phonemes/sounds are modifiable, not fixed and eternal].

विकारादेशोपदेशात्संशयः ॥ ४० ॥

vikārādeśopadeśātsaṁśayaḥ || 40 ||

Because of the [grammatical] teaching of modification (vikāra) and substitution (ādeśa) [of phonemes], doubt arises [as to whether sound/the phoneme is eternal or non-eternal].

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेः ॥ ४१ ॥

prakṛtivivṛddhau vikāravivṛddheḥ || 41 ||

[Argument for real transformation:] When the original base (prakṛti) increases, the modification (vikāra) increases correspondingly [as in material transformation, e.g. more milk yielding more curd].

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेः विकाराणां अहेतुः ॥ ४२ ॥

nyūnasamādhikopalabdheḥ vikārāṇāṁ ahetuḥ || 42 ||

Since modification is observed to occur whether [the base is] lesser, equal, or greater [in amount], that reason [proportional increase] does not hold as proof [of substantial transformation in the case of phonemes].

द्विविधस्य अपि हेतोः अभावातसाधनं दृष्टान्तः ॥ ४३ ॥

dvividhasya api hetoḥ abhāvātasādhanaṁ dṛṣṭāntaḥ || 43 ||

Since neither of the two [applicable] reasons is present, the example [cited, e.g. milk becoming curd] fails to prove its point (asādhana).

न अतुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात् ॥ ४४ ॥

na atulyaprakṛtīnāṁ vikāravikalpāt || 44 ||

No, because among substrates that are dissimilar (atulya-prakṛti), the modification too differs in kind.

द्रव्यविकारवैषम्यवत्वर्णविकारविकलः ॥ ४५ ॥

dravyavikāravaiṣamyavatvarṇavikāravikalaḥ || 45 ||

[Objection:] Just as there is disparity in the modification of [material] substances, so too there is a deficiency [of genuine transformation] in the modification of phonemes (varṇa-vikāra).

न विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४६ ॥

na vikāradharmānupapatteḥ || 46 ||

No, because it is not the case that the property of undergoing modification (vikāra-dharma) is inapplicable [to phonemes; they genuinely do undergo it].

विकारप्राप्तानां अपुनरापत्तेः ॥ ४७ ॥

vikāraprāptānāṁ apunarāpatteḥ || 47 ||

...because things that have [truly] undergone modification do not revert again to their former state.

सुवर्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेः अहेतुः ॥ ४८ ॥

suvarṇādīnāṁ punarāpatteḥ ahetuḥ || 48 ||

[Objection:] Since gold and the like DO revert again [to an earlier form, as through melting and reshaping], that reason [irreversibility] is not valid.

न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ४९ ॥

na tadvikārāṇāṁ suvarṇabhāvāvyatirekāt || 49 ||

No, because the modifications of that [gold] do not depart from the [underlying] nature of gold [gold remains gold through its transformations — unlike the case of sound].

वर्णत्वाव्यतिरेकात्वर्णविकाराणां अप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५० ॥

varṇatvāvyatirekātvarṇavikārāṇāṁ apratiṣedhaḥ || 50 ||

Since [likewise, phonemic] modifications do not depart from letter-hood (varṇatva), there is no [valid] objection to phonemic modification on this ground.

सामान्यवतो धर्मयोगो न सामान्यस्य ॥ ५१ ॥

sāmānyavato dharmayogo na sāmānyasya || 51 ||

Connection with a [given] property belongs to the possessor of the universal [the individual particular], not to the universal (sāmānya) itself.

नित्यत्वे अविकारातनित्यत्वे च अनवस्थानात् ॥ ५२ ॥

nityatve avikārātanityatve ca anavasthānāt || 52 ||

If [sound is] eternal, there can be no modification [since the eternal is changeless by nature]; and if non-eternal, there is no [stable underlying] persistence [for that change to occur to] — [a dilemma for either position].

नित्यानां अतीन्द्रियत्वात्तद्धर्मविकल्पात्च वर्णविकाराणां अप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५३ ॥

nityānāṁ atīndriyatvāttaddharmavikalpātca varṇavikārāṇāṁ apratiṣedhaḥ || 53 ||

[Objection:] Since eternal things are beyond the senses (atīndriya), and since there can be a variation in the manifestation of their properties, there is no [valid] objection to phonemic modification [being merely varying manifestations of an eternal underlying sound, rather than true change].

अनवस्थायित्वे च वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तद्विकारोपपत्तिः ॥ ५४ ॥

anavasthāyitve ca varṇopalabdhivattadvikāropapattiḥ || 54 ||

And if [phonemes are held to be] impermanent/momentary, then, just as with the [fresh] perception of a letter each time, so too the occurrence of its 'modification' [would simply be a fresh instance each time, not a real transformation].

विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात्कालान्तरे विकारोपपत्तेः च अप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५५ ॥

vikāradharmitve nityatvābhāvātkālāntare vikāropapatteḥ ca apratiṣedhaḥ || 55 ||

[Reply:] Since [sound] possesses the property of undergoing modification, it lacks eternality; and since the modification occurs at a subsequent time, there is no [valid] objection [to its non-eternality — this resolves the preceding dilemma].

प्रकृत्यनियमात् ॥ ५६ ॥

prakṛtyaniyamāt || 56 ||

...because there is no fixed rule governing the original base (prakṛti) [as required for genuine material-style modification, unlike the case of phonemes].

अनियमे नियमात्न अनियमः ॥ ५७ ॥

aniyame niyamātna aniyamaḥ || 57 ||

[Objection:] Since there is, [in fact,] a rule even within what is claimed to be irregularity, it is not truly irregular.

नियमानियमविरोधातनियमे नियमात्च अप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५८ ॥

niyamāniyamavirodhātaniyame niyamātca apratiṣedhaḥ || 58 ||

Because regularity and irregularity are mutually contradictory, and because any regularity [that is found] exists only within an [otherwise] irregular [domain], there is no [valid] objection [to sutra 56].

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्दह्रासवृद्धिश्लेषेभ्यः तु विकारोपपत्तेः वर्णविकाराः ॥ ५९ ॥

guṇāntarāpattyupamardahrāsavṛddhiśleṣebhyaḥ tu vikāropapatteḥ varṇavikārāḥ || 59 ||

Rather, phonemic modifications (varṇa-vikāra) occur through [processes such as] the acquisition of a different quality, suppression/overpowering, diminution, increase, and coalescence — [by these, phonemic change] is properly accounted for.

ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् ॥ ६० ॥

te vibhaktyantāḥ padam || 60 ||

Those [stems] ending in a case-ending or verb-ending (vibhakti) are [termed] a 'word' (pada).

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसन्निधौ उपचारात्संशयः ॥ ६१ ॥

vyaktyākṛtijātisannidhau upacārātsaṁśayaḥ || 61 ||

Because of the figurative application [of a word] in the simultaneous presence of the individual (vyakti), the form (ākṛti), and the universal (jāti), doubt arises as to which of the three a word truly denotes.

याशब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसङ्ख्यावृद्ध्यपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानां व्यक्तौ उपचारात्व्यक्तिः ॥ ६२ ॥

yāśabdasamūhatyāgaparigrahasaṅkhyāvṛddhyapacayavarṇasamāsānubandhānāṁ vyaktau upacārātvyaktiḥ || 62 ||

[Argument that the individual is meant:] Because terms such as the relative 'yā', collectivity, exclusion and inclusion, number, increase and decrease, letters, compounding, and grammatical markers are all applied with figurative reference to the individual, [therefore] the individual [is what a word denotes].

न ततनवस्थानात् ॥ ६३ ॥

na tatanavasthānāt || 63 ||

No, because that [individual] has no permanence or stability (anavasthāna).

सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यः ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराजसक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशाटकान्नपुरुषेष्वतद्भावे अपि तदुपचारः ॥ ६४ ॥

sahacaraṇasthānatādarthyavṛttamānadhāraṇasāmīpyayogasādhanādhipatyebhyaḥ brāhmaṇamañcakaṭarājasaktucandanagaṅgāśāṭakānnapuruṣeṣvatadbhāve api tadupacāraḥ || 64 ||

On account of [relations such as] association, location, purpose, function, measure, containment, proximity, connection, instrumentality, and superordination, figurative usage (upacāra) occurs even where the thing itself [in its primary sense] is not [literally] present — as when terms like 'the platform', 'the cart', 'the king', 'the gruel', 'the sandalwood', 'the Ganges', 'the garment', or 'the food' are extended to persons [associated with those things, e.g. 'the Brahmin of the platform', 'the king's cart'].

Note: The dvandva list of examples (brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa-rāja-saktu-candana-gaṅgā-śāṭaka-anna-puruṣa) is a well-known interpretive crux with more than one traditional segmentation; the pairing of terms here follows the most commonly cited construal but is not the only one attested.

आकृतिः तदपेक्षत्वात्सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः ॥ ६५ ॥

ākṛtiḥ tadapekṣatvātsattvavyavasthānasiddheḥ || 65 ||

[Argument that the form is meant:] The form (ākṛti) [is what a word denotes], because [the individual] depends upon it, and because the ascertainment of an individual's real existence (sattva) is established through it.

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्ते अपि अप्रसङ्गात्प्रोक्षणादिनां मृद्गवके जातिः ॥ ६६ ॥

vyaktyākṛtiyukte api aprasaṅgātprokṣaṇādināṁ mṛdgavake jātiḥ || 66 ||

[Argument that the universal is meant:] Even though [an object] may possess a [particular] individual and form, since prescribed [ritual] acts such as sprinkling do not extend to a clay [image of a] cow, [what a word denotes must be] the universal (jāti) [since injunctions about a cow apply only where cow-ness is truly present].

न आकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वात्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः ॥ ६७ ॥

na ākṛtivyaktyapekṣatvātjātyabhivyakteḥ || 67 ||

No, because the manifestation of the universal (jāti) is itself dependent upon the form and the individual.

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयः तु पदार्थः ॥ ६८ ॥

vyaktyākṛtijātayaḥ tu padārthaḥ || 68 ||

Rather, the individual (vyakti), the form (ākṛti), and the universal (jāti) together constitute the meaning of a word (padārtha).

व्यक्तिः गुणविशेषाश्रयः मूर्तिः ॥ ६९ ॥

vyaktiḥ guṇaviśeṣāśrayaḥ mūrtiḥ || 69 ||

The individual (vyakti) is the concrete embodiment (mūrti) that is the substrate of particular qualities (guṇa-viśeṣa).

आकृतिः जातिलिङ्गाख्या ॥ ७० ॥

ākṛtiḥ jātiliṅgākhyā || 70 ||

The form (ākṛti) is that which is termed the mark/indicator (liṅga) of the universal (jāti).

समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः ॥ ७१ ॥

samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ || 71 ||

The universal (jāti) is that whose nature is to produce a uniform cognition of sameness [across individual instances].

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् ॥ १ ॥

darśanasparśanābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāt || 1 ||

Because one and the same object is apprehended through both sight and touch [a single self, distinct from the senses, must be the unifying perceiver].

न विषयव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २ ॥

na viṣayavyavasthānāt || 2 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because the objects of each sense are fixedly restricted to their own domain, so it is not truly one and the same object common to both.

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ ॥

tadvyavasthānādevātmasadbhāvādapratiṣedhaḥ || 3 ||

[Reply:] There is no refutation — for it is precisely from that very restriction of the senses' domains, together with the recognition of one object across them, that the self's existence is established.

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

śarīradāhe pātakābhāvāt || 4 ||

[Objection:] Because there is no sin in the burning of the [dead] body, as though the self were entirely unrelated to it.

तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

tadabhāvaḥ sātmakapradāhe'pi tannityatvāt || 5 ||

[Objection continues:] That same absence of sin would hold even in the burning of a body together with the self [i.e., burning a living being], since the self is eternal [and so cannot be destroyed by fire either way].

न कार्याश्रयकर्तृवधात् ॥ ६ ॥

na kāryāśrayakartṛvadhāt || 6 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because it is the killing of the agent who is the substratum of [his own] actions and their fruits, [and that remains a real harm and sin, even though the self as such is indestructible].

सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ७ ॥

savyadṛṣṭasyetareṇa pratyabhijñānāt || 7 ||

[Further proof of the self:] Because there is recognition, by the other [eye], of what was [first] seen by the left [eye] — "this is the very thing I saw" — proving one perceiver common to both.

नैकस्मिन्नासास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात् ॥ ८ ॥

naikasminnāsāsthivyavahite dvitvābhimānāt || 8 ||

[The unifying perceiver] is not confined to a single [eye] — for, although the two eyes are separated by the nasal bone [and so might seem to be two independent instruments], [their unified perception shows that] the notion of duality [between two separate perceivers] does not hold.

Note: Terse compound naikasminnāsāsthivyavahite dvitvābhimānāt parsed as na+ekasmin+nāsāsthi ('nasal bone')+vyavahite+dvitva-abhimānāt; the precise dialectical force (rebutting an inference of two perceivers from the eyes' physical separation) is an interpretive reconstruction, not fully explicit in the sutra itself.

एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशान्नैकत्वम् ॥ ९ ॥

ekavināśe dvitīyāvināśānnaikatvam || 9 ||

[Objection:] Because when one [eye] is destroyed the other is not destroyed, there is no [real] unity [between the two, and hence no single underlying self is needed].

अवयवनाशेऽप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ १० ॥

avayavanāśe'pyavayavyupalabdherahetuḥ || 10 ||

[Reply:] That is not a valid reason — for the whole continues to be perceived even when a part of it is destroyed.

दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ११ ॥

dṛṣṭāntavirodhādapratiṣedhaḥ || 11 ||

There is no refutation [of the self's unity], since that objection contradicts this very analogy [of whole and part].

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् ॥ १२ ॥

indriyāntaravikārāt || 12 ||

[This is shown further] because it is only a distinct sense-organ that undergoes impairment [when one eye is destroyed, not the self, which remains unaffected].

न स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात् ॥ १३ ॥

na smṛteḥ smartavyaviṣayatvāt || 13 ||

[Objection:] Memory does not [prove a persisting self], because memory's scope extends only to what is to be remembered [and does not by itself require a persisting rememberer].

तदात्मगुणसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

tadātmaguṇasadbhāvādapratiṣedhaḥ || 14 ||

[Reply:] There is no refutation, since memory exists as a quality [guṇa] belonging to the self, and so directly proves its substratum.

नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात् ॥ १५ ॥

nātmapratipattihetūnāṁ manasi sambhavāt || 15 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because the grounds for cognizing the self could occur in the mind [manas] alone, without requiring a separate self.

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ १६ ॥

jñāturjñānasādhanopapatteḥ saṁjñābhedamātram || 16 ||

[Reply:] Since manas is established [merely] as the knower's instrument of cognition, [calling manas itself the knower] would be but a difference of name — the self as true knower still stands proven.

नियमश्च निरनुमानः ॥ १७ ॥

niyamaśca niranumānaḥ || 17 ||

And this regularity [that manas functions only as an instrument in the service of a single, constant knower] cannot be established by any other inference.

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ १८ ॥

pūrvābhyastasmṛtyanubandhājjātasya harṣabhayaśokasampratipatteḥ || 18 ||

Because the newborn exhibits joy, fear, and sorrow on account of the connection of memory-impressions habituated in a former [life — proving a self persisting across births].

पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः ॥ १९ ॥

padmādiṣu prabodhasammīlanavikāravattadvikāraḥ || 19 ||

That change [in the infant, i.e. its inborn fear and desire] is like the change of opening and closing seen in the lotus and the like, [which occurs automatically by inherent disposition, without deliberate learning].

नोष्णशीतवर्षाकालनिमित्तत्वात्पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम् ॥ २० ॥

noṣṇaśītavarṣākālanimittatvātpañcātmakavikārāṇām || 20 ||

[This cannot be explained by mere physical causation], because the fivefold modifications [of the infant's joy, fear, and sorrow] are not occasioned by such external factors as heat, cold, or the rainy season.

Note: 'pañcātmaka' (fivefold) is terse and could refer either to the set of affective changes just listed or to the five elements/senses generally; rendered as the former, in line with the surrounding argument, but the referent is not fully explicit.

प्रेत्याहाराभ्यासकृतात्स्तन्याभिलाषात् ॥ २१ ॥

pretyāhārābhyāsakṛtātstanyābhilāṣāt || 21 ||

Because of the newborn's desire for the mother's milk, produced by the habituation to food formed in a former existence.

अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणम् ॥ २२ ॥

ayaso'yaskāntābhigamanavattadupasarpaṇam || 22 ||

That [infant's] creeping toward [the breast] is like iron's moving toward a lodestone [an automatic, instinct-driven approach explainable by an unseen prior disposition].

नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात् ॥ २३ ॥

nānyatra pravṛttyabhāvāt || 23 ||

[This is confirmed] because there is no such inclination toward anything else [besides the breast, showing the desire is specific, not blind general instinct].

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ २४ ॥

vītarāgajanmādarśanāt || 24 ||

Because one never observes a birth that is entirely free of such [prior] desire [every newborn shows this, requiring a universal, carried-over cause].

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ २५ ॥

saguṇadravyotpattivattadutpattiḥ || 25 ||

That [desire's] arising [together with the infant's affections, right from birth] is like the arising of a substance together with its quality.

न संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम् ॥ २६ ॥

na saṁkalpanimittatvādrāgādīnām || 26 ||

[This must be so], because desire and the rest [in the newborn] are not caused by [deliberate] volition [an infant cannot have formed any such resolve in this life].

पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः ॥ २७ ॥

pārthivaṁ guṇāntaropalabdheḥ || 27 ||

The body is [predominantly] earthy — [although] other qualities [besides earth's] are also perceived in it.

Note: The ablative hetu (guṇāntaropalabdheḥ, 'because other qualities are perceived') sits oddly as direct support for 'earthy'; read here as a concessive point that opens the following examination of the body's other, non-earth qualities (sutras 28-30).

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥

pārthivāpyataijasaṁ tadguṇopalabdheḥ || 28 ||

[Objection:] The body is made of earth and water only, not of fire, because a quality of water [e.g. moisture] is perceived in it.

निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम् ॥ २९ ॥

niḥśvāsocchvāsopalabdheścāturbhautikam || 29 ||

[Objection continues:] And, because breathing (inhalation and exhalation) is observed [implying the presence of air], the body consists of four elements.

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम् ॥ ३० ॥

gandhakledapākavyūhāvakāśadānebhyaḥ pāñcabhautikam || 30 ||

[Nyaya's own conclusion:] Because of [the presence in the body of] smell, moisture, digestive heat, structural arrangement, and the provision of [bodily] cavities/space, the body is in fact made of all five elements.

श्रुतिप्रामाण्याच्च ॥ ३१ ॥

śrutiprāmāṇyācca || 31 ||

And [this is confirmed] also by the authority of scripture.

कृष्णसारे सत्युपलम्भाद्व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भात्संशयः ॥ ३२ ॥

kṛṣṇasāre satyupalambhādvyatiricya copalambhātsaṁśayaḥ || 32 ||

There is doubt [as to whether the same sense-organ or a different one is at work], because in [seeing] a black antelope [at a distance], there is at times direct perception, and at other times a perception distinguished/apart from it.

Note: 'vyatiricya' (having excluded/set apart) is read as marking a second, distinguishable mode of perceiving the distant antelope (e.g. indistinct vs. clear); the exact perceptual contrast intended is not fully recoverable from the sutra alone.

महदणुग्रहणात् ॥ ३३ ॥

mahadaṇugrahaṇāt || 33 ||

[This doubt is reinforced] because the same [organ] apprehends both large and minute [objects].

रश्म्यर्थसंनिकर्षविशेषात्तद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ३४ ॥

raśmyarthasaṁnikarṣaviśeṣāttadgrahaṇam || 34 ||

[Reply:] That apprehension occurs because of a specific contact between the [eye's] ray and the object.

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ३५ ॥

tadanupalabdherahetuḥ || 35 ||

[Objection:] That [ray] is not [itself] perceived — hence this cannot be a valid reason.

नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरभावहेतुः ॥ ३६ ॥

nānumīyamānasya pratyakṣato'nupalabdhirabhāvahetuḥ || 36 ||

[Reply:] Not so — the non-perception, through direct perception, of something properly known [only] by inference is not proof of its non-existence.

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः ॥ ३७ ॥

dravyaguṇadharmabhedāccopalabdhiniyamaḥ || 37 ||

And there is a fixed regularity governing perception, based on the distinction among substance, quality, and property.

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायाद्रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥ ३८ ॥

anekadravyasamavāyādrūpaviśeṣācca rūpopalabdhiḥ || 38 ||

And the perception of colour/form occurs owing to [an object's] inherence in numerous [constituent] substances and owing to a specific colour.

कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः ॥ ३९ ॥

karmakāritaścendriyāṇāṁ vyūhaḥ puruṣārthatantraḥ || 39 ||

And the deployment of the sense-organs, effected by motion, is governed by human purpose [directed toward what the self intends].

मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४० ॥

madhyandinolkāprakāśānupalabdhivattadanupalabdhiḥ || 40 ||

That [ray's] non-perception is like the non-perception of a firebrand's light at midday [present, but overwhelmed by daylight].

न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः ॥ ४१ ॥

na rātrāvapyanupalabdheḥ || 41 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because [the ray] is not perceived even at night, when there is no overpowering light to explain its imperceptibility.

वाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद्विषयोपलब्धेरनभिव्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४२ ॥

vāhyaprakāśānugrahādviṣayopalabdheranabhivyaktito'nupalabdhiḥ || 42 ||

[Reply:] The non-perception, due to non-manifestation, [occurs] because the perception of any object requires the assistance of external light.

अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात् ॥ ४३ ॥

abhivyaktau cābhibhavāt || 43 ||

And when [the ray] does manifest [in daylight, it remains unseen] because of being overpowered [by the greater brightness].

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च ॥ ४४ ॥

naktañcaranayanaraśmidarśanācca || 44 ||

And [the ray's existence is confirmed] because the ray in the eyes of nocturnal creatures is [directly] observed.

अप्राप्यग्रहणं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः ॥ ४५ ॥

aprāpyagrahaṇaṁ kācābhrapaṭalasphaṭikāntaritopalabdheḥ || 45 ||

[A further point:] Visual apprehension occurs without [the ray actually] reaching the object — since objects screened by glass, a sheet of mica, or crystal are still perceived.

कुड्यान्तरितानुपलब्धेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४६ ॥

kuḍyāntaritānupalabdherapratiṣedhaḥ || 46 ||

[Reply:] There is no refutation [of the contact theory of vision], since what is screened by a [solid, opaque] wall is indeed not perceived.

अप्रतिघातात्संनिकर्षोपपत्तिः ॥ ४७ ॥

apratighātātsaṁnikarṣopapattiḥ || 47 ||

Because of the absence of obstruction [in transparent media], the [ray's] contact with the object is accounted for.

आदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरेऽपि दाह्येऽविघातात् ॥ ४८ ॥

ādityaraśmeḥ sphaṭikāntare'pi dāhye'vighātāt || 48 ||

[This is shown] because the sun's ray, even with a crystal interposed, is not obstructed with regard to its power to burn a combustible object.

नेतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४९ ॥

netaretaradharmaprasaṅgāt || 49 ||

[Objection:] Not so — for [otherwise] it would entail the unwanted consequence of each thing's properties [being transferred] to the other.

Note: 'itaretaradharmaprasaṅgāt' does not name which two things' properties would wrongly cross over; most plausibly this anticipates the mirror/water reflection case of sutra 50 (object and reflecting surface), but the referent is left implicit in the sutra.

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥ ५० ॥

ādarśodakayoḥ prasādasvābhāvyādrūpopalabdhivattadupalabdhiḥ || 50 ||

That perception [of a reflected image, in a mirror or in water,] occurs, like the ordinary perception of form, because of the inherent clarity natural to a mirror and to water.

दृष्टानुमितानां नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ ५१ ॥

dṛṣṭānumitānāṁ niyogapratiṣedhānupapattiḥ || 51 ||

Regarding things known by direct observation or by inference, an exclusive prescription or an absolute denial [insisting vision works by only one single mechanism] is untenable.

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशयः ॥ ५२ ॥

sthānānyatve nānātvādavayavinānāsthānatvācca saṁśayaḥ || 52 ||

There is doubt [as to whether touch is one sense-organ or many]: because its locations differ [touch-sensation arising all over the body, suggesting multiplicity], and because the composite whole [the organism itself] likewise occupies many places [as a single entity, leaving the matter unclear either way].

Note: The compound sthānānyatve nānātvādavayavinānāsthānatvāt is dense and admits more than one parsing; rendered as presenting two grounds for doubt (multiplicity of touch-loci vs. the single composite body spanning those loci), following the section's overall question of whether touch is one organ or several.

त्वगव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ५३ ॥

tvagavyatirekāt || 53 ||

[It is one organ,] because it is not distinct from the skin [touch-sensation everywhere on the body being one with the single, continuous organ of skin].

न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः ॥ ५४ ॥

na yugapadarthānupalabdheḥ || 54 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because objects are not apprehended simultaneously [at separate points on the body, as a single, truly unified organ should allow].

Note: The direction of this objection against sutra 53's 'one organ' view is inferred from context (a single organ should register simultaneous, spatially separate contacts, but does not); the sutra itself gives only the bare hetu.

विप्रतिषेधाच्च न त्वगेका ॥ ५५ ॥

vipratiṣedhācca na tvagekā || 55 ||

And, because of this contradiction, the skin/touch is not a single [uniform organ].

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

indriyārthapañcatvāt || 56 ||

[Nyaya's settled position:] Because the sense-organs and their objects are five in number [touch is properly one among five distinct senses, not an all-pervading single faculty].

न तदर्थबहुत्वात् ॥ ५७ ॥

na tadarthabahutvāt || 57 ||

[This is confirmed:] it is not [a single, all-purpose faculty], because of the multiplicity of its objects.

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५८ ॥

gandhatvādyavyatirekādgandhādīnāmapratiṣedhaḥ || 58 ||

There is no denying smell and the rest [as distinct sense-qualities], because of the invariable connection of 'smell-ness' and so on with their [respective, fixed] substrata.

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम् ॥ ५९ ॥

viṣayatvāvyatirekādekatvam || 59 ||

Because there is no divergence in [each organ's] having its own [fixed] object, there is oneness [a single dedicated organ for each object-domain].

न बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः ॥ ६० ॥

na buddhilakṣaṇādhiṣṭhānagatyākṛtijātipañcatvebhyaḥ || 60 ||

[Objection:] Not [truly established as five], merely from the fivefold-ness found in such criteria as cognition, defining mark, substratum, function, shape, and genus.

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम् ॥ ६१ ॥

bhūtaguṇaviśeṣopalabdhestādātmyam || 61 ||

[Reply:] There is essential identity [of each sense-organ with its respective element], because a specific quality belonging to [each of] the elements is [respectively] perceived through it.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्याः ॥ ६२ ॥

gandharasarūpasparśaśabdānāṁ sparśaparyantāḥ pṛthivyāḥ || 62 ||

Of [the five qualities] smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound, [the qualities] up to and including touch belong to earth.

अप्तेजोवायूनां पूर्वं पूर्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः ॥ ६३ ॥

aptejovāyūnāṁ pūrvaṁ pūrvamapohyākāśasyottaraḥ || 63 ||

For water, fire, and air, each [progressively] excludes the preceding [element's quality; water lacks smell, fire lacks smell and taste, air lacks smell, taste and colour]; and the last [quality, sound,] belongs to space.

न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः ॥ ६४ ॥

na sarvaguṇānupalabdheḥ || 64 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because not all [the expected] qualities are [always] perceived [in each element, casting doubt on the scheme].

एकैकश्येनोत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावादुत्तरोत्तराणां तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ६५ ॥

ekaikaśyenottarottaraguṇasadbhāvāduttarottarāṇāṁ tadanupalabdhiḥ || 65 ||

[Reply:] That non-perception, regarding the successive [elements], occurs because, taken singly, the successive qualities are [also] present in each [carried forward from the earlier elements, so their separate, exclusive presence is not always isolable — though the scheme itself still holds].

Note: ekaikaśyenottarottaraguṇasadbhāvāduttarottarāṇāṁ tadanupalabdhiḥ is highly compressed; the reading offered (that qualities accumulate across elements, blurring exclusive perception of any single one) follows the immediate context but is an interpretive reconstruction.

विष्टं ह्यपरम्परेण ॥ ६६ ॥

viṣṭaṁ hyaparampareṇa || 66 ||

For indeed [each quality] is [directly] present [in its element], not merely by way of succession [transmitted indirectly from another element].

Note: viṣṭaṁ hyaparampareṇa is a very terse closing remark for the 64-65 exchange; rendered as affirming that each element's quality inheres in it directly rather than via an indirect chain, but the sutra gives no further specification.

न पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥ ६७ ॥

na pārthivāpyayoḥ pratyakṣatvāt || 67 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because both the earthy and the watery [elements] are equally directly perceptible.

पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात्तत्तत्प्रधानम् ॥ ६८ ॥

pūrvapūrvaguṇotkarṣāttattatpradhānam || 68 ||

[Reply:] Each [element] is designated as predominant [with respect to its characteristic quality] because of the preponderance of each [successive, more fundamental] quality.

तद्व्यवस्थानं तु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ ६९ ॥

tadvyavasthānaṁ tu bhūyastvāt || 69 ||

But that classification [of each element by its characteristic quality] is made on the basis of preponderance, not exclusive presence.

सगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात् ॥ ७० ॥

saguṇānāmindriyabhāvāt || 70 ||

[This is confirmed] because [the elements] possessing these respective qualities become the sense-organs [each organ being constituted from the element whose distinctive quality it registers].

तेनैव तस्याग्रहणाच्च ॥ ७१ ॥

tenaiva tasyāgrahaṇācca || 71 ||

And because that [higher element's quality] is not apprehended by that very [lower element's] organ [confirming the strict correspondence of each organ to its own element and quality].

न शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः ॥ ७२ ॥

na śabdaguṇopalabdheḥ || 72 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because sound is [also] perceived as a quality [of other substances too, not solely of space].

तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ७३ ॥

tadupalabdhiritaretaradravyaguṇavaidharmyāt || 73 ||

[Reply:] That [apparent] perception of sound elsewhere is due to the dissimilarity of properties between those various substances and their [own, different] qualities; [sound remains, properly, the exclusive quality of space alone].

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात्संशयः ॥ १ ॥

karmākāśasādharmyātsaṁśayaḥ || 1 ||

There is doubt about karma (action, i.e. motion) on account of its similarity (sādharmya) to ākāśa (space/ether) — namely, whether motion, like space, is not directly perceptible but known only through inference.

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

viṣayapratyabhijñānāt || 2 ||

This doubt is resolved on account of the recognition of the object (viṣaya-pratyabhijñāna) — because we directly recognize a moving thing as the very same thing, its motion is grasped through such recognition, not by inference alone.

साध्यसमत्वादहेतुः ॥ ३ ॥

sādhyasamatvādahetuḥ || 3 ||

[Objection:] This appeal to recognition is not a valid reason (ahetu), because it — recognition, or its validity as proof of persistence — is itself equally in need of proof (sādhya-sama); it begs the very question at issue.

न युगपदग्रहणात् ॥ ४ ॥

na yugapadagrahaṇāt || 4 ||

[Reply:] No — because the successive phases of a moving thing are not apprehended all at once; the absence of a single simultaneous grasp does not itself disprove the object's continuity.

अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने च विनाशप्रसङ्गः ॥ ५ ॥

apratyabhijñāne ca vināśaprasaṅgaḥ || 5 ||

And if such recognition is denied as invalid, the undesired consequence follows that the object would have to be considered destroyed at every succeeding instant, which is absurd.

क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ६ ॥

kramavṛttitvādayugapadgrahaṇam || 6 ||

The non-simultaneous apprehension of a thing's successive states occurs simply because the process, i.e. motion, proceeds in temporal sequence (krama) — not because the underlying object is a series of distinct momentary things.

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानञ्च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात् ॥ ७ ॥

apratyabhijñānañca viṣayāntaravyāsaṅgāt || 7 ||

And apparent non-recognition in some instances is due to the attention being engaged with another object (viṣayāntara-vyāsaṅga), i.e. distraction, not because the object has actually ceased to be.

न गत्यभावात् ॥ ८ ॥

na gatyabhāvāt || 8 ||

No — that account does not hold either, because there is no absence of continuous motion connecting the earlier and later states.

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमानः ॥ ९ ॥

sphaṭikānyatvābhimānavattadanyatvābhimānaḥ || 9 ||

It may be objected that apparent difference is illusory: just as there is a mistaken notion of a crystal being 'a different crystal' — when in fact it is the same one, its appearance merely varying — so too there may arise a mistaken notion of something else being 'different'.

Note: The dialectical attribution of sutras 9-10 (whether 9 gives the Nyaya's own illusion-analogy defending persistence, or merely sets up a premise) cannot be fully fixed without the Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya; rendered here on the standard reading, with sutra 10 as the Buddhist/momentarist (kṣaṇikavādin) rejoinder that turns the crystal example against it.

स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद्व्यक्तीनामहेतुः ॥ १० ॥

sphaṭike'pyaparāparotpatteḥ kṣaṇikatvādvyaktīnāmahetuḥ || 10 ||

[Reply — the momentarist (kṣaṇikavādin) view:] Even in the case of the crystal, ever-new individual instances arise one after another (apara-apara-utpatti); because these particulars are momentary — subject to momentariness, kṣaṇikatva — the crystal-illusion analogy is not a valid reason for proving persistence.

Note: See note at sutra 9 — sutra 10 states the momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) position that turns the crystal example against persistence; the reply proper follows at sutra 11.

नियमहेत्वभावाद्यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ११ ॥

niyamahetvabhāvādyathādarśanamabhyanujñā || 11 ||

In the absence of any compelling reason necessitating such a revision, one should accept things simply as they are perceived (yathā-darśana) — ordinary recognition need not be overridden by an unproven theory of hidden momentary particulars.

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ १२ ॥

notpattivināśakāraṇopalabdheḥ || 12 ||

No — because the causes of a thing's origination and destruction are in fact perceived and apprehended, whether directly or through observation of an inferential sign.

क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिवच्च तदुपपत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

kṣīravināśe kāraṇānupalabdhivaddadhyutpattivacca tadupapattiḥ || 13 ||

As with the seeming non-perception of a separate cause in the destruction of milk, so also with the arising of curd — its explanation follows accordingly, the same single process of transformation accounting for both; no distinct, unseen 'destruction-cause' need be posited.

लिङ्गतो ग्रहणान्नानुपलब्धिः ॥ १४ ॥

liṅgato grahaṇānnānupalabdhiḥ || 14 ||

Since the cause is apprehended through an inferential sign (liṅga), there is no real non-perception of it, even where it is not directly seen.

न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् ॥ १५ ॥

na payasaḥ pariṇāmaguṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt || 15 ||

No — milk is not annihilated; what occurs is merely the manifestation of a different quality through transformation (pariṇāma), the continuity of the underlying substance persisting even as its qualities change.

व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेरनुमानम् ॥ १६ ॥

vyūhāntarāddravyāntarotpattidarśanaṁ pūrvadravyanivṛtteranumānam || 16 ||

The observed arising of a different substance from a different configuration of its parts is itself the inferential ground for the cessation of the prior substance — the emergence of the new is what constitutes, and evidences, the old one's passing.

क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः क्वचिच्चोपलब्धेरनेकान्तः ॥ १७ ॥

kvacidvināśakāraṇānupalabdheḥ kvaciccopalabdheranekāntaḥ || 17 ||

Since in some cases the cause of destruction is not perceived, while in other cases it is perceived, there is no single fixed universal rule (anekānta) either way.

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात् ॥ १८ ॥

nendriyārthayostadvināśe'pi jñānāvasthānāt || 18 ||

This does not apply to the sense-organ and its object in the same way — because even when their contact ceases, the cognition already produced from it continues to remain (avasthāna) for a time.

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः ॥ १९ ॥

yugapajjñeyānupalabdheśca na manasaḥ || 19 ||

And since cognizable objects are not apprehended all at once, this non-simultaneity does not by itself prove momentariness pertaining to manas (the internal mind-organ) alone.

तदात्मगुणत्वेऽपि तुल्यम् ॥ २० ॥

tadātmaguṇatve'pi tulyam || 20 ||

Even if it (cognition) is held to be a quality of the self (ātman), the same situation applies equally (tulyam) — the difficulty is not thereby resolved.

इन्द्रियैर्मनसः संनिकर्षाभावात्तदनुत्पत्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

indriyairmanasaḥ saṁnikarṣābhāvāttadanutpattiḥ || 21 ||

Because of the absence of manas's contact (saṁnikarṣa) with the sense-organs at all times — it can conjoin with only one at once — there is non-simultaneous arising of cognition.

नोत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात् ॥ २२ ॥

notpattikāraṇānapadeśāt || 22 ||

No — because no cause for its origination can be pointed out; the claim that it is produced cannot be substantiated by citing any specific cause.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ २३ ॥

vināśakāraṇānupalabdheścāvasthāne tannityatvaprasaṅgaḥ || 23 ||

And since no cause of destruction is perceived, if the thing were held to persist unchanged forever, the undesired consequence would follow that it must be eternal (nitya).

अनित्यत्वग्रहाद्बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत् ॥ २४ ॥

anityatvagrahādbuddherbuddhyantarādvināśaḥ śabdavat || 24 ||

Since the impermanence of a cognition (buddhi) is directly apprehended, its cessation occurs through being displaced by a subsequent cognition (buddhy-antara) — just as is the case with sound (śabda), each instance giving way to the next.

ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसंनिकर्षान्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिः ॥ २५ ॥

jñānasamavetātmapradeśasaṁnikarṣānmanasaḥ smṛtyutpatterna yugapadutpattiḥ || 25 ||

Because memory (smṛti) arises from the contact of manas with that locus of the self (ātma-pradeśa) wherein the earlier cognition inheres, and since manas contacts only one such locus at a time, there is no simultaneous arising of several memories.

नान्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः ॥ २६ ॥

nāntaḥśarīravṛttitvānmanasaḥ || 26 ||

No — this restriction is not simply because manas operates within the body (antaḥśarīra-vṛttitva) alone.

साध्यत्वादहेतुः ॥ २७ ॥

sādhyatvādahetuḥ || 27 ||

That claim itself, being equally in need of proof (sādhya-sama), is not a valid reason.

स्मरतः शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ २८ ॥

smarataḥ śarīradhāraṇopapatterapratiṣedhaḥ || 28 ||

There is no objection to this, since it is well established that one who remembers thereby sustains and maintains the body (śarīra-dhāraṇa), memory serving the body's continued preservation.

न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः ॥ २९ ॥

na tadāśugatitvānmanasaḥ || 29 ||

No — the objection that manas cannot cause memory because it moves too swiftly (āśu-gatitva) does not hold.

न स्मरणकालानियमात् ॥ ३० ॥

na smaraṇakālāniyamāt || 30 ||

No — the objection on the ground of irregularity in the timing of memory (smaraṇa-kāla-aniyama) likewise does not hold.

आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः ॥ ३१ ॥

ātmapreraṇayadṛcchājñatābhiśca na saṁyogaviśeṣaḥ || 31 ||

And self-impulsion of the self, mere chance (yadṛcchā), or ignorance (ajñatā) do not constitute the specific determining conjunction that explains why memory arises when it does.

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण समानम् ॥ ३२ ॥

vyāsaktamanasaḥ pādavyathanena saṁyogaviśeṣeṇa samānam || 32 ||

Rather, this is comparable to the case of a person whose mind is absorbed elsewhere (vyāsakta-manas) not noticing an injury to the foot — there too a particular accompanying circumstance, namely the mind's engagement elsewhere, accounts for it.

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावादयुगपत्स्मरणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

praṇidhānaliṅgādijñānānāmayugapadbhāvādayugapatsmaraṇam || 33 ||

Because memory-triggering cognitions such as attention (praṇidhāna), inferential signs (liṅga), and the like do not occur simultaneously, memory likewise does not occur simultaneously but arises one at a time, as its occasions arise.

ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः ॥ ३४ ॥

jñasyecchādveṣanimittatvādārambhanivṛttyoḥ || 34 ||

Because, for the cognizing self (jña), desire (icchā) and aversion (dveṣa) are the proximate causes of initiating action (ārambha) and of ceasing from it (nivṛtti).

तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३५ ॥

talliṅgatvādicchādveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣvapratiṣedhaḥ || 35 ||

Since initiation and cessation of action are the inferential sign (liṅga) of desire and aversion, there is no objection to inferring their presence even in physical bodies composed of earth and the like (pārthivādi).

Note: 'pārthivādi' (things made of earth) most plausibly refers here to physical, embodied beings rather than literal inert matter, but the precise referent is not fully recoverable without the bhāṣya; translated conservatively with a bracketed gloss.

परश्वादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ ३६ ॥

paraśvādiṣvārambhanivṛttidarśanāt || 36 ||

[Objection:] Because the initiation and cessation of action are observed even in the case of an axe and the like — inanimate instruments which plainly have no desire.

नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ ॥ ३७ ॥

niyamāniyamau tu tadviśeṣakau || 37 ||

[Reply:] Rather, it is regularity and irregularity (niyama-aniyama) that distinguish the two cases — an agent's law-like, desire-driven action, versus an instrument's action, which occurs only when wielded by another.

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात्पारतन्त्र्यादकृताभ्यागमाच्च न मनसः ॥ ३८ ॥

yathoktahetutvātpāratantryādakṛtābhyāgamācca na manasaḥ || 38 ||

Because action has the aforesaid cause (icchā-dveṣa), because an instrument like the axe is dependent on another (pāratantrya), and because otherwise the fault of akṛtābhyāgama would follow — an effect arising for one without being produced by a corresponding cause of one's own — the initiation and cessation of action are not attributable to manas alone, apart from an agent's desire and aversion.

परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३९ ॥

pariśeṣādyathoktahetūpapatteśca || 39 ||

And by process of elimination (pariśeṣa), the aforesaid cause — desire and aversion — alone is thereby established.

स्मरणं त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् ॥ ४० ॥

smaraṇaṁ tvātmano jñasvābhāvyāt || 40 ||

Memory (smaraṇa), however, arises from the self's inherent nature as a knower (jña-svābhāvya) — it is intrinsic to a conscious, cognizing self to remember, given the appropriate occasioning causes.

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः ॥ ४१ ॥

praṇidhānanibandhābhyāsaliṅgalakṣaṇasādṛśyaparigrahāśrayāśritasambandhānantaryaviyogaikakāryavirodhātiśayaprāptivyavadhānasukhaduḥkhecchādveṣabhayārthitvakriyārāgadharmādharmanimittebhyaḥ || 41 ||

Memory arises from the following causes (nimitta): (1) concentrated attention (praṇidhāna), (2) fixed association or binding (nibandha), (3) repeated practice (abhyāsa), (4) an inferential sign (liṅga), (5) a defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa), (6) similarity or resemblance (sādṛśya), (7) possession (parigraha), (8) the relation of substratum and what is supported (āśraya-āśrita), (9) relation or connection of another kind (sambandha), (10) immediate succession (ānantarya), (11) separation or disjunction (viyoga), (12) sharing a common function or effect (eka-kārya), (13) opposition or conflict (virodha), (14) distinction or excess (atiśaya), (15) attainment or acquisition (prāpti), (16) intervention or obstruction (vyavadhāna), (17) pleasure and pain (sukha-duḥkha), (18) desire and aversion (icchā-dveṣa), (19) fear (bhaya), (20) want or need (arthitva), (21) action (kriyā), (22) attachment or passion (rāga), and (23) merit and demerit (dharma-adharma).

Note: This is a single, very long enumerative sūtra (one large compound) giving the classical Nyaya list of ~23 causes (nimitta) of smṛti (memory) — the locus later treatises draw on for their theory of memory. Rendered here as a numbered list in both languages rather than compressed, per the translation brief.

कर्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात् ॥ ४२ ॥

karmānavasthāyigrahaṇāt || 42 ||

Because motion (karma) is apprehended as not remaining or enduring (anavasthāyin) — grasped only fleetingly, phase by phase.

अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वाद्विद्युत्सम्पाते रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवत् ॥ ४३ ॥

avyaktagrahaṇamanavasthāyitvādvidyutsampāte rūpāvyaktagrahaṇavat || 43 ||

The apprehension of such a fleeting thing is indistinct (avyakta), owing to its transience — like the indistinct apprehension of visual form during a flash of lightning.

हेतूपादानात्प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ४४ ॥

hetūpādānātpratiṣeddhavyābhyanujñā || 44 ||

But by adducing this very reason, one thereby ends up conceding what one had set out to deny — citing rapid succession to explain the lightning-flash actually presupposes an underlying continuity.

प्रदीपार्चिःसंतत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ४५ ॥

pradīpārciḥsaṁtatyabhivyaktagrahaṇavattadgrahaṇam || 45 ||

Its apprehension is in fact like the apprehension, clearly manifest, of a continuous series in a lamp's flame (pradīpa-arciḥ-saṁtati) — what appears as one continuous flame is a rapid succession of momentary flame-instances, yet is validly perceived as a single continuum.

द्रव्ये स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः ॥ ४६ ॥

dravye svaguṇaparaguṇopalabdheḥ saṁśayaḥ || 46 ||

Regarding a substance (dravya), because both its own qualities (sva-guṇa) and qualities belonging to another (para-guṇa) appear to be perceived in connection with it, doubt arises.

यावच्छरीरभावित्वाद्रूपादीनाम् ॥ ४७ ॥

yāvaccharīrabhāvitvādrūpādīnām || 47 ||

Because form (rūpa) and the other qualities — taste, smell, touch — persist as long as the body itself does (yāvac-charīra-bhāvitva).

न पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ४८ ॥

na pākajaguṇāntarotpatteḥ || 48 ||

No — they are not simply constant, inherent qualities of the body, because different new qualities do arise through heat-transformation (pāka).

प्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धेः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४९ ॥

pratidvandvisiddheḥ pākajānāmapratiṣedhaḥ || 49 ||

Since each new heat-produced quality is established by superseding its counterpart, there is no objection to the reality of such heat-produced (pākaja) qualities.

शरीरव्यापित्वात् ॥ ५० ॥

śarīravyāpitvāt || 50 ||

Because it pervades the entire body (śarīra-vyāpitva).

न केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः ॥ ५१ ॥

na keśanakhādiṣvanupalabdheḥ || 51 ||

No — it does not pervade uniformly, because it is not perceived or found in hair, nails, and the like.

त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य केशनखादिष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

tvakparyantatvāccharīrasya keśanakhādiṣvaprasaṅgaḥ || 52 ||

Since the living, sentient body extends only as far as the skin (tvak-paryanta), there is no real difficulty regarding hair, nails, and the like being outside its scope.

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ५३ ॥

śarīraguṇavaidharmyāt || 53 ||

Because of its dissimilarity in kind from bodily qualities (śarīra-guṇa-vaidharmya).

न रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ५४ ॥

na rūpādīnāmitaretaravaidharmyāt || 54 ||

No — dissimilarity alone does not prove that, because form and the rest — color, taste, smell, touch — are also mutually dissimilar from one another, yet are all still classed together.

ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद्रूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५५ ॥

aindriyakatvādrūpādīnāmapratiṣedhaḥ || 55 ||

Since form and the rest are sensory in nature (aindriyaka), there is no objection to classing them, consistently, as such.

ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः ॥ ५६ ॥

jñānāyaugapadyādekaṁ manaḥ || 56 ||

Because of the non-simultaneity of cognitions (jñāna-ayaugapadya), manas is one — there is only a single manas per self.

न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः ॥ ५७ ॥

na yugapadanekakriyopalabdheḥ || 57 ||

[Objection:] No, manas cannot be proven single by this, because many actions are in fact observed to occur simultaneously.

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसंचारात् ॥ ५८ ॥

alātacakradarśanavattadupalabdhirāśusaṁcārāt || 58 ||

[Reply:] That perception of apparent simultaneity is like the perception of a whirled firebrand's circle (alāta-cakra) — an illusion of a continuous ring arising from rapid movement (āśu-saṁcāra); the underlying activity remains strictly sequential, merely too swift to be perceived as such.

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणु ॥ ५९ ॥

yathoktahetutvāccāṇu || 59 ||

And, on account of the aforesaid reason — the non-simultaneity of cognition — manas is atomic (aṇu), minute and partless, in dimension.

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ६० ॥

pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāttadutpattiḥ || 60 ||

Its (manas's) origination in a new birth occurs through its connection with the fruit of actions previously performed (pūrva-kṛta-phala) — that is, prior karma.

भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्युपादानवत्तदुपादानम् ॥ ६१ ॥

bhūtebhyo mūrtyupādānavattadupādānam || 61 ||

[View to be examined:] Its material derivation (upādāna) is from the five elements (bhūta), just as the bodily form is derived from them.

न साध्यसमत्वात् ॥ ६२ ॥

na sādhyasamatvāt || 62 ||

No — because that claim is equally in need of proof (sādhya-sama); it begs the question.

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः ॥ ६३ ॥

notpattinimittatvānmātāpitroḥ || 63 ||

No — manas is not produced from the parents, because the parents are merely the occasioning cause of the body's origination, not necessarily of manas.

तथाहारस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

tathāhārasya || 64 ||

Likewise, manas is not caused by food (āhāra) either.

प्राप्तौ चानियमात् ॥ ६५ ॥

prāptau cāniyamāt || 65 ||

And these theories fail because, given the presence (prāpti) of parents or of food, there would be no fixed regularity necessarily connecting them to manas's production.

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत्संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म ॥ ६६ ॥

śarīrotpattinimittavatsaṁyogotpattinimittaṁ karma || 66 ||

Just as there is an occasioning cause for the origination of the body, so karma (accumulated past action) is the occasioning cause for the origination of the self-manas conjunction (saṁyoga).

एतेनानियमः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ६७ ॥

etenāniyamaḥ pratyuktaḥ || 67 ||

By this, the charge of irregularity raised earlier is refuted.

तददृष्टकारितमिति चेत्पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे ॥ ६८ ॥

tadadṛṣṭakāritamiti cetpunastatprasaṅgo'pavarge || 68 ||

If it be said that this conjunction is brought about by adṛṣṭa — the unseen force of accumulated karma — then again, that same undesired consequence would apply even at liberation (apavarga): one would have to ask why the conjunction ever ceases, if adṛṣṭa alone is sufficient to produce it.

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगानुच्छेदः ॥ ६९ ॥

manaḥkarmanimittatvācca saṁyogānucchedaḥ || 69 ||

And because the activity of manas has the aforesaid causes — it is driven by karma/adṛṣṭa as long as these persist — there is no cessation of the self-manas conjunction so long as those causes remain.

नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्च प्रायणानुपपत्तेः ॥ ७० ॥

nityatvaprasaṅgaśca prāyaṇānupapatteḥ || 70 ||

And if the conjunction never ceased at all, the undesired consequence of its eternality would follow — since departure, i.e. death (prāyaṇa), would then become impossible and inexplicable.

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववदेतत्स्यात् ॥ ७१ ॥

aṇuśyāmatānityatvavadetatsyāt || 71 ||

This would be like the case of the non-eternality of an atom's dark colour (aṇu-śyāmatā) — a quality that, though not causeless or arbitrary, is still not absolutely permanent, since it can cease and change under the proper cause, such as heat-transformation.

नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ७२ ॥

nākṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgāt || 72 ||

No — there is no real difficulty, since a proper cause for its cessation can indeed be given; otherwise, the fault of akṛtābhyāgama — an effect arising without a corresponding cause of its own — would follow, and hence a fuller account, taken up next, is required.

प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता ॥ १ ॥

pravṛttiryathoktā || 1 ||

Activity (pravṛtti) is as already described [in sutra 1.1.17].

तथा दोषाः ॥ २ ॥

tathā doṣāḥ || 2 ||

So too are the faults (doṣas), as already described [in sutra 1.1.18].

तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

tattrairāśyaṁ rāgadveṣamohārthāntarabhāvāt || 3 ||

That [fault] is threefold — attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and delusion (moha) — because each is a distinct entity from the others.

नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

naikapratyanīkabhāvāt || 4 ||

[Objection:] Not so — since all three share a single antagonist [namely true knowledge, which removes them all alike, so they are not truly distinct].

व्यभिचारादहेतुः ॥ ५ ॥

vyabhicārādahetuḥ || 5 ||

[Reply:] That reason does not hold, because it strays [applies inconsistently: distinct things such as different colours are likewise all removed by a single agent, e.g. fire, yet remain distinct from one another].

तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

teṣāṁ mohaḥ pāpīyānnāmūḍhasyetarotpatteḥ || 6 ||

Of these [three], delusion is the worst, since the other two do not arise in one who is free of delusion.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो दोषेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

nimittanaimittikabhāvādarthāntarabhāvo doṣebhyaḥ || 7 ||

[Objection:] Since [delusion] stands in a cause-effect relation to the other two faults, it must be a thing distinct from the faults [and so should not itself be classed as one].

न दोषलक्षणावरोधान्मोहस्य ॥ ८ ॥

na doṣalakṣaṇāvarodhānmohasya || 8 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because delusion falls squarely within the definition of a fault already given.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९ ॥

nimittanaimittikopapatteśca tulyajātīyānāmapratiṣedhaḥ || 9 ||

And there is no bar to a cause-effect relation holding between things of the same kind — so delusion may be both a fault in itself and the cause of the other faults.

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

ātmanityatve pretyabhāvasiddhiḥ || 10 ||

Only if the self is eternal is the reality of life after death (pretyabhāva) established.

व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

vyaktādvyaktānāṁ pratyakṣaprāmāṇyāt || 11 ||

[Objection:] Because perception is authoritative regarding one particular, manifest thing arising from another manifest thing [e.g. a jar from clay] — so the body too may simply arise from the material elements, without need of a transmigrating self.

न घटाद्घटानिष्पत्तेः ॥ १२ ॥

na ghaṭādghaṭāniṣpatteḥ || 12 ||

[Counter-objection:] But that cannot be a universal rule — a jar, after all, is not produced from another jar.

व्यक्ताद्घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ १३ ॥

vyaktādghaṭaniṣpatterapratiṣedhaḥ || 13 ||

[Reply:] There is no such bar — a jar is indeed produced from a different manifest thing, namely its own two halves.

अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् ॥ १४ ॥

abhāvādbhāvotpattirnānupamṛdya prādurbhāvāt || 14 ||

[Objection:] Being arises from non-being, since nothing is manifested without the prior destruction [of its material cause — a seed must perish before a sprout appears].

व्याघातादप्रयोगः ॥ १५ ॥

vyāghātādaprayogaḥ || 15 ||

[Reply:] Not so — such a statement is self-contradictory and so cannot be maintained [whatever destroys the cause and takes its place either already existed, in which case it did not newly 'come to be', or did not exist, in which case it cannot be called a 'destroyer'].

नातीतानागतयोः कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् ॥ १६ ॥

nātītānāgatayoḥ kārakaśabdaprayogāt || 16 ||

[Objection:] There is no such inconsistency, since action-words are used figuratively for what is past or future [not presently existing] — as when one says 'he takes pride in the son yet to be born.'

न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः ॥ १७ ॥

na vinaṣṭebhyo'niṣpatteḥ || 17 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because nothing is ever produced from what has already been destroyed.

क्रमनिर्देशादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १८ ॥

kramanirdeśādapratiṣedhaḥ || 18 ||

There is no real objection when 'destruction' merely indicates a sequence of stages [e.g. the seed's old form ending as the sprout's new form arises] — this is not the same as saying being arises from bare non-being.

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् ॥ १९ ॥

īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt || 19 ||

[Thesis:] The Lord (Īśvara) is the cause [of the fruits of action], since human action is sometimes observed to be without fruit despite diligent effort.

Note: Sutras 4.1.19-21 form Nyaya's classical technical debate on whether Ishvara is a necessary cause of karmic fruit alongside human action — a question in causation/logic theory (the earliest locus for this argument, later greatly expanded by Udayana). It is philosophical argumentation about divine agency as a possible cause, not a devotional or liturgical statement; translated neutrally here.

न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ॥ २० ॥

na puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ || 20 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because no fruit whatsoever is produced in the absence of human action; were Īśvara the sole cause, fruit should arise even without action, which is not observed.

Note: Continues the technical causation argument begun in 4.1.19 — objecting that positing Ishvara as sole cause is unnecessary, since fruit is invariably tied to human action. A logical objection, not a devotional statement.

तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः ॥ २१ ॥

tatkāritatvādahetuḥ || 21 ||

[Reply:] That objection does not hold — because human action itself is impelled by Him [Īśvara]; action is merely the instrument through which He dispenses the fruit, so action's necessity does not disprove Īśvara's causal role.

Note: The Naiyayika's considered reply closing this three-sutra unit (19-21): human action operates as Ishvara's instrument for dispensing karmic fruit. This is the earliest classical locus for a theistic causal argument in the Nyaya system, cited widely in later Nyaya theology (e.g. Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali). It is a technical logical argument about causation, not devotional praise — translated neutrally.

अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् ॥ २२ ॥

animittato bhāvotpattiḥ kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādidarśanāt || 22 ||

[Objection:] Existent things arise from no cause at all — as we see, for instance, in the natural sharpness of thorns, which arises without any maker.

अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वान्नानिमित्ततः ॥ २३ ॥

animittanimittatvānnānimittataḥ || 23 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because to say something is 'produced from no-cause' is self-defeating, since the very expression treats 'absence of cause' itself as a cause.

निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २४ ॥

nimittānimittayorarthāntarabhāvādapratiṣedhaḥ || 24 ||

There is no real contradiction here [in distinguishing caused and uncaused], since 'cause' and 'absence of cause' are simply two distinct things.

सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

sarvamanityamutpattivināśadharmakatvāt || 25 ||

[Thesis:] Everything is impermanent, because everything has the character of arising and perishing.

नानित्यतानित्यत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

nānityatānityatvāt || 26 ||

[Reply:] Not so — for if impermanence truly pervaded everything, impermanence itself would have to be an eternal property, which contradicts the very thesis that nothing is eternal.

तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् ॥ २७ ॥

tadanityatvamagnerdāhyaṁ vināśyānuvināśavat || 27 ||

[Objection:] That impermanence is itself non-eternal — like a fire that dies out once its fuel is spent, impermanence ceases once all impermanent things have perished.

नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २८ ॥

nityasyāpratyākhyānaṁ yathopalabdhivyavasthānāt || 28 ||

[Reply:] This does not rule out eternal things — for the eternal and the non-eternal are each determined precisely according to what is, or is not, perceived to arise and perish [e.g. ether, time, space, and the self, never observed arising or perishing, are eternal].

सर्वं नित्यम्पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

sarvaṁ nityampañcabhūtanityatvāt || 29 ||

[Thesis:] Everything is eternal, because the five elemental substances that compose everything are eternal.

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

notpattivināśakāraṇopalabdheḥ || 30 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because we directly perceive the causes of things' arising and perishing.

तल्लक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३१ ॥

tallakṣaṇāvarodhādapratiṣedhaḥ || 31 ||

[Objection:] This is no refutation — since whatever is produced or destroyed still shares the eternal character of the element it is made of.

नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३२ ॥

notpattitatkāraṇopalabdheḥ || 32 ||

[Reply:] Not so — that is no valid opposition, since we perceive both the arising of the effect and its cause distinctly; an effect may issue from an eternal cause without itself being eternal, just as sound, though produced from eternal ether, is non-eternal.

न व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३३ ॥

na vyavasthānupapatteḥ || 33 ||

Nor can everything be eternal — for then expressions like 'it was produced' or 'it will be destroyed' could never be coherently applied at all.

सर्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् ॥ ३४ ॥

sarvaṁ pṛthagbhāvalakṣaṇapṛthaktvāt || 34 ||

[Thesis:] Everything is merely a plurality of discrete parts — since any existing thing consists of a set of separate distinguishing marks, with no single unifying substance beneath them.

नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ३५ ॥

nānekalakṣaṇairekabhāvaniṣpatteḥ || 35 ||

[Reply:] Not so — a single entity is indeed constituted by its many distinguishing marks taken together [e.g. a jar's many qualities and parts all belong to one underlying substance, the jar].

लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३६ ॥

lakṣaṇavyavasthānādevāpratiṣedhaḥ || 36 ||

And there is no valid objection here — precisely because a thing's marks are consistently found located in one and the same substance [without which we could never say 'this is the same jar I touched yesterday'].

सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः ॥ ३७ ॥

sarvamabhāvo bhāveṣvitaretarābhāvasiddheḥ || 37 ||

[Thesis:] Everything is, in a sense, non-existent — because among existing things, each is established only as the reciprocal non-existence of every other [a horse 'is not' a cow, and vice versa].

न स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम् ॥ ३८ ॥

na svabhāvasiddherbhāvānām || 38 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because things are positively established in their own intrinsic nature; a cow is a cow in itself, even though it 'is not' a horse.

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

na svabhāvasiddhirāpekṣikatvāt || 39 ||

[Objection:] Nor is there truly establishment by intrinsic nature, since all such determinations are relative — 'long' and 'short', for instance, are defined only with reference to each other.

व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम् ॥ ४० ॥

vyāhatatvādayuktam || 40 ||

[Reply:] This is untenable, because it is self-refuting — if 'long' and 'short' are established only in dependence on each other, then, neither being independently established first, their very relation could never be established at all.

संख्यैकान्तासिद्धिः कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४१ ॥

saṁkhyaikāntāsiddhiḥ kāraṇānupapattyupapattibhyām || 41 ||

The claim that a fixed number [of ultimate categories] holds absolutely cannot be established — whether the reason given for it proves tenable or untenable, either way the fixity fails.

न कारणावयवभावात् ॥ ४२ ॥

na kāraṇāvayavabhāvāt || 42 ||

[Objection:] Not so — because the reason offered is itself simply a part of that fixed number, and being a part poses no contradiction.

निरवयवत्वादहेतुः ॥ ४३ ॥

niravayavatvādahetuḥ || 43 ||

[Reply:] That is not a valid ground — since, until the number is itself fixed, no determinate part is available for it [the reason cannot be called a 'part' of a number not yet established].

सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः ॥ ४४ ॥

sadyaḥ kālāntare ca phalaniṣpatteḥ saṁśayaḥ || 44 ||

There is doubt about the timing of a ritual act's fruit, since fruit is observed to arise both immediately and after an interval of time.

न सद्यः कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात् ॥ ४५ ॥

na sadyaḥ kālāntaropabhogyatvāt || 45 ||

[Reply:] Not immediately — since that fruit [heaven, from maintaining the sacred fire] is meant to be enjoyed only after an interval, namely after death.

कालान्तरेणानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात् ॥ ४६ ॥

kālāntareṇāniṣpattirhetuvināśāt || 46 ||

[Objection:] Nor can it arise after an interval — because by then the cause, the act itself, has already perished.

प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवत्तत्स्यात् ॥ ४७ ॥

prāṅniṣpattervṛkṣaphalavattatsyāt || 47 ||

[Reply:] Prior to its visible fruition, the result exists in potential form, comparable to the fruit of a tree — just as roots being watered now will in time yield fruit, so an act performed now yields its result, through the unseen residual force (adṛṣṭa), in due time.

नासन्न सन्न सदसत्सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात् ॥ ४८ ॥

nāsanna sanna sadasatsadasatorvaidharmyāt || 48 ||

[Objection — the Mādhyamika Buddhist position:] Before its production the effect is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both — since existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive properties.

Note: States the Mādhyamika Buddhist tetralemma-style position on the ontological status of an effect prior to production (the Bhasya cites Nagarjuna and Aryadeva here); flagged since it directly restates a rival school's technical doctrine as part of the broader sat-kārya-vāda vs. asat-kārya-vāda debate spanning sutras 44-54.

उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात् ॥ ४९ ॥

utpādavyayadarśanāt || 49 ||

[Reply:] Not so — the effect was simply non-existent prior to its production, since we directly observe things arising and perishing.

बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत् ॥ ५० ॥

buddhisiddhaṁ tu tadasat || 50 ||

And that [the effect's prior non-existence] is further confirmed by purposive cognition itself — a weaver sets to weaving cloth precisely because he apprehends it as not-yet-existent, though producible from thread.

आश्रयव्यतिरेकाद्वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवदित्यहेतुः ॥ ५१ ॥

āśrayavyatirekādvṛkṣaphalotpattivadityahetuḥ || 51 ||

[Objection:] The analogy to the fruit of a tree does not hold — because, unlike the tree, which remains one continuous substrate, the substrate here is discontinuous: the body that performed the ritual act is not the same body said to enjoy the fruit in heaven.

प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५२ ॥

prīterātmāśrayatvādapratiṣedhaḥ || 52 ||

[Reply:] This objection fails — because the substrate of that fruit, satisfaction, is the self, not the body; and the self that performed the act is identical with the self that later enjoys the fruit.

न पुत्रपशुस्त्रीपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्देशात् ॥ ५३ ॥

na putrapaśustrīparicchadahiraṇyānnādiphalanirdeśāt || 53 ||

[Objection:] But the self alone cannot be the whole story, since scripture specifies such fruits as a son, cattle, a wife, retinue, gold, food, and the like — which plainly cannot reside in the self the way pleasure can.

तत्सम्बन्धात्फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः ॥ ५४ ॥

tatsambandhātphalaniṣpattesteṣu phalavadupacāraḥ || 54 ||

[Reply:] Because true fruit — happiness — is produced through one's connection with a son, cattle, and the rest, the term 'fruit' is figuratively applied to those things themselves, though happiness in the self remains the fruit in the strict sense.

विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः ॥ ५५ ॥

vividhabādhanāyogādduḥkhameva janmotpattiḥ || 55 ||

[Thesis:] Because it is bound up with manifold afflictions, birth — embodied existence — is nothing but suffering.

न सुखस्याप्यान्तरालनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ५६ ॥

na sukhasyāpyāntarālaniṣpatteḥ || 56 ||

[Objection:] Not so — pleasure too clearly occurs, arising in the intervals between pains.

बाधनानिर्वृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

bādhanānirvṛttervedayataḥ paryeṣaṇadoṣādapratiṣedhaḥ || 57 ||

[Reply:] That objection does not succeed — because even in one experiencing pleasure, affliction does not cease, owing to the fault of continued craving for further satisfaction even amid enjoyment.

दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च ॥ ५८ ॥

duḥkhavikalpe sukhābhimānācca || 58 ||

And also because what is taken as pleasure with such conceit is, in truth, only a variety of suffering itself.

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः ॥ ५९ ॥

ṛṇakleśapravṛttyanubandhādapavargābhāvaḥ || 59 ||

[Objection:] Since one is continually bound up with one's debts, afflictions, and activity, there can be no attainment of liberation at all.

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ॥ ६० ॥

pradhānaśabdānupapatterguṇaśabdenānuvādo nindāpraśaṁsopapatteḥ || 60 ||

[Reply:] Since the statement that one incurs three debts at birth cannot hold in its primary sense, it is to be understood in a restated, secondary sense — for such figurative usage is well established for purposes of scriptural censure or praise, here praising the householder's stage rather than describing literal lifelong bondage.

समारोपणादात्मन्यप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६१ ॥

samāropaṇādātmanyapratiṣedhaḥ || 61 ||

There is no objection to this reply — since the ascetic ritually deposits the sacrificial fires within the self before renouncing [per the Vedic formula], and such figurative attribution belongs properly within its own context.

Note: The compound samāropaṇād ātmani apratiṣedhaḥ is terse and admits more than one reading. Rendered here per the likely Bhasya sense: the Vedic renunciation formula in which the ascetic ritually 'deposits' his sacrificial fires within himself (ātmany agnīn samāropya sannyasyet) before renouncing, thereby figuratively discharging the three debts of 4.1.59. An alternative, more generic reading ('a figurative statement must suit its proper context') is also attested in some translations; flagged as an interpretive choice.

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः ॥ ६२ ॥

pātracayāntānupapatteśca phalābhāvaḥ || 62 ||

[Objection:] But it is not feasible to carry the accumulation of sacrificial materials through to completion once one has renounced — so, by that reasoning, this substitute, symbolic sacrifice would yield no fruit.

Note: pātracaya ('accumulation of vessels/ritual materials') is a rare, difficult compound; this rendering is best-effort. The sutra appears to raise a further doubt about whether the renunciate's symbolic self-sacrifice (4.1.61) can truly substitute for an ongoing physical sacrifice — a doubt sutra 63's reply then resolves by redefining liberation itself as simply the cessation of affliction, not the accumulation of ritual fruit.

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः ॥ ६३ ॥

suṣuptasya svapnādarśane kleśābhāvavadapavargaḥ || 63 ||

[Reply:] Liberation (apavarga) is like the state of one in sound, dreamless sleep — simply the absence of affliction.

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसंधानाय हीनक्लेशस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

na pravṛttiḥ pratisaṁdhānāya hīnakleśasya || 64 ||

For one whose afflictions are gone, activity no longer serves to bring about further rebirth — it does not lead to renewed connection with a body.

न क्लेशसंततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥

na kleśasaṁtateḥ svābhāvikatvāt || 65 ||

[Objection:] Not so — there is no end to the afflictions, since their continuum is innate and beginningless.

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वम् ॥ ६६ ॥

prāgutpatterabhāvānityatvavatsvābhāvike'pyanityatvam || 66 ||

[Reply:] Just as the prior non-existence of a thing before its production is beginningless yet non-eternal — it ends once the thing is produced — so too even what is innate and beginningless can be non-eternal, having an end without having had a beginning.

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववद्वा ॥ ६७ ॥

aṇuśyāmatānityatvavadvā || 67 ||

Or it may be understood to be non-eternal like the natural blackness of an atom, which, though innate, can still be changed, as when it is turned red by firing.

न संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाच्च रागादीनाम् ॥ ६८ ॥

na saṁkalpanimittatvācca rāgādīnām || 68 ||

[Reply:] Not so — because attachment and the rest of the faults arise from mistaken conceptualization (saṅkalpa) about their objects, not from some inherent will or unchangeable nature; being caused by error, they can be removed by right knowledge.

दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ॥ १ ॥

doṣanimittānāṁ tattvajñānādahaṅkāranivṛttiḥ || 1 ||

From true knowledge of the causes of the faults, there follows the cessation of the notion of 'I' (ego-sense).

दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः संकल्पकृताः ॥ २ ॥

doṣanimittaṁ rūpādayo viṣayāḥ saṁkalpakṛtāḥ || 2 ||

The cause of the faults is objects such as form and so on—but only as they are fashioned by [false] mental construction (saṅkalpa).

तन्निमित्तं त्ववयव्यभिमानः ॥ ३ ॥

tannimittaṁ tvavayavyabhimānaḥ || 3 ||

But the cause of that [construction of objects] is the false notion of a composite whole (avayavin) as a real entity distinct from its parts.

विद्याविद्याद्वैविध्यात्संशयः ॥ ४ ॥

vidyāvidyādvaividhyātsaṁśayaḥ || 4 ||

Because of the two-fold possibility arising from [right] knowledge and ignorance, there is doubt [as to whether the whole is real].

तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

tadasaṁśayaḥ pūrvahetuprasiddhatvāt || 5 ||

That is not [genuine] doubt, since the matter has already been established by the reasons given earlier.

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि न संशयः ॥ ६ ॥

vṛttyanupapatterapi tarhi na saṁśayaḥ || 6 ||

Then indeed there is no doubt at all—because the [whole's] mode of inherence [in its parts] is impossible.

कृत्स्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः ॥ ७ ॥

kṛtsnaikadeśāvṛttitvādavayavānāmavayavyabhāvaḥ || 7 ||

Since the whole does not inhere in its parts either wholly in each part or partially distributed among them, there is no [reality of a] whole in relation to the parts.

तेषु चावृत्तेरवयव्यभावः ॥ ८ ॥

teṣu cāvṛtteravayavyabhāvaḥ || 8 ||

And since it does not inhere in them at all, the whole does not exist.

पृथक्चावयवेभ्योऽवृत्तेः ॥ ९ ॥

pṛthakcāvayavebhyo'vṛtteḥ || 9 ||

Nor does it exist separately from the parts, since there is no [relation of] inherence [to ground such separate existence].

न चावयव्यवयवाः ॥ १० ॥

na cāvayavyavayavāḥ || 10 ||

Nor are the parts, [taken together,] themselves the whole.

एकस्मिन्भेदाभावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेरप्रश्नः ॥ ११ ॥

ekasminbhedābhāvādbhedaśabdaprayogānupapatterapraśnaḥ || 11 ||

Since there is no internal difference within a single [entity], the application of the term 'difference' [between whole and parts] is untenable; hence this is not a [valid] question at all.

अवयवान्तराभावेऽप्यवृत्तेरहेतुः ॥ १२ ॥

avayavāntarābhāve'pyavṛtterahetuḥ || 12 ||

Even where there are no further parts [to consider], [the argument from] non-inherence is not a valid reason [to deny the whole's existence].

केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥ १३ ॥

keśasamūhe taimirikopalabdhivattadupalabdhiḥ || 13 ||

The perception of that [supposed whole] is like the perception of a mass of hair by one afflicted with timira [an eye-disorder that blurs and conflates distinct things into one].

स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणेन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणस्य तथाभावो नाविषये प्रवृत्तिः ॥ १४ ॥

svaviṣayānatikrameṇendriyasya paṭumandabhāvādviṣayagrahaṇasya tathābhāvo nāviṣaye pravṛttiḥ || 14 ||

Without transgressing its own proper objects, a sense-organ's grasp of its object is keen or dull according as the organ itself is keen or dull; but a sense-faculty never operates upon what is not its object.

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात् ॥ १५ ॥

avayavāvayaviprasaṅgaścaivamāpralayāt || 15 ||

And thus [if wholes are denied,] the regress of part and whole would continue right up to universal dissolution.

न प्रलयोऽणुसद्भावात् ॥ १६ ॥

na pralayo'ṇusadbhāvāt || 16 ||

There is no such regress continuing up to dissolution, because the atom—[being truly partless]—exists [as its terminus].

परं वा त्रुटेः ॥ १७ ॥

paraṁ vā truṭeḥ || 17 ||

Or is there something even more subtle than the truṭi [the smallest perceptible compound of atoms]?

आकाशव्यतिभेदात्तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ १८ ॥

ākāśavyatibhedāttadanupapattiḥ || 18 ||

Because of the pervasive interpenetration of space [into all things], that [claim of an absolutely partless ultimate unit] is untenable.

आकाशासर्वगतत्वं वा ॥ १९ ॥

ākāśāsarvagatatvaṁ vā || 19 ||

Or else it would follow, absurdly, that space is not all-pervading.

अन्तर्बहिश्च कार्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्ये तदभावः ॥ २० ॥

antarbahiśca kāryadravyasya kāraṇāntaravacanādakārye tadabhāvaḥ || 20 ||

Space is found both within and without a produced substance; but since [its presence within] is accounted for by another cause [namely the substance's own composite formation], in what is not a product [such as the eternal atom] that internal pervasion is absent.

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्वगतम् ॥ २१ ॥

śabdasaṁyogavibhavācca sarvagatam || 21 ||

And because of the diffusion of sound and of its conjunction [with the ear, occurring everywhere], space is all-pervading.

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि चाकाशधर्माः ॥ २२ ॥

avyūhāviṣṭambhavibhutvāni cākāśadharmāḥ || 22 ||

Non-obstruction, non-resistance, and all-pervasiveness are the [defining] properties of space (ākāśa).

मूर्तिमतां च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भावः ॥ २३ ॥

mūrtimatāṁ ca saṁsthānopapatteravayavasadbhāvaḥ || 23 ||

And since [their] having a definite configuration would otherwise be inexplicable, corporeal [substances of limited magnitude] must have parts.

संयोगोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २४ ॥

saṁyogopapatteśca || 24 ||

And also because otherwise conjunction [with other things] would be inexplicable.

अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ २५ ॥

anavasthākāritvādanavasthānupapatteścāpratiṣedhaḥ || 25 ||

The charge that this leads to an infinite regress, and that infinite regress is untenable, does not amount to a valid refutation.

बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ २६ ॥

buddhyā vivecanāttu bhāvānāṁ yāthātmyānupalabdhistantvapakarṣaṇe paṭasadbhāvānupalabdhivattadanupalabdhiḥ || 26 ||

But through analytical discrimination by the intellect, the true nature of things is not apprehended [as a whole separate from parts]—just as, when the threads are withdrawn one by one, the existence of the cloth [as something over and above them] is not apprehended; such is the non-apprehension of the whole.

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ २७ ॥

vyāhatatvādahetuḥ || 27 ||

But that argument is not a valid reason, since it is self-contradictory.

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्ग्रहणम् ॥ २८ ॥

tadāśrayatvādapṛthaggrahaṇam || 28 ||

Since the parts are the substrate of that whole, [the whole and its parts] are not apprehended separately.

प्रमाणतश्चार्थप्रतिपत्तेः ॥ २९ ॥

pramāṇataścārthapratipatteḥ || 29 ||

And also because the object [i.e., the whole] is indeed cognized and ascertained by a valid means of knowledge [namely perception].

प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ३० ॥

pramāṇānupapattyupapattibhyām || 30 ||

[The matter is settled] by examining both the untenability and the tenability of that supposed means of valid cognition.

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ ३१ ॥

svapnaviṣayābhimānavadayaṁ pramāṇaprameyābhimānaḥ || 31 ||

This very notion of something as a means of valid knowledge and its object may, [one could object,] be like the false conception one has of the content of a dream.

मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा ॥ ३२ ॥

māyāgandharvanagaramṛgatṛṣṇikāvadvā || 32 ||

Or it might be like a magical illusion, the phantom city of the Gandharvas, or a mirage.

हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः ॥ ३३ ॥

hetvabhāvādasiddhiḥ || 33 ||

But that thesis is unestablished, for want of any valid reason [to support it].

स्मृतिसंकल्पवच्च स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः ॥ ३४ ॥

smṛtisaṁkalpavacca svapnaviṣayābhimānaḥ || 34 ||

The false notion of the content of a dream is [explicable] like memory and mental construction—that is, it arises from past impressions and imagination, without any present real object.

मिथ्योपलब्धेर्विनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात्स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् प्रतिबोधे ॥ ३५ ॥

mithyopalabdhervināśastattvajñānātsvapnaviṣayābhimānapraṇāśavat pratibodhe || 35 ||

False perception is destroyed by true knowledge, just as the false notion of a dream's content is destroyed upon awakening.

बुद्धेश्चैवं निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात् ॥ ३६ ॥

buddheścaivaṁ nimittasadbhāvopalambhāt || 36 ||

And so too, in the case of waking cognition, [it is not like a dream,] because we observe that it has a real, present cause.

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धेर्द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः ॥ ३७ ॥

tattvapradhānabhedācca mithyābuddherdvaividhyopapattiḥ || 37 ||

And because of the distinction between the underlying substance and its predominant [sensory] element, a two-fold classification of false cognition is established.

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात् ॥ ३८ ॥

samādhiviśeṣābhyāsāt || 38 ||

[A special, extraordinary cognition arises] from the practice of special meditative concentration (samādhi).

नार्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् ॥ ३९ ॥

nārthaviśeṣaprābalyāt || 39 ||

[This special cognition is] not caused, as ordinary error is, by the predominance of a particular sense-object.

क्षुदादिभिः प्रवर्तनाच्च ॥ ४० ॥

kṣudādibhiḥ pravartanācca || 40 ||

Whereas [ordinary false cognition] is induced by such causes as hunger and the like.

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāttadutpattiḥ || 41 ||

Its arising is due to the connection with the fruit of deeds done in a former [life].

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशः ॥ ४२ ॥

araṇyaguhāpulinādiṣu yogābhyāsopadeśaḥ || 42 ||

There is instruction to practice yoga in forests, caves, riverbanks, and similar [solitary] places.

अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ ४३ ॥

apavarge'pyevaṁ prasaṅgaḥ || 43 ||

The same contingency arises even with regard to final liberation (apavarga).

न निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात् ॥ ४४ ॥

na niṣpannāvaśyambhāvitvāt || 44 ||

Not so—because for one whose [liberation] is already accomplished, no such [contingency] remains inevitable.

तदभावश्चापवर्गे ॥ ४५ ॥

tadabhāvaścāpavarge || 45 ||

And the absence of that [affliction/contingency] is precisely what liberation (apavarga) consists in.

तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चाध्यात्मविध्युपायैः ॥ ४६ ॥

tadarthaṁ yamaniyamābhyāmātmasaṁskāro yogāccādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ || 46 ||

For that purpose [of liberation], the self is refined through the observances of yama and niyama, and through yoga—by means of the prescribed methods of inner spiritual discipline.

Note: Source (Sanskrit Wikisource) prints this sutra with the number ४६ (46), duplicating the immediately following sutra's printed number — a genuine manuscript/transcription numbering defect in the source, not a counting error introduced here. Resolved via this project's established policy of using clean sequential position-numbering as ground truth when the source's own printed numbers conflict.

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासस्तद्विद्यैश्च सह संवादः ॥ ४७ ॥

jñānagrahaṇābhyāsastadvidyaiśca saha saṁvādaḥ || 47 ||

[Self-cultivation is furthered by] the practice of acquiring knowledge, and by discussion together with those who are learned in it.

Note: Source (Sanskrit Wikisource) prints this sutra with the number ४६ (46), duplicating the immediately preceding sutra's printed number — a genuine manuscript/transcription numbering defect in the source, not a counting error introduced here. Resolved via this project's established policy of using clean sequential position-numbering as ground truth when the source's own printed numbers conflict.

तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोऽर्थिभिरनसूयुभिरभ्युपेयात् ॥ ४८ ॥

taṁ śiṣyagurusabrahmacāriviśiṣṭaśreyo'rthibhiranasūyubhirabhyupeyāt || 48 ||

One should approach him [the person of knowledge]—whether as a disciple, a teacher [among peers], a fellow-student, or one seeking the highest good—provided one is free from envy and malice.

प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे ॥ ४९ ॥

pratipakṣahīnamapi vā prayojanārthamarthitve || 49 ||

Or one may approach even someone who offers no counter-thesis [to debate], for a [further] purpose, when there is a genuine desire to know.

तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् ॥ ५० ॥

tattvādhyavasāyasaṁrakṣaṇārthaṁ jalpavitaṇḍe vījaprarohasaṁrakṣaṇārthaṁ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat || 50 ||

For the sake of safeguarding one's own ascertainment of truth, jalpa [debate aimed at victory] and vitaṇḍā [mere cavil, debate without upholding a counter-thesis] are undertaken—just as a fence of thorny branches is built to protect a sprouting seed.

ताभ्यां विगृह्य कथनम् ॥ ५१ ॥

tābhyāṁ vigṛhya kathanam || 51 ||

By means of those two [jalpa and vitaṇḍā], one should engage in adversarial debate—[as a defensive means to protect the honest pursuit of truth, not as an end in itself].

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमाः ॥ १ ॥

sādharmyavaidharmyotkarṣāpakarṣavarṇyāvarṇyavikalpasādhyaprāptyaprāptiprasaṅgapratidṛṣṭāntānutpattisaṁśayaprakaraṇahetvarthāpattyaviśeṣopapattyupalabdhyanupalabdhinityānityakāryasamāḥ || 1 ||

[The twenty-four jātis are:] sādharmyasama (the parity based on mere similarity), vaidharmyasama (the parity based on mere dissimilarity), utkarṣasama (the parity based on imputed excess), apakarṣasama (the parity based on imputed deficiency), varṇyasama (the parity based on treating the qualificand as the example), avarṇyasama (the parity based on treating the non-qualificand as the subject), vikalpasama (the parity based on mere alternation), sādhyasama (the parity based on treating the example itself as needing proof), prāptisama (the parity based on the reason's contact with the probandum), aprāptisama (the parity based on the reason's non-contact), prasaṅgasama (the parity based on infinite regress), pratidṛṣṭāntasama (the parity based on a counter-example), anutpattisama (the parity based on the logical non-origination of the cause), saṁśayasama (the parity based on induced doubt), prakaraṇasama (the parity based on an alleged open question), hetusama/ahetusama (the parity based on the charge that 'the reason is no reason'), arthāpattisama (the parity based on presumption), aviśeṣasama (the parity based on an alleged non-distinction), upapattisama (the parity based on an equally available rationale), upalabdhisama (the parity based on continued apprehension despite the absence of the stated cause), anupalabdhisama (the parity based on non-apprehension), nityasama (the parity based on imputed eternality), anityasama (the parity based on imputed non-eternality), and kāryasama (the parity based on diversity of effect). [These are the twenty-four futile rejoinders (jāti).]

Note: This sutra is confirmed to enumerate all 24 traditional jāti-names in the classical order (as promised at 1.1.1 / 1.2.18-20). Note: the compound gives 'hetu' (not 'ahetu') at this point via sandhi, but the defining sutras (17-19) explicitly use the term 'ahetusama' for this same jāti; both names are given here to track that variant.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यसमौ ॥ २ ॥

sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāmupasaṁhāre taddharmaviparyayopapatteḥ sādharmyavaidharmyasamau || 2 ||

When [the proponent's] application [of the example to the thesis] is made through similarity or dissimilarity, since the opposite property [could equally well] be shown to hold, [there arise] the sādharmyasama and vaidharmyasama [rejoinders].

गोत्वाद्गोसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३ ॥

gotvādgosiddhivattatsiddhiḥ || 3 ||

Just as, from cowness [as the specific, relevant reason], the establishing of a cow follows, so must the establishing of [any] thesis [proceed — through a genuinely relevant connecting property, not through mere resemblance].

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाच्चोत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यसमाः ॥ ४ ॥

sādhyadṛṣṭāntayordharmavikalpādubhayasādhyatvāccotkarṣāpakarṣavarṇyāvarṇyavikalpasādhyasamāḥ || 4 ||

Because properties can be optionally assigned between the thesis-subject and the example [in either direction], and because both [the subject and the example] would then equally stand in need of proof, [there arise] the utkarṣasama, apakarṣasama, varṇyasama, avarṇyasama, vikalpasama, and sādhyasama [rejoinders].

Note: This sutra bundles six related jātis (jāti-types 3-8 in the master list of sutra 1) under one description, since all six arise from the same tactic of shifting properties between the example and the thesis-subject.

किंचित्साधर्म्यादुपसंहारसिद्धेर्वैधर्म्यादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ ॥

kiṁcitsādharmyādupasaṁhārasiddhervaidharmyādapratiṣedhaḥ || 5 ||

Since the application [of the example to the thesis] is validly established through some [specific, relevant] similarity — and likewise [may proceed] through [relevant] dissimilarity — [an objection raised merely by pointing to some other, irrelevant] similarity or dissimilarity is not a [genuine] refutation.

साध्यातिदेशाच्च दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

sādhyātideśācca dṛṣṭāntopapatteḥ || 6 ||

And because the [scope of the] probandum has already been delimited [at the very outset of the inference], the example is thereby rendered appropriate [only with respect to that specific relevant property — so incidental resemblance elsewhere does not vitiate it].

प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्याविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्यासाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ ॥ ७ ॥

prāpya sādhyamaprāpya vā hetoḥ prāptyāviśiṣṭatvādaprāptyāsādhakatvācca prāptyaprāptisamau || 7 ||

[The objection]: 'The reason, whether it reaches [i.e., is in identity/contact with] the probandum or does not reach it, is in the first case no different [from the probandum, hence redundant], and in the second case incapable of proving anything [being unconnected]' — [these are] the prāptisama and aprāptisama [rejoinders].

घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात्पीडने चाव्यभिचारादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ८ ॥

ghaṭādiniṣpattidarśanātpīḍane cāvyabhicārādapratiṣedhaḥ || 8 ||

Since we observe that effects such as a pot are produced [through instruments that need not identically merge with the effect], and since in a case like pressing [oil-seeds] there is no deviation [in the causal relation even without literal 'contact' in the objector's sense], [the prāpti/aprāpti objection] is not a [valid] refutation.

दृष्टान्तस्य कारणानपदेशात्प्रत्यवस्थानाच्च प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ प्रदीपोपादानप्रसङ्गविनिवृत्तिवत्तद्विनिवृत्तिः ॥ ९ ॥

dṛṣṭāntasya kāraṇānapadeśātpratyavasthānācca pratidṛṣṭāntena prasaṅgapratidṛṣṭāntasamau pradīpopādānaprasaṅgavinivṛttivattadvinivṛttiḥ || 9 ||

Because no independent cause/proof is stated for [the property asserted of] the example itself [threatening an infinite regress], and because [the opponent] counters [it] by means of a counter-example — [these are] the prasaṅgasama and pratidṛṣṭāntasama [rejoinders]. [But such a regress] is terminated just as the [apparent] regress in lighting one lamp from another, and that from a further one, is [eventually] terminated.

Note: The lamp-from-lamp analogy is read here as Nyaya's own point (the regress is not vicious — it terminates), consistent with the standard reading of this sutra as a reply rather than a further restatement of the objection; flagging as an interpretive choice given the sutra's terseness.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे च नाहेतुर्दृष्टान्तः ॥ १० ॥

pratidṛṣṭāntahetutve ca nāheturdṛṣṭāntaḥ || 10 ||

And even when a counter-example is put forward as if it were itself a reason, this does not thereby deprive the [proponent's original] example of its probative force.

प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः ॥ ११ ॥

prāgutpatteḥ kāraṇābhāvādanutpattisamaḥ || 11 ||

[The objection]: 'Prior to [the effect's] origination, there is [as yet] no cause [properly so called, since a cause is defined only in relation to its effect — so the reason cannot function]' — [this is] the anutpattisama [rejoinder].

तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः ॥ १२ ॥

tathābhāvādutpannasya kāraṇopapatterna kāraṇapratiṣedhaḥ || 12 ||

Because, by virtue of possessing that [causal] nature, a cause is properly established in relation to what has [actually] originated, there is no [valid] refutation of [the proponent's use of] the cause [merely by pointing to the moment prior to origination].

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरैन्द्रियकत्वे समाने नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यात् संशयसमः ॥ १३ ॥

sāmānyadṛṣṭāntayoraindriyakatve samāne nityānityasādharmyāt saṁśayasamaḥ || 13 ||

[The objection]: 'Since the universal [being proved eternal] and the example are alike in being perceptible by the senses, and both resemble both eternal and non-eternal things, [this shared resemblance should instead produce] doubt [as to which the universal really is]' — [this is] the saṁśayasama [rejoinder].

साधर्म्यात्संशये न संशयो वैधर्म्यादुभयथा वा संशयेऽत्यन्तसंशयप्रसङ्गो नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमाच्च सामान्यस्याप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

sādharmyātsaṁśaye na saṁśayo vaidharmyādubhayathā vā saṁśaye'tyantasaṁśayaprasaṅgo nityatvānabhyupagamācca sāmānyasyāpratiṣedhaḥ || 14 ||

If doubt arose merely from similarity, that would not really be [grounds for genuine] doubt; and if it arose from dissimilarity, or from both, it would lead to the absurdity of endless, universal doubt [about everything]. Moreover, since [the proponent] has not [even] conceded that [the universal's] eternality [is to be re-settled by this consideration], there is no [valid] refutation regarding the universal.

उभयसाधर्म्यात्प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसमः ॥ १५ ॥

ubhayasādharmyātprakriyāsiddheḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ || 15 ||

[The objection]: 'Since [the matter under dispute] is similarly resembled by both [alternatives], either conclusion could equally be established — so the matter is still genuinely open [i.e., merely at issue]' — [this is] the prakaraṇasama [rejoinder].

प्रतिपक्षात्प्रकरणसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेः ॥ १६ ॥

pratipakṣātprakaraṇasiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ pratipakṣopapatteḥ || 16 ||

Since a matter is properly called 'an open question' (prakaraṇa) only when a [genuinely established] counter-thesis exists, the [prakaraṇasama] refutation does not hold [by mere assertion] — because it too requires that a counter-thesis actually be established [by proper means, which the objector has not done].

त्रैकाल्यानुपपत्तेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः ॥ १७ ॥

traikālyānupapatterhetorahetusamaḥ || 17 ||

[The objection]: 'The reason cannot exist [meaningfully in relation to the probandum] in any of the three times — prior, simultaneous, or subsequent — [therefore it is no reason at all]' — [this is] the ahetusama [rejoinder].

न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेस्त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः ॥ १८ ॥

na hetutaḥ sādhyasiddhestraikālyāsiddhiḥ || 18 ||

It is not [true] that the probandum's being established through the reason [presupposes any fixed temporal relation of the kind alleged]; hence the charge of non-establishment with respect to the three times is itself unestablished.

प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेश्च प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः ॥ १९ ॥

pratiṣedhānupapatteśca pratiṣeddhavyāpratiṣedhaḥ || 19 ||

And since, by the very same [three-time] argument, [the opponent's own act of] refutation would likewise be impossible [its own reason being subject to the identical objection], what was to be refuted [i.e., the proponent's thesis] does not [in fact] get refuted.

अर्थापत्तितः प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेरर्थापत्तिसमः ॥ २० ॥

arthāpattitaḥ pratipakṣasiddherarthāpattisamaḥ || 20 ||

[The objection]: 'By [the logic of] presumption (arthāpatti), a counter-thesis is equally established [alongside the proponent's]' — [this is] the arthāpattisama [rejoinder].

अनुक्तस्यार्थापत्तेः पक्षहानेरुपपत्तिरनुक्तत्वादनैकान्तिकत्वाच्चार्थापत्तेः ॥ २१ ॥

anuktasyārthāpatteḥ pakṣahānerupapattiranuktatvādanaikāntikatvāccārthāpatteḥ || 21 ||

If [the proponent] had actually stated [i.e., committed to] the implication that presumption is being made to yield, a charge of abandoning the thesis might apply — but since it was in fact unstated, [that charge does not apply]; and further, since [reasoning by] presumption is inconclusive [it need not yield only the opponent's implication], the arthāpattisama [objection fails].

एकधर्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गात्सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषसमः ॥ २२ ॥

ekadharmopapatteraviśeṣe sarvāviśeṣaprasaṅgātsadbhāvopapatteraviśeṣasamaḥ || 22 ||

[The objection]: 'Since [two things] share a single common property, there is no [real] distinction between them' — [this is] the aviśeṣasama [rejoinder; but it fails,] since it would entail the absurd consequence that absolutely everything is non-distinct [from everything else, given some shared property], whereas each thing has its own distinct being.

क्वचित्तद्धर्मोपपत्तेः क्वचिच्चानुपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः ॥ २३ ॥

kvacittaddharmopapatteḥ kvaciccānupapatteḥ pratiṣedhābhāvaḥ || 23 ||

Since a given property is present in some respects [or cases] and absent in others, there is no [valid] refutation [of a genuine distinction merely from a partial non-distinction].

उभयकारणोपपत्तेरुपपत्तिसमः ॥ २४ ॥

ubhayakāraṇopapatterupapattisamaḥ || 24 ||

[The objection]: 'A [plausible] rationale (upapatti) can be made out equally for both [the proponent's thesis and its opposite]' — [this is] the upapattisama [rejoinder].

उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २५ ॥

upapattikāraṇābhyanujñānādapratiṣedhaḥ || 25 ||

Since [the opponent], by offering a rationale for the counter-thesis, thereby concedes [the general legitimacy of] a reasoned ground [as valid — which is exactly what the proponent's own argument rests on] — [this jāti] is no [valid] refutation.

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलम्भादुपलब्धिसमः ॥ २६ ॥

nirdiṣṭakāraṇābhāve'pyupalambhādupalabdhisamaḥ || 26 ||

[The objection]: 'Even in the absence of the specifically stated cause, [the effect] is still observed to occur — [so the stated cause is not truly necessary]' — [this is] the upalabdhisama [rejoinder].

कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ २७ ॥

kāraṇāntarādapi taddharmopapatterapratiṣedhaḥ || 27 ||

Since that same property [i.e., effect] can also arise from a different cause [without this contradicting the proponent's claim about the cause in question], [the upalabdhisama objection] is not a [valid] refutation.

तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसमः ॥ २८ ॥

tadanupalabdheranupalambhādabhāvasiddhau tadviparītopapatteranupalabdhisamaḥ || 28 ||

[The objection]: 'When the non-existence [of something] is claimed to be established simply from its non-apprehension, the opposite [conclusion, i.e., its existence] could equally be established [by the same reasoning]' — [this is] the anupalabdhisama [rejoinder].

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ २९ ॥

anupalambhātmakatvādanupalabdherahetuḥ || 29 ||

Since [the opponent's] 'non-apprehension' [as invoked in that objection] is of the very nature of mere non-cognition [and not itself a positive, independent ground], it is no [valid] reason [and so cannot support the anupalabdhisama objection].

ज्ञानविकल्पानां च भावाभावसंवेदनादध्यात्मम् ॥ ३० ॥

jñānavikalpānāṁ ca bhāvābhāvasaṁvedanādadhyātmam || 30 ||

And [non-apprehension is not thereby discredited as a ground], since the presence and absence of the various forms of cognition are [directly] known through inner, introspective experience [i.e., one immediately knows, within oneself, when a given cognition is present or absent — so in that domain, non-apprehension is indeed a valid ground].

Note: The phrase 'adhyātmam' is terse and the exact intended scope is debated among commentators; rendered here as Nyaya affirming that non-apprehension IS a valid ground specifically for inner/cognitive states (known via introspection), closing the anupalabdhisama discussion (sutras 28-30). Flagging as an interpretive choice.

साधर्म्यात्तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः ॥ ३१ ॥

sādharmyāttulyadharmopapatteḥ sarvānityatvaprasaṅgādanityasamaḥ || 31 ||

[The objection]: 'Since, by similarity [to non-eternal things], an equal property [i.e., non-eternality] can be attributed [to anything], it would follow that everything — [including what the proponent holds to be eternal] — is non-eternal' — [this is] the anityasama [rejoinder].

साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसामर्थ्यात् ॥ ३२ ॥

sādharmyādasiddheḥ pratiṣedhāsiddhiḥ pratiṣedhyasāmarthyāt || 32 ||

Since [a conclusion drawn] merely from similarity is itself logically unestablished, the [anityasama] refutation is unestablished — because that which [the opponent] seeks to refute [i.e., the proponent's original inference] retains its own [independent, specifically relevant] probative force.

दृष्टान्ते च साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञातस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वात्तस्य चोभयथाभावान्नाविशेषः ॥ ३३ ॥

dṛṣṭānte ca sādhyasādhanabhāvena prajñātasya dharmasya hetutvāttasya cobhayathābhāvānnāviśeṣaḥ || 33 ||

And in the example, it is the property that is specifically cognized in the relation of probandum-to-probans which validly functions as the reason; and since that specific probandum-probans relation — not mere similarity — is absent in [the cases the opponent conflates], there is in fact no genuine non-distinction [between the proponent's case and what the opponent equates it with].

Note: This continues the anityasama discussion (sutras 31-32) with a further, more precise reply, rather than opening a separate jāti — the term 'aviśeṣa' here is used generically ('no [real] non-distinction'), not as a reference back to the earlier aviśeṣasama jāti of sutras 22-23.

नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः ॥ ३४ ॥

nityamanityabhāvādanitye nityatvopapatternityasamaḥ || 34 ||

[The objection]: 'Since even the eternal possesses some features of the non-eternal, eternality could, by parity, equally be attributed to the non-eternal too' — [this is] the nityasama [rejoinder].

प्रतिषेध्ये नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्येऽनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः ॥ ३५ ॥

pratiṣedhye nityamanityabhāvādanitye'nityatvopapatteḥ pratiṣedhābhāvaḥ || 35 ||

With respect to what [the opponent seeks] to refute: even granting that the eternal has some feature of the non-eternal, since non-eternality is properly and consistently established for the non-eternal [without genuine contradiction], there is no [valid] refutation [by the nityasama objection].

प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात्कार्यसमः ॥ ३६ ॥

prayatnakāryānekatvātkāryasamaḥ || 36 ||

[The objection]: 'Since effort (prayatna) [can] produce many different kinds of effects [not just the one claimed, effort cannot be fixed as the cause of any single specific effect]' — [this is] the kāryasama [rejoinder].

कार्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुपलब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

kāryānyatve prayatnāhetutvamanupalabdhikāraṇopapatteḥ || 37 ||

In the case of a different effect [arising, one might object that] effort is then not [truly] the cause — but since a further, presently unapprehended cause might [instead] plausibly account for [that different effect, this does not disprove effort's causal role in the case actually at issue].

प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः ॥ ३८ ॥

pratiṣedhe'pi samāno doṣaḥ || 38 ||

Even in [the opponent's own act of] refutation, the very same fault [that was alleged] equally applies.

सर्वत्रैवम् ॥ ३९ ॥

sarvatraivam || 39 ||

And this holds true everywhere [i.e., the same principle — that the objector's own refutation is equally liable to the fault alleged — applies uniformly across all the jātis].

प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोषवद्दोषः ॥ ४० ॥

pratiṣedhavipratiṣedhe pratiṣedhadoṣavaddoṣaḥ || 40 ||

In the counter-refutation of a refutation [i.e., when a further rejoinder is directed against the opponent's refutation], the fault [incurred] is of the same kind as the fault [that afflicted] the [original] refutation.

प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे हेतुनिर्देशे परपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात्समानो दोषः ॥ ४१ ॥

pratiṣedhaṁ sadoṣamabhyupetya pratiṣedhavipratiṣedhe samāno doṣaprasaṅgo matānujñā svapakṣalakṣaṇāpekṣopapattyupasaṁhāre hetunirdeśe parapakṣadoṣābhyupagamātsamāno doṣaḥ || 41 ||

Having [implicitly] conceded that the [original] refutation is faulty, if one then directs a counter-refutation against that refutation, the consequence is that the very same fault now applies [to oneself] — this is called matānujñā ('conceding the same fault applies to one's own position'). Likewise, in the rationale and conclusion that depend on the very definition of one's own thesis, and in the statement of the reason [for it], since one thereby concedes the same fault that was charged against the opponent's position [as applying equally to one's own] — the fault is equal [on both sides].

Note: This closing sutra formally defines matānujñā (sutras 38-41 form its build-up: the fault-in-refutation principle stated generally in 38-39, then applied to counter-refutation in 40, then named in 41).

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ॥ १ ॥

pratijñāhāniḥ pratijñāntaraṁ pratijñāvirodhaḥ pratijñāsaṁnyāso hetvantaramarthāntaraṁ nirarthakamavijñātārthamapārthakamaprāptakālaṁ nyūnamadhikaṁ punaruktamananubhāṣaṇamajñānamapratibhā vikṣepo matānujñā paryanuyojyopekṣaṇaṁ niranuyojyānuyogo'pasiddhānto hetvābhāsāśca nigrahasthānāni || 1 ||

Abandoning one's thesis (pratijñāhāni), shifting one's thesis (pratijñāntara), contradicting one's thesis (pratijñāvirodha), renouncing one's thesis (pratijñāsannyāsa), shifting one's reason (hetvantara), irrelevance (arthāntara), meaninglessness (nirarthaka), the unintelligible (avijñātārtha), the incoherent (apārthaka), the out-of-sequence (aprāptakāla), the deficient (nyūna), the redundant (adhika), repetition (punarukta), failure to repeat back (ananubhāṣaṇa), non-understanding (ajñāna), inability to respond (apratibhā), evasion (vikṣepa), admitting the opponent's point (matānujñā), overlooking a censurable point (paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa), reproaching where no fault occurred (niranuyojyānuyoga), deviating from one's own established tenet (apasiddhānta), and the pseudo-probans (hetvābhāsas) — these are the [twenty-two] points of defeat (nigrahasthānas).

Note: Master enumeration of all 22 nigrahasthānas (formal points of defeat in debate) in their fixed classical order; each is individually defined in the sutras that follow (5.2.2–5.2.24).

प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ॥ २ ॥

pratidṛṣṭāntadharmābhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte pratijñāhāniḥ || 2 ||

Conceding, with respect to one's own example, the very property found in the opponent's counter-example [in order to escape refutation] is pratijñāhāni, 'abandonment of one's thesis.'

प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्तदर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ॥ ३ ॥

pratijñātārthapratiṣedhe dharmavikalpāttadarthanirdeśaḥ pratijñāntaram || 3 ||

When one's asserted thesis is refuted, restating that very point of contention by resorting to an alternative property [i.e. redefining the thesis in different terms] is pratijñāntara, 'shifting one's thesis.'

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः ॥ ४ ॥

pratijñāhetvorvirodhaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ || 4 ||

A contradiction between one's thesis and one's own reason [such that the reason, if true, negates the thesis] is pratijñāvirodha, 'contradicting one's thesis.'

पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः ॥ ५ ॥

pakṣapratiṣedhe pratijñātārthāpanayanaṁ pratijñāsaṁnyāsaḥ || 5 ||

When one's position [pakṣa] is refuted, disowning the very point one had asserted in the thesis [claiming one never held it] is pratijñāsannyāsa, 'renouncing one's thesis.'

अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरम् ॥ ६ ॥

aviśeṣokte hetau pratiṣiddhe viśeṣamicchato hetvantaram || 6 ||

When a reason stated in general, unqualified terms is refuted, then seeking to save it by introducing a [new] qualification is hetvantara, 'shifting one's reason.'

प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् ॥ ७ ॥

prakṛtādarthādapratisambaddhārthamarthāntaram || 7 ||

A statement whose content bears no connection to the matter under discussion is arthāntara, 'irrelevance.'

वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् ॥ ८ ॥

varṇakramanirdeśavannirarthakam || 8 ||

A statement that is like a mere recitation of letters in sequence [e.g. the alphabet], conveying no sense whatsoever, is nirarthaka, 'meaninglessness.'

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम् ॥ ९ ॥

pariṣatprativādibhyāṁ trirabhihitamapyavijñātamavijñātārtham || 9 ||

A statement that, although repeated three times to the assembly and to the opponent, still remains ungrasped by them, is avijñātārtha, 'the unintelligible.'

पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमपार्थकम् ॥ १० ॥

paurvāparyāyogādapratisambaddhārthamapārthakam || 10 ||

A statement whose parts lack mutual [syntactic] connection, owing to a failure of proper before-and-after ordering among the words, is apārthaka, 'the incoherent.'

अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् ॥ ११ ॥

avayavaviparyāsavacanamaprāptakālam || 11 ||

Stating the members of the syllogism in an inverted [wrong] order is aprāptakāla, 'the out-of-sequence.'

हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् ॥ १२ ॥

hīnamanyatamenāpyavayavena nyūnam || 12 ||

A [syllogistic statement] deficient by even a single one of its required members is nyūna, 'the deficient.'

हेतूदाहरणाधिकमधिकम् ॥ १३ ॥

hetūdāharaṇādhikamadhikam || 13 ||

A statement furnished with more reasons or examples than are needed is adhika, 'the redundant.'

शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् ॥ १४ ॥

śabdārthayoḥ punarvacanaṁ punaruktamanyatrānuvādāt || 14 ||

Restating either a word or its meaning that has already been stated — except when done deliberately as an anuvāda [a resumptive repetition, e.g. for drawing a conclusion] — is punarukta, 'repetition.'

अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम् ॥ १५ ॥

arthādāpannasya svaśabdena punarvacanaṁ punaruktam || 15 ||

Stating explicitly, in so many words, a point that was already understood by implication [arthāpatti, from what had already been said] is likewise punarukta — a second form of 'repetition.'

Note: Gives the second sub-variety of punarukta (repetition), continuing directly from 5.2.14 rather than introducing a new nigrahasthāna; the master list at 5.2.1 counts punarukta as a single item among the 22, so this does not affect the overall count.

विज्ञातस्य परिषदा त्रिरभिहितस्याप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुभाषणम् ॥ १६ ॥

vijñātasya pariṣadā trirabhihitasyāpyapratyuccāraṇamananubhāṣaṇam || 16 ||

Failing to repeat back a point that has already been understood by the assembly, even though it was stated as many as three times [and repetition was called for], is ananubhāṣaṇa, 'failure to repeat back.'

अविज्ञातं चाज्ञानम् ॥ १७ ॥

avijñātaṁ cājñānam || 17 ||

And [where a point stated] simply is not understood [by oneself at all], that is ajñāna, 'non-understanding.'

उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा ॥ १८ ॥

uttarasyāpratipattirapratibhā || 18 ||

The inability to produce a reply [rejoinder] is apratibhā, 'inability to respond.'

कार्यव्यासङ्गात्कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः ॥ १९ ॥

kāryavyāsaṅgātkathāvicchedo vikṣepaḥ || 19 ||

Breaking off the debate under the pretext of [being occupied with] other business is vikṣepa, 'evasion.'

स्वपक्षे दोषाभ्युपगमात्परपक्षे दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ॥ २० ॥

svapakṣe doṣābhyupagamātparapakṣe doṣaprasaṅgo matānujñā || 20 ||

Admitting a fault in one's own position, such that the same fault then applies equally to the opponent's position [and one is thereby forced to grant it], is matānujñā, 'admitting the opponent's point.'

निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्यानिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ॥ २१ ॥

nigrahasthānaprāptasyānigrahaḥ paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam || 21 ||

Failing to point out [reproach the opponent for] a point of defeat that has actually occurred is paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa, 'overlooking a censurable point.'

अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥ २२ ॥

anigrahasthāne nigrahasthānābhiyogo niranuyojyānuyogaḥ || 22 ||

Charging the opponent with a point of defeat where none has actually occurred is niranuyojyānuyoga, 'reproaching where no fault occurred.'

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यानियमात्कथाप्रसङ्गोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ २३ ॥

siddhāntamabhyupetyāniyamātkathāprasaṅgo'pasiddhāntaḥ || 23 ||

Having accepted [and declared] an established tenet of one's own school, then conducting the debate without adhering to it — i.e. arguing inconsistently with one's own accepted doctrine — is apasiddhānta, 'deviating from one's own established tenet.'

हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः ॥ २४ ॥

hetvābhāsāśca yathoktāḥ || 24 ||

And the hetvābhāsas — the pseudo-probans [fallacious reasons] — are, [as points of defeat,] just as already described [in Book One, 1.2.4–9].

Note: This is the final sutra of the entire Nyaya Sutras. It closes the text with a cross-reference back to the hetvābhāsa (pseudo-probans) definitions given at 1.2.4–9, completing the enumeration of the 22 nigrahasthānas begun at 5.2.1.